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This thesis examines how the idea of Socialism was remade in Britain 
during the 1880s. It does so with reference to the two figures most 
receptive to the work of Karl Marx, H. M. Hyndman and E. B. Bax. It 
argues that, despite the progress made in others areas of the history of 
British Socialism, the historiography on Hyndman and Bax is still marred 
by the influence of Friedrich Engels. It demonstrates that the terms 
‘Marxist’ and ‘Marxism’ are anachronisms. It shows that ‘Marxism’ was an 
invented intellectual tradition. It argues therefore that it is a mistake to 
take its existence for granted at the outset of the period. It shows instead 
how Hyndman and Bax interpreted Marx over time, with and without 
Engels’s mediation. It reveals, firstly, that Hyndman was not the Tory 
Radical of historical repute, and Bax, secondly, was one of the most 
serious internal critics of ‘Marxism’ of his generation, who did battle with 
Engels in print. The chapters on Hyndman reveal a fuller cast of 
characters than historians have usually been apt to acknowledge. For 
instance, Giuseppe Mazzini, Henry Fawcett, William Cunningham, John 
Morley, W. H. Mallock, and Arnold Toynbee all feature prominently. The 
chapters on Bax also reveal previously unacknowledged affinities: most 
importantly, perhaps, Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill. What also 
becomes apparent is the substantially different set of sources to those 
customarily proposed that at once both informed and facilitated the 
passage of modern British Socialist thought: briefly, the ‘culture of 
altruism’ that flourished among intellectuals from the 1850s to the 1880s, 
the rise of historical economics, the discourse of democratic Teutonism 
and the invention of primitive society, Comtian Positivism, and political 
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‘The truth is this: during the period of England’s industrial monopoly the 
English working-class have, to a certain extent, shared in the benefits of the 
monopoly... And that is the reason why, since the dying-out of Owenism, 
there has been no Socialism in England.’1 This was the view propounded by 
Friedrich Engels in an article written for Commonweal, the recently 
established newspaper of the Socialist League, in 1885. In 1892, Engels 
reproduced the content of that article, in full, in the preface to a new 
English edition of his youthful account of the consequences of the 
‘industrial revolution’, The Condition of the Working Class in England.  
Overall, Engels believed that the conclusions arrived at in his journalistic 
assessment of ‘England in 1845 and in 1885’ still held good; he had, he 
insisted, at that later date, ‘but little to add.’2 Yet, despite Engels’s obvious 
reticence, among the utterances that he did in fact join to his previous 
effort, in the final three paragraphs of the preface turned over to that task, 
he included a qualification of some considerable moment: ‘Needless to say’, 
he acknowledged, in an almost reluctant tone, ‘that today there is indeed 
“Socialism again in England”, and plenty of it – Socialism of all shades: 
Socialism conscious and unconscious, Socialism prosaic and poetic, 
Socialism of the working-class and of the middle-class, for verily, that 
abomination of abominations, Socialism, has not only become respectable, 
but has actually donned evening dress and lounges lazily on drawing-room 
causeuses.’3 
                                                          
1 Friedrich Engels, The Condition of the Working Class in England (London, 
Panther, 1969), p. 34. 




Engels’s post-hoc proviso was no overstatement. By 1892, Socialism 
had indeed re-entered intellectual and political life in Britain in earnest. For 
example, besides the presence of various groups organised with the explicit 
aim of realising their respective visions of Socialism – the Fabian Society, 
the Social Democratic Federation, and the Socialist League – some of the 
most notable political and literary figures of the period were also busy 
issuing favourable pronouncements about its positive characteristics, or 
even adopting, for the first time, the word Socialist as a self-designative 
term: with uneven degrees of enthusiasm, Joseph Chamberlain, Charles 
Dilke, and Oscar Wilde all fall under the first head, while Frederic Harrison 
can be taken as an illustration for the second.4 It is, to be sure, impossible to 
tell if Engels had him in mind for the part, but if Wilde is the ideal-typical 
candidate for the role of Socialism clad in evening dress, lounging lazily on 
drawing-room causeuses, then Sidney Webb and William Morris neatly 
fulfil the same function for Socialism in its prosaic and poetic shades. In the 
same manner, if Socialism of the working-class was most clearly 
represented in Britain by a figure like John Burns or Will Thorne (in 
Engels’s imagination at least), then the Fabian Society epitomised its 
middle-class equivalent.5 In a telling comparison, at the same time as Burns 
and Thorne were assuming important leadership roles in the ‘New 
Unionism’ at the end of the 1880s, the Fabians were preoccupied instead 
with the notion of ‘permeating’ the Liberal Party, and maintained a 
                                                          
4 Joseph Chamberlain, ‘Favorable Aspects of State Socialism’, The North American 
Review, 152 (Jan. 1891), pp. 534-548. Charles Dilke, ‘A Radical Programme. Part I’, 
The New Review, 3/14 (Jul. 1890), pp. 1-14. Oscar Wilde, ‘The Soul of Man Under 
Socialism’, Fortnightly Review, 49/340 (Feb. 1891), pp. 292-319. Frederic 
Harrison, ‘Moral and Religious Socialism’, New Year’s Address at Newton Hall, 1 
Jan. 1891, reprinted in National and Social Problems (London, Macmillan & co, 
1908), pp. 440-462.  
5 Tristram Hunt, The Frock-Coated Communist. The Life and Times of the Original 
Champagne Socialist (London, Penguin, 2010), p. 334. 
8 
 
disdainful pose as to the suitability of the ‘New Unions’ to operate as a 
vehicle of change.6 
By contrast, Engels showed no hesitation in affirming his support 
for the ‘New Unionism’. Indeed, his recognition of the movement’s 
significance constituted a second, and final, caveat to the analysis presented 
in his article of seven years previous. In fact, this second caveat, for Engels, 
was of far greater importance than the first: for neither the ‘momentary 
fashion among bourgeois circles of affecting a mild dilution of Socialism’, 
nor even ‘the actual progress Socialism has made in England generally,’ 
could match in terms of political magnitude ‘the revival of the East End of 
London.’7 Needless to say, this was a profoundly partial interpretation. 
Clearly, when Engels invoked the notion of Socialism unconscious he meant 
the so-called ‘revival of the East End’. But the idea that unconscious 
Socialism was operative in Britain already had a substantial and influential 
alternative history of its own: Henry Fawcett, John Morley, and Herbert 
Spencer had all argued that Socialism had acquired, unintentionally, an 
impetus from the State and reform-minded members of the ‘educated 
classes’; this was also the view of the Fabians. Engels, however, was 
dismissive of the kind of legislative action that aroused sustained and 
heated controversy among other British political commentators.8 In 
general, he was scornful of organised Socialism too. The Fabians incited his 
disdain owing to their ethos of class-neutrality.9 But the revolutionary 
                                                          
6 See Asa Briggs, ‘Introduction’, in George Bernard Shaw (ed.), Fabian Essays 
(London, George Allen & Unwin, 1962), p. 25. Sidney Webb, ‘Introduction to the 
1920 Reprint’, in Shaw (ed.), Fabian Essays, p. 272. 
7 Engels, Condition of the Working Class, p. 34. 
8 ‘It is nothing but self-interested misrepresentation… to describe as ‘socialism’ all 
interference by the state with free competition’, Engels wrote pointedly to Eduard 
Bernstein in March 1881. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works. Vol. 
46. Marx and Engels: 1880-83 (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 1992), p. 74. 
9 Engels admitted that the Fabians had ‘produced… a number of good propaganda 
pieces... But’, he added, ‘the moment they come to their own brand of tactics and 
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Socialists provoked his contempt for their naivety, or, more serious still, the 
‘doctrinaire’ assumptions that inoculated them against the ‘New Unionism’ 
– the very phenomenon, that is, that Engels looked upon as ‘one of the 
greatest and most fruitful facts of this fin de siècle.’10 
 
Despite both the extreme partiality of the position adopted by Engels, and 
the notably tenuous credibility of many of his historico-prophetic claims, 
the judgements outlined above have proven remarkably influential. In fact, 
it is no exaggeration to say that the figure of Friedrich Engels casts a very 
long shadow indeed over the historiography of Socialism in Britain. That 
influence can be seen in two principal ways. In the first of these, historians 
have typically followed Engels in his periodisation of the shifting fortunes of 
Socialism. More specifically, until only relatively recently the historiography 
had been dominated by a number of distinguished historians who actually 
reproduced – in a roundabout way – his very model of interpretation. These 
historians identified with a method of historical research ostensibly 
inaugurated by Karl Marx, which diagnosed ‘social being’ as the 
determining factor of ‘social consciousness’: that is to say, they adhered to 
the so-called ‘materialist conception of history’, or ‘historical materialism’.11  
                                                                                                                                                   
gloss over the class struggle, the rot sets in.’ Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 
Collected Works. Vol. 50. Engels: 1892-1895 (London, Lawrence & Wishart, 2004), 
p. 83. For an expression of that neutrality see George Bernard Shaw, ‘The Fabian 
Society: What it has done; and How it has done it’, Fabian Tract 41 (1892), p. 27. 
10 Engels, Condition of the Working Class, p. 35. 
11 For the historians in question Marx’s famous preface to A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy functioned as a summary of his views. It is also 
worth noting Stefan Collini’s observation that, the preface to E. P. Thompson’s 
book The Making of the English Working Class ‘has been, according to one 
thought-provoking but ultimately unverifiable assertion, the most widely read 
preface since Marx’s 1859 preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political 
Economy, the classic epitome of the theory of ‘historical materialism’. Common 
Reading. Critics, Historians, Publics (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 
176. Thompson’s interpretation of ‘historical materialism’ was, of course, atypically 
10 
 
Broadly speaking, what that meant in practice was a commitment to 
four basic beliefs. The first belief that these historians cleaved to was a 
conception of the ‘industrial revolution’ endowed with the force of a 
revolutionary event – the begetter no less of the ‘proletariat’ as Engels had 
depicted it in the work cited at the beginning of this introduction.12 The 
second belief shared in common by these historians resided in the mutual-
understanding that the period of history between the decline of Chartism 
and the ‘revival’ of Socialism necessitated an explanation as the site of a 
‘non-event’, namely the failure of the proletariat to perform the 
revolutionary role assigned to it in ‘Marxist’ theory.13 Engels attempted his 
own reconciliation of theoretical expectation and actual history with the 
concept of an ‘aristocracy of the working-class’ – and the longevity of that 
single category alone confirms the extent of the influence he exercised.14 
That said, the distinction maintained in the historiography between the 
nominally ‘utopian’ forms of Socialism and their ‘modern’ or ‘scientific’ 
Marxian successor – the third belief – provides a worthy competitor as 
                                                                                                                                                   
agent-centred. The emphasis he placed on self-activity thus distinguished his work 
from that of other proponents of ‘the materialist conception of history’. 
12 For analysis of this enduring myth see D. C. Coleman, Myth, History and the 
Industrial Revolution (London and Rio Grande, The Hambledon Press, 1992); 
David Cannadine, ‘The Present and the Past in the Industrial Revolution 1880-
1980’, Past & Present, 103/1 (1984), pp. 131-172; and Stefan Collini, ‘The Literary 
Critic and the Village Labourer: ‘Culture’ in Twentieth Century Britain’, 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 14 (2004), pp. 93-116. 
13 Christopher Kent, ‘Presence and Absence: History, Theory, and the Working 
Class’, Victorian Studies, 29/3 (1986), pp. 437-462. 
14 See Eric Hobsbawm, Labouring Men. Studies in the History of Labour (London, 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1964), Ch. 15; and, most pertinently here, Royden 
Harrison, Before the Socialists. Studies in Labour and Politics, 1861-1881 (London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), Ch. 1. Meanwhile, for a critique and a historical 
assessment of the notion see Alastair Reid, ‘Politics and Economics in the 
Formation of the British Working Class: A Response to H. F. Moorhouse’, Social 
History, 3/3 (1978), p. 347-361. There were, to be sure, other historians who 
cleaved to less obviously reductionist explanatory concepts. From the beginning of 
the 1960s, the Gramscian notion of hegemony enjoyed a considerable degree of 
popularity, for example. 
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evidence of sustained dominion.15 The first three of these beliefs are only 
tangentially related to the so-called ‘revival’ of Socialist thought in Britain 
during the 1880s – the subject of this thesis – but the final one impinges 
upon it directly: namely, the belief entertained by many of these historians 
that, in addition to the arrested development of the practical movement of 
the working-class in Britain, indigenous Socialist theory was also 
‘abnormally’ weak.16 
Until the 1980s, this remained the state of play in the historiography 
of British Socialism. During that decade, however, the project of inferring 
political affinity from social class was increasingly vacated. In its place, a 
growing number of historians began to adopt a non-referential conception 
of language, which eventually led to a new appreciation of the autonomy – 
or the primacy even – of the political as a causal category.17 Moreover, by 
the 1990s this new approach had borne considerable scholarly fruit. Yet, if 
the main beliefs informing the work of the deeply authoritative historians of 
the previous generation had been successfully extirpated, a number of 
minor factual prejudices remained, continuing to outlive the 
historiographical tradition that once sustained them. And here, too, the 
shadow of Engels is discernible. 
The second way in which Engels can be seen to exercise influence in 
the historiography of British Socialism derives from the various 
contemporaneous assessments he made of the revival’s foremost 
personalities and groups. In this instance as well, the same group of 
                                                          
15 See Gregory Claeys, ‘Non-Marxian socialism 1815-1914’, in Gareth Stedman 
Jones and Gregory Claeys (eds.), The Cambridge History of Nineteenth-Century 
Political Thought (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 524-529.  
16 Hobsbawm, Labouring Men, p. 235. 
17 See Gareth Stedman Jones’s ‘Introduction’ to Languages of Class. Studies in 
English Working Class History 1832-1982 (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), pp. 1-24. 
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historians responsible for advancing Engels’s historiographical assumptions 
and claims were also culpable of reproducing his distorted evaluation of 
British Socialism, in both its practical and theoretical forms. If the 
exponents of non-Marxian Socialism in Britain were thus promptly 
discharged as ‘uninteresting’ and ‘quite unimportant’, the Socialists most 
sympathetic to Marx were likewise condemned as ‘numerically and 
intellectually negligible’.18 This at least was the view of a number of 
exceptionally combative young historians writing for the New Left Review 
during the 1960s.19 Other historians, however, associated with a somewhat 
different tradition of ‘Marxist historiography’ (and politics) were 
considerably more cautious and less categorical in their disregard of British 
Socialist intellectuals.20 Yet Morris was the only Socialist presumed to 
identify with the tradition purportedly bequeathed by Marx to receive 
complete exoneration from the charge of intellectual bankruptcy.21 
Moreover, what was given with one hand was instantly taken away with the 
other. That is to say, the very historians responsible for the exoneration of 
                                                          
18 Tom Nairn, ‘The Nature of the Labour Party (Part 1)’, New Left Review, 1/27 
(1964), p. 44.  Eric Hobsbawm, How to Change the World. Marx and Marxism 
1840-2011 (London, Little Brown, 2011), p. 224. 
19Principally Anderson and Nairn, who gave their names to the so-called 
‘Anderson-Nairn thesis’ in the following articles: ‘Origins of the Present Crisis’, 
New Left Review, 1/23 (1964), pp. 26-53; and ‘Components of the National 
Culture’, New Left Review, 1/50 (1968), pp. 3-57 by the former; and ‘The British 
Political Elite’, New Left Review, 1/23 (1964), pp. 18-25; ‘The English Working 
Class’, New Left Review, 1/24 (1964), pp. 43-57; and the aforementioned, ‘Nature 
of the Labour Party’ and its companion essay, ‘The Nature of the Labour Party (Part 
Two)’, New Left Review, 1/28 (1964), pp. 33-62 by the latter. 
20 I deploy the term ‘intellectual’ in the knowledge that it is still fundamentally 
anachronistic to do so for the period in British history under discussion. The 
meaning conferred to it here is the relatively neutral one, suggesting only an 
individual preoccupied with ideas independent from a professional raison d'être. 
See, above all, Stefan Collini, Absent Minds. Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2007); and Peter Allen, ‘The Meanings of ‘An Intellectual’: 
Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century English Usage’, University of Toronto 
Quarterly, 55/4 (1986), pp. 342-358. 
21 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Bernard Shaw’s Socialism’, Science & Society, 11/4 (1947), p. 
324. E. P. Thompson, William Morris. Romantic to Revolutionary (London, 
Merlin Press, 1977). 
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Morris were guilty of entrenching, at the same time, Engels’s judgements of 
the other Socialists receptive to Marx even further.22 
Undoubtedly, part of the reason for this was political. Indeed, to 
revisit this section of the historiography, which roughly traversed the period 
between the formation of the Communist Party Historians Group in 1946 
and the cessation of Perry Anderson’s editorship of the New Left Review at 
the beginning of the 1980s, is to re-enter quite unfamiliar historical terrain, 
closer in its political preoccupations to the theoretical output of the subjects 
of this study than to the hermeneutic priorities of most present-day 
professional historians.23 It is no exaggeration in fact to suggest that they 
belong to the same continuous history: namely, the history of the career of 
‘Marxism’ in Britain. The anachronistic set of pre-judgements that these 
historians extraneously carried into their historical scholarship about what 
it meant to be a ‘Marxist’ precluded, in short, a properly dispassionate 
appraisal. 
With the exception of Morris, the reputations of those present at the 
foundation of ‘Marxism’ during the 1880s have not fared well. Indeed, the 
reputations of the two most important figures involved in the reception of 
Marx’s ideas, Henry Mayers Hyndman and Ernest Belfort Bax, have fared 
notably badly. If the former was never permitted to recover from the 
                                                          
22 While Hobsbawm, for instance, granted in one breath the ‘really interesting and 
original contributions to Marxist theory in these islands’ from Morris and James 
Connolly, in the next he imperiously dismissed Bax as a ‘cranky’ author of ‘pioneer 
Marxist histories’. Labouring Men, p. 234. Thompson, similarly, dealt summarily 
with Bax, spurning his ‘sudden fits of utter abstraction’, his ‘completely unpractical 
cast of mind’, and his ‘essential lack of proportion’. ‘His best work was done’, he 
concluded, ‘when Morris was at his elbow to bring him down to earth with a bang 
out of his naive ruminations.’ William Morris, p. 373. 
23 See Dennis L. Dworkin, Cultural Marxism in Postwar Britain. History, the New 
Left, and the Origins of Cultural Studies (Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 
1997), which incorporates the history of the Communist Party Historians Group. 
For more compressed histories of the British New Left see Lin Chun, The British 
New Left (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1993); and Michael Kenny, The 




unyielding attitude of antipathy shown towards him by Engels, the latter 
was sentenced to obscurity for his apparently heterodox views. In any case, 
their basic unreliability was confirmed by the support shown by both men 
for the British State during the First World War, and – even more 
unforgivably perhaps – by their shared opposition to the ‘Bolshevist regime 
in Russia’.24 Between them, they had created, in short, an intellectual and 
political space not only on the wrong side of Engels, but on the wrong side 
of Vladimir Lenin too, the other ‘official’ heir to the Marxian heritage.25 
Needless to say, in the context of the politically supercharged historical 
scholarship of the Cold War era, this was an exceptionally unfortunate 
position to occupy. It was a handicap from which neither Hyndman nor Bax 
ever really recovered. For, when the purchase of ‘historical materialism’ and 
its attendant categories finally began to deteriorate in the 1980s, the 
interest in ‘Marxism’ and its own internal history deteriorated with it. As 
other historians stepped into the breach to champion some of the long-
ignored personalities and thinkers associated with Socialism during the 
1880s, that relationship of neglect was not expunged. It was simply 
inverted. Hence the familiar, politically determined, characterisations of 
Hyndman and Bax passed down from Engels were imported, unaltered, to 
provide ambience for a series of much more unfamiliar vignettes. 
One step forward two steps back may not be the most apt 
description of this historiographical breakthrough; but the statement two 
                                                          
24 Ernest Belfort Bax, ‘Two Bolshevist Intellectuals’, Justice, (Aug. 26, 1920), p. 7. 
Hyndman articulated his dislike of Bolshevism succinctly in The Evolution of 
Revolution (London, Twentieth Century Press, 1921), Ch. 33. For Bax and 
Hyndman’s shared opposition to ‘Prussian militarist ambition’, meanwhile, during 
the First World War see the article they penned together, ‘Socialism, Materialism 
and the War’, The English Review (Dec. 1914), pp. 52-69. 
25 In a review essay in 1911, Lenin described Hyndman’s autobiography as ‘the life 
story of a British bourgeois philistine who, being the pick of his class, finally makes 
his way to socialism, but never completely throws off bourgeois traditions, 
bourgeois views and prejudices.’ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works. Vol. 17 (London, 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1963), p. 309. 
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steps forward one step back may well contain more than just a sizable grain 
of truth in it. For if the lopsidedness of the historiography had only been 
reversed, rather than set fully aright, what had been achieved was a partial 
recovery of the exceptionally rich array of non-Marxian Socialist ideas 
generated during the 1880s.26 Taken together, the so-called linguistic turn 
in social history and the renewed interest in some of the forgotten voices of 
fin de siècle Socialism illuminated new ways in which the ‘revival’ of 
Socialism in Britain might be re-narrated. Whatever that entailed precisely 
remained to be resolved. But one thing at least seemed reasonably certain:  
the portrait of British Socialism that Engels had sketched, or completed 
rather, in 1892 was ineradicably flawed. Modern historians, in 
consequence, would have to return to the drawing board anew. 
 
It is fair to say that by the 1990s the major conceptual fallacies engendered 
by Engels had been largely expunged from the historiography of British 
Socialism. As we have seen, however, that did not prevent the phenomenon 
of certain more minor prejudices persisting. This was most obviously the 
case, and by and large remains so, as far as the Social Democratic 
Federation and its leading intellectuals were concerned. Yet, those rather 
careless, secondary distortions were by no means the only fossils left over. 
Other, considerably more important, relics, too, retained a place in the 
historiography. And, even now, they continue to impair how the history of 
Socialism during the 1880s is understood. 
The first of these deposits is essentially linguistic. It is also more 
equivocal than the second, insofar as its impression is injurious. Shorn of its 
                                                          
26 Ruth Livesey’s, Socialism, Sex, and the Culture of Aestheticism in Britain, 1880-
1914 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), in particular, takes this section of the 
historiography to a new level of sophistication. 
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previous, pronounced theoretical load, the development of organised 
Socialism during the final two decades of the nineteenth century is still 
customarily described as a ‘revival’.27 As we have already seen, the concept 
of a ‘revival’ was first given currency by Engels. In the opening quotation of 
this introduction, Engels suggested that ‘since the dying out of Owenism’ 
Socialism had been conspicuously absent in Britain; and it had not 
returned, he added, until the 1880s. Taking these utterances to have a 
strictly numerical meaning, Engels, to be sure, may well have had a point. It 
is certainly true that the Christian Socialists around Frederick Denison 
Maurice, John Ludlow, and Charles Kingsley numbered very few; the Guild 
of St. Matthew, founded by Stewart Headlam in 1877, was similarly modest 
in size; and John Stuart Mill’s self-description as a Socialist in his 
Autobiography was also a singular affair, showing few signs of 
simulation.28 Clearly, then, given the breadth of support that Socialism 
enjoyed during the 1830s, by contrast, and again in the 1880s, there is 
nothing intrinsically wrong in using the term ‘revival’.29 If, however, that is 
what is implied by most modern historians, Engels, on the other hand, had 
a quite different association in mind from this, somewhat insipid, 
numerical connection. 
                                                          
27 See, for example, Gregory Claeys, Imperial Sceptics. British Critics of Empire, 
1850-1920 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 124; Ruth Kinna, 
William Morris. The Art of Socialism (Cardiff, Cardiff University Press, 2000), p. 
88; and Jon Lawrence, ‘Popular Radicalism and the Socialist Revival in Britain’, 
Journal of British Studies, 31/2 (1992), pp. 163-186, three texts singularly free 
from any of the assumptions historically attendant upon its usage. 
28 For the history of Christian Socialism see Edward R. Norman, The Victorian 
Christian Socialists (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Peter d’A 
Jones, The Christian Socialist Revival, 1877-1914. Religion, Class, and Social 
Conscience in Late-Victorian England (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 
1968). John Stuart Mill, Autobiography (London, Penguin, 1989), p. 175. The 
historiography on Mill’s relationship to Socialism is expounded in fn. 188. 
29 For the numerical support Owenism enjoyed in Britain in the 1830s see J. F. C. 
Harrison, Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain and America. The Quest for 
the New Moral World (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), pp. 195-232. 
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That Engels appealed to Owenism at all in this context was actually 
something of an anomaly. For Owenism performed much the same role in 
his assessment of Socialism in Britain during the 1830s and forties, as 
organised Socialism and its so-called bourgeois hangers-on did in the 
1880s. That is to say, each was considered comparatively trivial. In the 
same way as organised Socialism counted for little next to the rise of the 
‘New Unionism’, Owenism was an episode of merely incidental proportions 
when juxtaposed to Chartism. According to Engels, Socialism was not an 
‘accidental discovery by this or that intellect of genius’, much less still, of 
some other more diminutive order of mind; Socialism, rather, was the 
‘necessary outcome of the struggle between two classes produced by history 
– the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.’30 More precisely, ‘Modern Socialism’ 
was ‘nothing but the reflex in thought’ of the ‘conflict between productive 
forces and mode of production’, ‘its ideal reflection in the minds of above all 
the class directly suffering under it, the working class.’31 Thus, if the 
Socialism embodied in both Chartism and the ‘New Unionism’ was of a 
characteristically unconscious stripe, it was no less real for its lack of 
articulate expression. On the contrary, these movements, as class 
movements, were symptomatic of ‘true proletarian Socialism’.32 
This, then, in essence, was what Engels meant when he spoke of a 
revival of Socialism. It goes without saying that this will no longer do. On a 
simple historical level, Engels’s declaration of identity between the 
movements cited above and Socialism is erroneous. It is now widely agreed, 
for example, that Chartism was not a premonition of Socialism, but the 
expression rather of ‘a radical critique of society, which had enjoyed an 
                                                          
30 Frederick Engels, Socialism. Utopian and Scientific (London, Bookmarks, 1993), 
p. 84. 
31 Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
32 Engels, Condition of the Working Class, p. 263. 
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almost continuous existence since the 1760s and 1770s.’33 Similarly, the 
‘New Unionism’ was far less promising political terrain than Engels had 
suggested: the Dockers accepted leaders like John Burns and Tom Mann, 
‘not because of their socialism but in spite of it.’34 Moreover, substituting 
Owenism for Chartism (reverting, that is, to a numerical connection) does 
little to resolve the problem. Robert Owen and his followers may have called 
themselves Socialists, but if that is where the kinship begins it ends sharply 
there too.35 However much they owed to the Owenites themselves, the 
influence exercised by Mill and the Christian Socialists was of far greater 
consequence for the following generation than the ideas and example 
provided by the community-builders that preceded them.36 Engels 
marginalized these mid-century Socialists for a reason. Simply stated, they 
did not cohere with his own exacting, if also notably vague, definition of 
Socialism. However, in the absence of the deeply felt political imperatives 
that once governed much of the scholarship, it clearly no longer makes 
sense to follow his lead in making the same omission. 
 
The fact that it never did make sense to cleave to such a stipulative 
definition provides one of the keynotes to Mark Bevir’s recent history of 
Socialism in late-nineteenth century Britain. He also provides there the first 
real attempt to displace the timeworn terminology of a Socialist ‘revival’. It 
is, of course, a somewhat lamentable situation when it still must be 
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forcefully insisted upon that ‘Socialism has no necessary core.’37 
Nonetheless, that task is performed by Bevir dexterously. Socialism, he 
quite rightly averred, is not a determinate idea, but ‘a fluid set of beliefs and 
practices that people are constantly making and remaking’.38  It is only 
unfortunate that Bevir opted to afford priority to the former description 
instead of the latter. For in deliberately adopting the Thompsonian locution 
of ‘making’ in place of the teleological or simply assumption-laden ‘revival’, 
the 1880s and 1890s thus becomes the period in which Socialism was 
made. However, while it is certainly true that a plurality of new Socialisms 
were indeed made in the timeframe established by Bevir, it remains the case 
that remaking is still the more apposite term. For, if the first 
unintentionally elides the imprint of earlier Socialisms, the second accounts 
for the continuities between the Owenite and various mid-century species 
of Socialism and their late-nineteenth century heirs. 
That Bevir’s re-description was not altogether successful is one 
thing, but that he exaggerated the novelty of his underlying approach is 
quite another. In The Making of British Socialism Bevir presented a 
bifurcated portrait of a ‘new’ historiography (sensitive to ‘language and 
ideas’) and an ‘old’ historiography (‘determinist and essentialist’ in 
character).39 In so doing, he enforced an exceptionally clumsy abridgement. 
To suggest that to ‘narrate the history of Socialism in terms of a diverse 
cluster of ideas and the traditions and dilemmas from which they emerged’ 
was a distinctly new proposition was plainly a spurious claim, even if it was 
not a wholly disingenuous one.40  Other historians, long preceding Bevir’s 
numerous efforts, had also declined to emulate the specific emphases 
                                                          
37 Mark Bevir, The Making of British Socialism (Princeton and Oxford, Princeton 
University Press, 2011), p. 13. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., pp. 6, 10. 
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embodied in ‘Marxist’ accounts, favouring instead more rigorously 
contextualist standpoints. For example, Stanley Pierson and Willard Wolfe 
both contributed nuanced analyses of late-nineteenth century British 
Socialism during the 1970s.41 Like Bevir, they too eschewed essentialist 
definitions of Socialism, downgraded the importance of the economic as a 
causal category, and stressed the considerable continuities in its 
remaking.42 That Bevir’s dichotomy between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ did not 
account for these valuable parallel histories was no mere sleight of hand, 
however, designed to accentuate his own achievements. It stemmed, rather, 
from the specific method of historical enquiry he recommended and 
deployed there – in particular, his use of ‘aggregate concepts’.43 
Clearly, Bevir’s presentation of a dualistic historiography 
suppressed the complexity that actually inhered in the scholarship. The use 
of the aggregate concepts the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ served more to obscure the 
historical record than they did to illuminate it. Nor, unfortunately, was this 
an isolated occurrence. There are further examples in which Bevir’s use of 
aggregate concepts does far more to shroud and confuse our understanding 
of the past than it does to elucidate it. Indeed, it is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that the suppression of complexity is simply a precondition of 
their use. It is, therefore, also hard not to conclude that it is a price scarcely 
worth paying for the ostensible greater narrative clarity and sense of 
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historical perspective that Bevir maintained they induce.44 Simply put, 
accuracy should, as far as possible, always override ease of explanation. 
This, of course, is by no means tantamount to calling for an extreme 
methodological nominalism. On the contrary, aggregate concepts no doubt 
have their place. It is, rather, simply to insist upon a somewhat more 
circumspect procedure of discrimination than that affected by Bevir in the 
series of analytical incisions with which he dissected the history of late-
nineteenth century British Socialism. For, in the critical judgements that he 
brought to pass in his book, the suppression of complexity is unmistakeably 
apparent. 
Nowhere is that imprudence more obvious than in Bevir’s use of the 
term ‘Marxist’. Bevir deployed it to demarcate one group of late-nineteenth 
century British Socialists from the other groups extant at the time. In itself, 
that was not of course an innovative move. The same division is ubiquitous 
in the secondary literature. Yet, notwithstanding its omnipresence, it is a 
profoundly anachronistic description. In Britain, the Socialists most 
receptive to Marx’s ideas did not describe themselves as ‘Marxists’, but self-
identified rather as Social Democrats. Moreover, the cognate term 
‘Marxism’, also used freely in this context by Bevir and other historians, is 
no less problematic. It, too, as we shall see, is equally poised to mislead. 
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Hence, in this respect, Bevir muddied the water further still, in this already 
notably stagnant recess of the historiography. For, if his use of the term 
‘Marxist’ was not unusual, the potential consequences of his decision to use 
it were certainly more pernicious, insofar as his rationalisation of the use of 
aggregate concepts provided the term with a certain philosophical 
undergirding, which it ordinarily lacked. Thus, with Bevir’s backing, these 
categories continue to undermine a historically accurate apprehension of 
the Socialist ideas circulating in Britain during the 1880s. Taken together, 
they constitute the second, and much more unequivocally harmful, deposit 
in the historiography of British Socialism invoked above. 
 
Once again, the figure of Engels looms large here: if it is not entirely 
accurate, in a strictly formal sense, to describe him as ‘the first Marxist’, it is 
certainly true to say ‘that he in some way invented Marxism’.45 In their 
present usage, neither one of these terms gained currency until the latter 
part of the 1880s.46 They were first used in a conscious and systematic way 
not by Engels, but by one of his foremost disciples, Karl Kautsky, from 1882 
onwards.47 Engels, by contrast, first speaks publicly of ‘the Marxist world 
outlook’, as opposed to just ‘scientific Socialism’, the label he typically 
deployed to describe the body of ideas apparently expounded by Marx, in 
1888. Furthermore, it does not become a habit.48 The British adherents of 
Social Democracy harboured similar linguistic preferences. They, too, 
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generally opted for the term ‘scientific Socialism’ as a way to demarcate and 
describe their ideas.49 Of course, for many late-nineteenth century 
European Socialists, these terms were mere synonyms, and could be readily 
exchanged for one another with no discernible change in meaning. For 
others, though, the term ‘scientific Socialism’ did not necessarily cohere 
exactly with the system elaborated by Engels during the 1880s. To 
categorise, therefore, these Socialists as ‘Marxists’ is not only to put the cart 
before the horse chronologically, it is also – in some cases, at least – 
ideationally misleading too. 
The words ‘Marxist’ and ‘Marxism’ were established properly in the 
European Socialist movement only after Engels’s death in 1895. They 
became entrenched during the so-called ‘revisionist crisis’.50 But the body of 
ideas denoted by the latter term had been set by Engels himself during the 
period following the publication of Anti-Dühring in 1878. As Gareth 
Stedman Jones observed, the book constituted ‘in many ways the founding 
moment of Marxism.’51 There were, however, other ancillary moments of 
importance during the early stages of the career of that invented intellectual 
tradition. The publication of Engels’s Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State, for instance, in 1884, and his Ludwig Feuerbach 
and the End of Classical German Philosophy, published in book-form four 
years later, also represented significant landmarks. Pride of place, though, 
among those further instalments goes to the graveside speech delivered by 
Engels at Marx’s funeral on 14 March 1883. Together with Anti-Dühring, 
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the transcript of that oration served to codify the interpretive framework 
from which Marx’s own ideas would thereafter be understood.52  
In contrast to forty years ago, it is now quite widely accepted that 
Marx’s ideas were adjusted or altered in the years between 1883 and 1895 
under Engels’s stewardship.53 This occurred in four crucial ways. To take 
the first three together, the conceptual triad of ‘scientific Socialism’, 
‘historical materialism’ and the ‘materialist dialectic’ were not of Marx’s 
design. Instead, these conceptual categories were created and given 
currency by Engels. Without doubt, all three of these adjustments were 
false. Yet if Engels was responsible for the labels of these categories, he was 
nevertheless applying a ‘gloss’, as Terrell Carver put it, to ideas contained, 
in potential at least, in Marx’s own work.54 The same cannot be said, 
however, of his fourth adjustment, which was much more straightforwardly 
fictitious, namely Marx’s alleged sympathy with Charles Darwin’s ideas on 
evolution, and the putative parallel between their respective intellectual 
endeavours.  
The relevance of this four-fold discrepancy for the remaking of 
British Socialism during the 1880s resides in the fact that this is how Marx’s 
ideas were gradually re-packaged and presented over the course of that 
decade. That is to say, British Socialists learnt to see Marx as the author of a 
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scientific, law-based model of historical development, with its own specific 
method of inquiry. Certainly, at the beginning of the 1880s Marx’s ideas 
had not been seen in those terms by Hyndman and Bax, the Socialists 
chiefly responsible for putting his name on the map among Radicals in 
Britain. Nor, initially, were Marx and Engels seen to inhabit a joint-identity. 
That connection was likewise created by Engels as he succeeded in recasting 
Marx’s ideas in his own positivist mould. The third person singular began to 
give way to the first person plural in Engels’s discussions of his former 
mentor’s work around 1885, thus commencing the myth of a long-standing 
working partnership between the two men concerning matters of theory.55 
The British Socialists attracted to Marx also learnt, consequently, to see it 
that way. 
 
The precise subject of this thesis is how the idea of Socialism was remade in 
Britain by the figures most receptive to Marx’s work during the 1880s. 
Chapters 1, 2, and 3 focus on Hyndman’s conversion to Socialism between 
1880 and 1881. They situate him against a backdrop of discussion of 
Socialism in the periodical press and the preoccupations of other 
contemporary Radicals. They chart how Hyndman initially viewed Marx’s 
ideas, unmediated by Engels, and how he combined them with other 
sources. The same task is performed for Bax in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 returns 
to Hyndman’s interaction with Marx’s thought in 1883, with Engels now 
exercising considerable influence in how he did so. Chapter 6 documents 
how Hyndman engaged with domestic political arguments. Chapters 7, 8, 9, 
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10 and 11 then pick up on Bax’s mature engagement with Marx under 
Engels’s tutelage. In combination, they elaborate the context from which 
Bax issued his theoretical contributions from 1884 to 1892, and illumine 
how he variously echoed and sought to combat a number of extant 
intellectual currents.  
 If the chapters on Hyndman reveal a fuller cast of characters than 
historians have usually been apt to acknowledge – Henry Fawcett, William 
Cunningham, John Morley, W. H. Mallock, and Arnold Toynbee to name 
only a few – then the chapters on Bax also reveal previously 
unacknowledged affinities: most importantly, perhaps, Herbert Spencer 
and John Stuart Mill. They divulge, additionally, a serious critique of 
Engels. So far from being ‘abnormally’ weak, what emerges is that Bax’s 
Socialist theory wrestled with many of the problems identified by mid- to 
late-twentieth century critics of Marxism working broadly within the same 
tradition. Some of those parallels are taken up in the conclusion. But what 
also becomes apparent is the substantially different set of sources to those 
customarily proposed that at once both informed and facilitated the passage 
of modern British Socialist thought: briefly, the ‘culture of altruism’ that 
flourished among intellectuals from the 1850s to the 1880s, the rise of 
historical economics, the discourse of democratic Teutonism and the 
invention of primitive society, Comtian Positivism, and political economy in 
its post-Millian form.  
 What is not considered in the following pages is the participation in 
the remaking of Socialism of either Edward Aveling or William Morris. 
Both, to be sure, merit discussion in a study of this nature: Aveling, if only 
for helping to perpetuate the Marx-Darwin myth, Morris for more 
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substantive reasons.56 But on grounds of limited space these Socialists also 
responsive to Marx have been omitted. Unlike Hyndman and Bax, Aveling’s 
contribution to Socialist literature was slim and unremarkable. He is, 
therefore, easily disregarded as a candidate for inclusion.57 Morris’s work, 
on the other hand, was neither of those things. But, as other scholars have 
recognised, his reception of Marx’s thought owed a great deal to Bax, and he 
is already relatively well served by the historiography.58 Besides, a line has 
to be drawn somewhere, and there are reasons, equally as robust, to extend 
the remit of discussion to others like George Bernard Shaw who initially 
fought Marx’s corner in the debate over value theory with Philip Wicksteed 
in 1884, and Edward Carpenter who also drew on Engels’s work and 
continued to hold Marx in high esteem while Shaw, conversely, performed 
an about-face on the import of the so-called ‘Jevonian Criticism’.59  
 The same kind of pragmatism, finally, informs the chronological 
parameters of the thesis too. Loosely, it takes 1892 as an endpoint. It does 
so, however, not because the Independent Labour Party was formed the 
following year, changing the organisational landscape of British Socialism; 
nor because the Fabian Society, whose members Engels described as 
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‘wolves in sheep’s clothing’ and ‘the worst enemies of the workers’, hit ‘its 
peak of early influence’ that year.60 It is, rather, the publication of Bax’s 
book, The Problem of Reality, that determines its outer boundary. For it is 
in that text that he challenged the Engelsian rendering of Marx most 
clearly, enunciating an alternative to the positivism, the uncompromisingly 
one-sided ‘materialist doctrine of history’, and the theory of economic 
collapse that formed the bedrock of ‘Marxism’. The thesis elides, in 
consequence, Bax’s role in the Revisionist Debate, as well as his noteworthy 
views on imperialism and patriotism (both of which were sharpened during 
the Second Boer War).61 Moreover, the chapters on Hyndman are even 
more circumscribed: they fail to broach his Municipal Socialist proposals, 
his critique of Marginalism, and his activities in opposition to the Russian 
Bolshevik regime.62 The intention, however, is that what the thesis forgoes 
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A Certain Hyndman 
 
On 15 December 1881 Marx wrote to his friend Friedrich Adolph Sorge. ‘The 
English’, he informed him, ‘have recently begun to occupy themselves more 
with Capital, etc.’63 Marx’s sense that a new swell of interest in his ideas 
had begun had been spurred by the publication of three texts, a small book 
published in June, and two articles published shortly after in October and 
December in the periodical press. He began by describing to Sorge an 
article written by John Rae, a soon-to-be historian of contemporary 
Socialism, published in the Contemporary Review: ‘Very inadequate, full of 
mistakes, but “fair”’, he added scornfully.64 ‘The fairness of making yourself 
at least sufficiently acquainted with the subject of your criticism seems a 
thing quite unknown to the penmen of British philistinism’, he protested.65  
Moving quickly on, Marx drew his friend’s attention next to ‘a little 
book’ which had been ‘published by a certain Hyndman (who had before 
intruded himself into my house)’, namely England for All.66  Needless to 
say, ‘a certain Hyndman’ who had ‘intruded himself into my house’ 
signalled a degree of displeasure here too. The main source of contention in 
this instance, however, was less an inadequacy of treatment, but rather – 
notoriously – what Marx felt was an inadequacy of acknowledgement. ‘The 
chapters on Labour and Capital are only literal extracts from, or 
circumlocutions of, the Capital’, he complained, ‘but the fellow does neither 
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quote the book, nor its author’.67 Nevertheless, Marx conceded that in ‘so 
far as it pilfers the Capital’ Hyndman’s book made ‘good propaganda’, even 
if its author was both a plagiarist and ‘a “weak” vessel’ to boot – ‘very far 
from having even the patience... of studying a matter thoroughly’.68  
Clearly, the publication of the first of these texts were disappointing 
events for Marx. The publication of the third, however, was, as he saw it, a 
much more encouraging affair. In the December edition of Modern 
Thought, Ernest Belfort Bax contributed an article elucidating Marx’s ideas 
in its series entitled ‘Leaders of Modern Thought’. ‘Now this’, Marx wrote in 
his letter to Sorge, completing his assessment of the recent surge of 
attention, ‘is the first publication of the kind which is pervaded by a real 
enthusiasm for the new ideas themselves and boldly stands up against Brit. 
Philistinism’.69  It, too, was not without its own serious faults, he 
explained.70 Indeed, much was also ‘wrong and confused’ there.71 But Marx 
gave it his imprimatur nonetheless, instructing Eleanor Marx to send Bax a 
letter of thanks and appreciation.72 
As it turned out, Bax and Marx would never meet. But the praise 
that Marx conferred upon his article did eventually lead to an invitation 
from Engels, asking Bax to visit him shortly after Marx’s death in 1883. 
That visit began, in turn, ‘an acquaintance and friendship’ that lasted until 
Engels’s own death in 1895.73 And, apart from Edward Aveling, the husband 
of Eleanor Marx, a noted activist in her own right, Bax was in fact the only 
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prominent British Socialist to frequent Engels’s house during the 1880s and 
nineties.74 
Hyndman, of course, was assuredly not a welcome guest in Engels’s 
home. Quite the opposite; following the incident adverted to above – 
namely, the allegation of plagiarism – Hyndman found himself 
permanently excluded from Engels’s house, and his reputation seriously 
sullied among many Continental Socialists as a result. He had, however, as 
the above quotation obliquely suggests, once been a welcome visitor at the 
Marx family home. Indeed, between the end of 1880 and the publication of 
England for All Hyndman could be found there relatively regularly. Besides 
his enthusiasm for Capital, which he had read just months prior to their 
first meeting, and which first earned him an audience with the little known 
German Doctor, their shared aversion to Russia on the so-called Eastern 
Question ‘constituted a link’ between them, and Marx was also already 
familiar with, and sympathetic to, Hyndman’s articles on India.75 According 
to Hyndman’s later reflections, their conversations ranged widely. And it is 
clear that Hyndman benefited greatly from the time he spent in discussion 
with Marx. It is also clear that the breach between them was entirely 
avoidable too. For there was, to be sure, plainly ‘no question’ of malicious 
intent in Hyndman’s failure to explicitly name Marx as the ‘great author 
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and original writer’ to whom he averred he was ‘indebted’ in the preface to 
England for All.76   
Contrary to Engels’s suggestion, Hyndman had no ‘designing intent 
to suck Marx’s brains and obtain the credit in English speaking countries 
for the results of Marx’s work.’77 Rather, ‘he had not mentioned Marx for 
reasons of expediency’, as Eduard Bernstein later explained.78 England for 
All had been written for the first members of the Democratic Federation, 
the disparate collection of popular and middle-class Radicals that 
Hyndman had begun to assemble in the Spring of 1881 with the intention of 
‘reviving’ what he described to Marx as ‘the Chartist organisation’.79  In 
other words, the book was addressed to an audience typically hostile to the 
notion of State intervention, and for whom Socialism connoted a ‘foreign’, 
not to say ‘violent’, phenomenon.80 Far from providing a cloak for ulterior 
purposes, the ’stupid letters of excuse’ that Hyndman sent in explanation, 
which Marx invoked in his letter to Sorge – ‘that “the English don’t like to 
be taught by foreigners,” that “my name was so much detested, etc.”’ – were 
actually extremely close to the mark.81  
Hyndman’s judgements were well-calculated. In addition to his 
famous omission, his use of Radical language, and the caution he showed in 
deploying the word Socialism and its derivatives, showed acute sensitivity 
to the deeply ingrained predilections of the community of readers he 
addressed. Following repeated promptings from Engels, Marx’s belated 
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indignation, on the other hand, demonstrated a level of credulity to support 
Hyndman’s retrospective impression that the author of Capital had, 
perhaps, never ‘properly understood England’.82 
As other contemporary Socialists acknowledged, where Hyndman 
was concerned Engels clearly had an axe to grind. Moreover, in the light of 
Stedman Jones’s recent work on the unacknowledged divergence of 
interests which had grown up between Engels and Marx in the years after 
1870, it no longer seems quite so apocryphal to suppose that Engels’s 
hostility was motivated by jealousy, by the fear, that is, of being displaced 
by Hyndman as Marx’s wealthy backer. In fact, ‘there is no reason’, 
according to Stedman Jones, ‘to disbelieve the testimony of Hyndman’ 
about the anxiety caused to Marx and his family by their continuing 
dependence upon Engels’s largesse.83 To be sure, ‘in poor health and with 
diminished energy’, Marx ‘was prepared to allow Engels to act for him’ 
during the final decade of his life.84 But, at the same time, in an effort to 
suppress disagreement, he also ceased to talk to Engels about his work.85  
No longer confident of proving the set of propositions that he had 
assembled between 1845 and 1848, Marx, on Stedman Jones’s view, silently 
abandoned the project of completing Capital after the publication of its first 
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volume in 1867. On account of his investigations of pre-capitalist societies, 
increasingly, it seemed to Marx that the ‘capitalist mode of production’ was 
not ‘just a particular historical stage in the development of the ‘forces of 
production’’.86 He began to cast doubt on the notion that ‘there were limits 
beyond which it could not further develop’.87 Secondly, and more 
importantly, he also began to cast doubt on the idea that ‘an economy 
without a market could match the dynamism and creativity of capitalism’.88 
It was as a consequence of these discoveries that Marx famously ‘turned 
away from thought about Britain and western Europe and buried himself in 
Russian agrarian statistics.’89 
Before long, Marx had forsaken the universal terms in which he had 
originally framed his argument.90 Discarding the assumption that 
‘communal property and despotic rule went together’, he grew to accept the 
belief that it would be possible for Russia to make a beeline to socialism 
from the village commune.91 In a letter composed in 1881, he endorsed, 
therefore, the political strategy of the Russian Populists over the ‘orthodox’ 
plans of the embryonic Emancipation of Labour group.92 Concurrently, 
Marx gave up the notion too that in engendering social transformation in 
Asia, England ‘was the unconscious tool of history’.93 Under the influence of 
his studies in pre-history, he ceased to praise ‘the breakdown of traditional 
and often communal’ social structures ‘by European merchants and 
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colonisers.’94 Engels, on the other hand, continued to believe in the efficacy 
of Marx’s theory in its original form: dogmatically stadial, rigidly 
universalist, and emphatically post-capitalist.95 
This, however, was the Marx known to Hyndman between 1880 and 
1881: anti-capitalist, buoyant about the prospect of revolution in Russia, 
and increasingly dissatisfied with being financially dependent upon Engels. 
Like Engels, Hyndman had no truck with any ‘romantic investment in the 
Obshchina.’96 But he accepted nonetheless Marx’s view that revolution 
might ‘begin in the East’.97 For a quite different reason he had shared 
Marx’s opposition to Russia during the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, a 
position which earned him – portentously, as it would turn out – the 
disdain of William Gladstone and many popular Liberals sympathetic to the 
‘Bulgarian atrocities campaign’.98  
For Hyndman, ‘the growing and aggressive despotism of Russia’ 
presented by far the greater threat to European democracy than the 
‘decaying domination of the Ottoman Turk’ over the Christian populations 
of south east Europe.99 Moreover, he was not alone among Radicals in 
taking that line. Rather, Hyndman fell in behind others like Joseph Cowen 
and Edward Beesly, the latter being Marx’s chief ally in Britain during the 
1860s and 1870s, who also repudiated the position of the ‘pro-Russian 
party’.100 Hyndman did not, though, suffer from the same kind of ‘visceral 
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36 
 
Russophobia’ as Marx.101 Indeed, he complained retrospectively that Marx 
‘carried this justifiable antagonism… to an abnormal extent’, accepting 
‘David Urquhart’s views on the East with a lack of direct investigation that 
surprised me in a man of so critical a mind.’102 Hence, when Eleanor Marx 
pressed him later to review the ‘letters and disquisitions’ that her father had 
written on the Eastern Question, Hyndman refused. He insisted that the 
‘book was not… worthy of its author’.103 
On India, matters stood differently. Hyndman had written about 
British policy in the subcontinent from as early as 1875.104 Prompted 
initially by reading a pamphlet on the issue composed by the Positivist 
James Geddes, and harnessing subsequently statistical evidence collected 
by Dadabhai Naoroji, Hyndman condemned the ‘drain’ of wealth to Britain 
from India that caused, he held, its repeated famines.105 He gave fullest 
expression to this ‘drain’ theory in two articles published in 1878 and 1879 
in the Nineteenth Century, under the title ‘The Bankruptcy of India’.106 That 
Marx had read them ‘with pleasure’ is not to be doubted.107 For, at that 
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time, Hyndman’s humanitarian critique of British colonial policy matched 
Marx’s hostility to European action in the extra-European world.108  
 
To be sure, Lenin was entitled to bemoan the lack of detail in Hyndman’s 
recollections of his discussions with Marx.109 As far as politics and theory is 
concerned they are without doubt insubstantial. But the above-quoted letter 
to Sorge does not ‘settle the matter’ of the nature of their short-lived 
relationship.110 On the contrary, the letter is deeply unreliable, both as a 
guide to Hyndman’s breach with Marx and as an assessment of the upturn 
of interest in Marx’s ideas. Firstly, as we have seen, Hyndman had good 
reason not to mention Marx by name in England for All. Secondly, Engels 
was clearly instrumental in driving a wedge between them. Thirdly, as we 
shall see in Chapter 2, Marx was also lagging in keeping abreast of the 
relevant literature. Marx’s ideas had been put to use in other articles 
published in British periodicals dating back to December 1878. Contrary to 
the impression that Marx created, Rae, Hyndman, and Bax were not, 
therefore, trenching on completely virgin ground. Finally, before his 
exegesis of Capital, Bax had contributed other articles to Modern Thought 
which addressed the topic of Socialism. In them, Bax combined ideas 
borrowed from Auguste Comte, Edward von Hartmann, and Herbert 
Spencer. Had Marx been cognizant of those articles as well, it is more than 
likely that he may well have been considerably more hesitant about 
embracing their author.111  
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On the above showing alone, then, the appraisal that Marx 
submitted to Sorge of the reception afforded to his ideas in Britain was 
plainly poorly judged. It would be a grave error, therefore, to take it as a 
reliable starting-point for a discussion of that process of engagement. By 
the same token, it would be an equally serious mistake to regard it as the 
threshold of the remaking of Socialism in Britain.112 For that development 
did not begin either with the texts isolated by Marx. To assume that it did is 
to effectively reproduce the line of the old British Marxist historians who 
essentially made modern Socialism and Marx the same thing.113  
In the first instance, the British reception of Marx’s mature thought 
began with an article published in the March 1875 edition of the 
Fortnightly Review. It was written by one John Macdonnell, ‘a keen 
amateur student of German politics and of political economy’.114 The 
reception afforded to Marx’s ideas among commentators, like Macdonnell, 
exterior to the Socialist movement has been well dealt with elsewhere.115 
However, the preamble to Hyndman’s first article on Socialism has rarely 
been acknowledged in the secondary literature, still less discussed in 
detail.116 Yet, as will become apparent in Chapter 2, the discussion begun by 
Henry Fawcett in the November 1878 edition of the Fortnightly Review, the 
locus of advanced Radical opinion from 1865 onwards, forms a crucial part 
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of the story.117 It is certainly true to say that Hyndman’s initial 
comprehension and endorsement of Socialism cannot be properly 
understood in its absence.  
 
Hyndman, in other words, had ‘pilfered’ from other thinkers besides Marx. 
In England for All, for example, he used John Stuart Mill’s Considerations 
on Representative Government almost as freely as Capital. Chapter 3 
considers that connection. But the articles published on Socialism in the 
periodical press between November 1878 and April 1880 provides the 
context for Hyndman’s earliest constructive statement on the topic. The 
sources he drew upon were not Marx and Engels, but rather Fawcett, Mill, 
and William Cunningham, then a young historical economist and 
sympathiser of Charles Kingsley and T. H. Green.118 
In this respect, Marx’s concessive point – ‘so far as it pilfers the 
Capital’ – was really very revealing. For if the arguments that Hyndman 
borrowed from Marx occupied a relatively small portion of England for All, 
and stayed, furthermore, within the economic purview of Capital, then they 
did not figure at all in ‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’, Hyndman’s 
first article on Socialism. As Marx implicitly acknowledged, the remaining 
chapters of England for All derived their inspiration from an entirely 
different set of sources. The vocabulary of ‘duty’, ‘enlightened patriotism’, 
‘energy’, ‘individuality’, ‘true sagacity’, and ‘vigour’ that rubbed shoulder to 
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shoulder there with the conceptual repertory established by Marx betrayed 
Hyndman’s Liberal intellectual credentials. By contrast, in ‘The Dawn of a 
Revolutionary Epoch’ Hyndman made no attempt to expound Marx’s 
notion of ‘unpaid labour’ nor his theory of cyclical crises of 
‘overproduction’. The language and conceptual framework deployed in that 
earlier article was, rather, of a well-nigh exclusively Liberal stamp.119 
Certainly, that understanding of Hyndman is not a common one. 
Instead, Hyndman has been routinely type-cast, not as a Socialist of Liberal 
heritage, but as ‘a former Conservative’, or in the most recent formulation 
of the same theme, as a Radical in the so-called Tory tradition.120 Given the 
weight of evidence inimical to that view it is a strangely persistent 
mischaracterisation, at once both credulous in its uncritical acceptance of 
remarks issued by hostile contemporary critics of Hyndman – Gladstone, 
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Engels, and various popular Liberals – and seemingly indifferent to, or 
simply incognizant of, his own self-descriptions.121  
It is undeniably true that Hyndman came from a Conservative 
familial background and had many friends among members of the 
Conservative party.122 It is also true that, on more than one occasion, he 
sought to cultivate his connections from within that milieu – his interview 
with Benjamin Disraeli providing the most famous example.123 It is, finally, 
undoubtedly the case, too, that Hyndman believed that reform-minded 
Conservatives were ultimately more dependable allies than Radicals of a 
Liberal hue.124 Yet, Hyndman’s connection to Liberalism and individual 
Radical Liberals was no less pronounced. It is fair to say that historians of 
late-nineteenth century British Socialism have been apt to forget the fluidity 
of relations among members of the ‘governing classes’.125 Hyndman’s own 
memoirs read at times much like a roll call of the great and the good, 
decidedly bipartisan in the sympathies they catalogue: University Liberals 
such as Boyd Kinnear and Charles Pearson stand side by side with 
Conservative intellectuals like H. D. Traill; and Liberal politicians such as 
Robert Lowe and Henry Labouchere are warmly mentioned in one sentence 
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and Conservative statesmen like Lord Salisbury and Randolph Churchill are 
cited alike in the next.126  
There can be no mistake that Hyndman moved freely among the 
‘well-connected, conventionally educated, comfortably situated, 
professionally successful, intellectually inclined men’ described so well by 
Stefan Collini – which is to say, that Hyndman was a ‘public moralist’. He 
was equally partial to the sense of identity, the aspirations, assumptions, 
and the conventions shared in common by that distinctive social group.127 
As Bax remarked, there was ‘nothing of the bohemian’ about him.128 On the 
contrary, having graduated from Trinity Hall, Cambridge, read for the Bar 
in London, found employment in the higher journalism, and come forward 
in 1880 as an independent parliamentary candidate in the election of that 
year, Hyndman was a consummate man of his type.129 Moreover, once that 
is recognised some of the purported ‘incongruities’ in Hyndman’s person 
can be accounted for more easily: not least, his refusal to abandon the 
traditional attire of a man of the gentlemanly class, the top-hat and frock-
coat.130  
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Following the aborted election campaign, Hyndman read Capital in the 
same year on a voyage to the United States. He wrote to Marx from 
America: ‘I have learnt more from its perusal, I think, than from any other 
book I ever read.’131 Prior to his long and faithful attachment to Marx, 
however, Hyndman’s intellectual allegiances had first been with John 
Stuart Mill; then later, with Mill’s protégé, John Morley. He regarded 
himself then, during the 1860s and 1870s, as a ‘Republican’ and a 
‘philosophic Radical’.132 Hyndman’s overall political temper cannot be 
properly understood when sequestered from these anterior intellectual 
affinities. Equally as important, though, are Hyndman’s other early, 
undeclared intellectual lodestars: Charles Dilke, his contemporary Trinity 
peer; Fawcett, his former lecturer in political economy; and Giuseppe 
Mazzini, Marx’s erstwhile adversary in the International Workingmen’s 
Association, Hyndman’s previous acquaintance among European 
revolutionary exiles residing in London.133 
In his autobiography, Hyndman compared Mazzini to Marx. For 
Lenin, that Hyndman should do so was nothing short of absurd. More 
astonishing still, was that Hyndman should express admiration for the 
Italian patriot.134 For Radicals of Hyndman’s generation, though, the ‘most 
conspicuous manifestation’ of the political climate in which they grew up 
was precisely the ethos of ‘transnational republicanism’ that Mazzini 
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embodied.135 In extolling the virtues of the architects of the modern Italian 
nation, Hyndman mirrored the main Radical current of the age.136 Other 
reformers of the 1880s, like Arnold Toynbee, one of the few intellectuals of 
the era to also take Marx seriously, set great store by Mazzini’s 
cosmopolitan patriotism.137 Mazzini’s greatness, according to Hyndman, 
had been obscured for Socialists of a younger age by his ‘opposition to Marx 
in the early days of the “International,” and his vigorous condemnation a 
little later of the Paris Commune’.138 But, he insisted, ‘Mazzini’s conception 
of the conduct of human life’ had been ‘a high and a noble one’.139 In 1883, 
Hyndman accordingly picked out for special praise the following passage 
from the ‘General Rules’ that Marx had composed for the International: ‘no 
duties without rights, no rights without duties’ – a concession made to the 
Mazzinian standpoint within the organisation.140 
Hyndman’s endorsement of Mazzinian morality was a blunder. 
However, Hyndman would continue to express other heretical views. To the 
charge of ‘Chauvinism’, for example, Hyndman willingly pleaded guilty, if it 
meant privileging the role of the ‘Celto-Teutonic peoples’ in the transition 
to Socialism.141 However, the influential idea that Hyndman gave 
expression to ‘a consistent strain of jingoist, anti-German – indeed racialist 
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– imperialism, which owed nothing to any British left-wing tradition’ is 
flatly erroneous.142 Rather than occupying an anomalous position, 
Hyndman again mirrored the main Radical current.143 His uninhibited 
views on the beneficence of the ‘great democracies of the English speaking 
peoples’ were inspired not by Disraeli, but by Dilke, Mill, and the 
democratic Teutonism popular among University Liberals.144 That 
Hyndman deployed a liberal ideal of England to support his particular 
Socialist end has been recognised in recent years by Julia Stapleton.145 But 
for an earlier generation of scholars committed to a more cosmopolitan 
ideal of internationalism (or simply scornful of native traditions) 
Hyndman’s utterances on the nation and imperialism went down like a lead 
balloon, before, that is, they were ever subjected to proper scrutiny.146 
Proper scrutiny is not a phrase that readily suggests itself when 
dealing with the historiography on Hyndman. Certainly, a vividly 
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anachronistic approach set the keynote in the work of the British Marxist 
historians. For instance, on reflection, it would be strange to find that 
Hyndman had been immune to the ‘intellectual republicanism’ of his 
Radical peers or to the reconciliation of liberalism and imperialism brought 
off by Mill and Dilke.147 By the same token, it would have been strange had 
Hyndman not ‘very poorly understood in 1880… the difference between a 
bourgeois democrat and a socialist.’148 The ‘indelible association between 
Marx and a ‘Marxist’ language of revolution’ originated in the twentieth-
century.149 Before that, the difference was not so pronounced. In fact, by the 
1860s, ‘it is probable that Marx had arrived at the reluctant acceptance of 
the representative state’.150 For a time, ‘he became an enthusiastic 
supporter of the Reform League’s outdoor pressure to enlarge the 
franchise’.151 If Marx later turned his back on the period of moderation 
encapsulated in the ‘Inaugural Address’ and ‘General Rules’ of the 
International Workingmen’s Association, he still endorsed the view that ‘an 
English revolution’ was unnecessary.152 He did so, furthermore, in a letter to 
Hyndman.  
 
In the period between 1880 and 1893 Hyndman traversed an intellectual 
gulf. However, much of that area he had covered by 1883. The odd detail 
might change here and there, and the overall inflection might subsequently 
alter, but from 1883 onwards Hyndman was a fully-fledged advocate of 
‘scientific Socialism’. In June 1881, at the time of the publication of 
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England for All Hyndman’s understanding of Marx was limited. It was 
circumscribed by access to two chief texts: the first volume of Capital in the 
French translation, and the Communist Manifesto, in addition, that is, to 
whatever he could glean in conversation from the man himself.153 Hyndman 
was still unfamiliar with Engels’s interpretative gloss. Nonetheless, if that 
initial apprehension bore little resemblance to the elaborate philosophy of 
history that he later imbibed from Engels, the chasm that Hyndman had 
bridged between his aborted candidature for parliament in 1880 and the 
formation of the Democratic Federation the following year was no less 
momentous.  
 At the outset of 1880 Hyndman was a reluctant reformer. In the 
space of just over a year Hyndman went from accepting ‘the ordinary views 
of industry and finance’, showing therefore sympathy for free trade in land 
but little enthusiasm for its nationalization; maintaining a hostile attitude 
to Home Rule in Ireland; and remaining sceptical about any wide-reaching 
extension of the franchise; to proclaiming the death of laissez faire; if not 
dropping his objections to Home Rule entirely, then to joining the Irish 
Land League; and to endorsing, finally, full manhood suffrage.154 It is hard 
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to say what caused that root and branch reversal.155 But what is clear is that 
Hyndman was prompted to re-evaluate some of his assumptions and beliefs 
by the flurry of articles published in the periodical press.  
Looking back upon his own contribution to that episode of 
discussion, Hyndman offered the following appraisal of ‘The Dawn of a 
Revolutionary Epoch’ in his autobiography: ‘The article was not, certainly, 
such an one as I should write now.’156 The reason Hyndman gave for the 
dissatisfaction he experienced in reading it thirty years later was the 
‘disinclination’ it displayed ‘to speak out plainly in favour of Socialism’.157 
‘Evidently,’ he wrote, ‘although theoretically a convinced Socialist, the 
underlying prejudice against the ideals of Socialism existing in my own 
mind still had its effect and prevented me from giving in the Nineteenth 
Century a proper survey of the situation.’158 ‘In fact,’ he added, more 
accurately, ‘I, unnecessarily as it seems to me now, accepted the limitations 
imposed by my surroundings.’159 
Hyndman wrote as a public moralist. The ‘limitations imposed by 
my surroundings’ meant not only the ideas on the topic of Socialism he then 
had available to him – typically hostile, even when sympathetic – but also 
the sense of identity conferred by the social status he inhabited. He shared 
‘the pretensions of the Victorian moralist to speak’, as Collini put it, not 
from ‘any merely partial or sectional interest’, but from a vantage-point that 
nominally ‘combined reflective disinterestedness with judicious realism’.160 
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Thus, the article was presented as a hard-headed and sober appraisal of the 
social and political conjuncture. 
Hyndman couched his argument in favour of the extension of ‘the 
principle of State management’ in the ostensibly reasonable and level-
headed style typical of the genre for which it was written. The fiery prose 
which led to the discontinuation of John Ruskin’s assault on political 
economy in the Cornhill Magazine in 1860 was singularly absent.161 In the 
same way that Fawcett habitually refuted the charge of ‘hard-heartedness’ 
levelled against political economy with the claim that it was about as 
reasonable to suggest the same of ‘a proposition in Euclid’, Hyndman’s 
proposals were dressed in the gown of inevitability. His readers were 
therefore asked to wear a stoic smile in accepting their logic.162 Hyndman 
displayed the confidence befitting his role: the confidence, on the one hand, 
of having the ‘easy, intimate, even conversable, relationship with both 
Reason and History’ with which the public moralist was naturally 
furnished; and the confidence, on the other, ‘of having the ear of the 
important audience’ to whom it was plainly addressed: the ‘governing’ or 
‘educated’ classes.163 
For a Socialist so steeped in the categories of ‘Marxism’, the absence 
of Marx’s notion of class struggle and its attendant idea that the State was 
simply a lever of class rule in Hyndman’s first public intervention in favour 
of a strongly attenuated form of modern Socialism was understandably 
galling. Like Mazzini and the Liberals mentioned above, in ‘The Dawn of a 
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Revolutionary Epoch’ Hyndman disavowed conflict and advocated class 
reconciliation instead.164 In place of ‘the violent overthrow of the 
bourgeoisie’ expounded in the Communist Manifesto, Hyndman inserted 
an appeal to the ‘upper classes’, not to abnegate their leadership, but rather 
to assume it properly.165 The ‘natural leaders’ of the community should 
preside over the work of ‘social reorganisation’, he insisted, yet ‘not for the 
selfish advantage of their own insignificant section, but for the benefit of 
that class which, as has been well said, is really the nation.’166  
The identification of proletariat and nation that Hyndman invoked 
was a Comtian formula. It was also an equation frequently deployed by 
Morley.167 Hyndman’s nod of assent was telling. But the utterance was 
suggestive in more ways than one. Instead of serving as proof of Hyndman’s 
nominal hankering for ‘an alliance between aristocracy and people’, the rest 
of the passage reveals that, here, too, Hyndman was actually borrowing 
from Mill’s Considerations, the text he leant on heavily in England for All. 
That is to say, when Hyndman wrote that, ‘the English people are not 
democratic in the Continental sense... they do respect their natural leaders’, 
he was not evoking the spectre of Charles Egremont, the hero of Disraeli’s 
Condition-of-England novel, Sybil.168 Rather, Hyndman was simply 
restating Mill’s exposition of English exceptionalism, according to which 
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‘the political feelings of Englishmen’ did indeed amount to an ‘unhesitating 
readiness to let themselves be governed by the upper classes’.169  
While Marx was hardly forthcoming in his praise of England for All, 
he conceded nonetheless that its chapters on labour and capital ‘made good 
propaganda’. To have said otherwise would not have been tenable. For in its 
condemnation of the principle of laissez faire, Hyndman’s ‘little book’ 
eclipsed every other pronouncement issued since Ruskin’s Unto this Last.170  
‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’, on the other hand, was more 
cautious. To suggest that ‘Incredulity and amazement must have been the 
typical reactions’ to Hyndman’s prognosis of ‘approaching trouble’ is to 
completely misread the context of his plea to take action on social 
inequality.171 So far from being unique, the periodical press was replete with 
comparable warnings. Hyndman in turn commandeered them. In so doing, 
moreover, he took inspiration from neither T. E. Kebbel nor Traill, the 
Conservative intellectuals who also recorded their anxiety about ‘the future 
stability of society’. Commenting on their arguments in ‘The Dawn of a 
Revolutionary Epoch’, Hyndman inserted the phrase ‘from their 
Conservative point of view’ to perform the work of ideological 
differentiation.172 In conformity with his stated affinities, Hyndman looked 
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instead to other Liberals for instruction, namely, to Fawcett and, above all, 























Socialism in the Periodical Press 
 
According to one commentator, if ‘he had lived ten years longer, Mill would 
have probably been one of the first Fabians; Fawcett’, on the other hand, 
the commentator added emphatically, ‘would certainly have not’.173 Of 
course, the depiction of Mill as a leading figure in the transition from 
Radicalism to Socialism is a familiar one.174 So, too, is Fawcett’s resistance 
to that transformation.175 The intention of this thesis is not to turn either 
idea on its head. But if Fawcett cannot be plausibly included as ‘one of the 
leading figures behind’ the remaking of Socialism, next to the usual 
candidates, Mill, Marx, and Henry George, he can be portrayed 
convincingly as an inadvertent contributor of considerable importance.176 
This chapter examines how the transition from Radicalism to Socialism 
played out. It charts how the concept of co-operation went from being 
considered an end in itself for the intellectuals involved in putting a form of 
modern Socialism on the theoretical map in Britain to becoming a merely 
transitional, or supplementary phenomenon to something more roundly 
Statist. It is against the backdrop of the discussion of these issues in the 
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periodical press between 1878 and 1880 that Hyndman’s first intervention 
on the topic is judged. What emerges is the extent to which he was indebted 
to the figures who participated in that debate. 
 
Doubtlessly, it is indeed a paradox that of all of Mill’s disciples the most 
concrete assistance to the remaking of Socialism should have been provided 
by Fawcett. For Fawcett was the least willing of Mill’s close followers to 
countenance even ‘the slightest assault upon the principle of individual 
responsibility’.177 Fawcett may well have been ‘a keen student of Mill’s 
double-decker treatises on logic and political economy’; he may have 
applauded Mill’s stance on the greatest issues of the day, from the American 
Civil War to the Governor Eyre Controversy; he may have even advocated 
many of the social and political measures promoted by Mill – co-operative 
production, Thomas Hare’s scheme of proportional representation, and the 
enfranchisement of women – taking him, therefore, into ‘the real inner 
sanctum of discipleship’; but there were nonetheless definite limits to his 
fidelity.178 Foremost among those limits was support for the kind of ‘partial 
and fragmentary collectivism’ with regard to land, education, and 
improving the conditions of labour, which Mill had begun to condone and 
actively champion during the closing years of his life, specifically from 1868 
onwards.179 Henceforward, on the question of State intervention, not to 
mention the ‘wage-fund’ doctrine and numerous other sticking points, they 
were separated by a notable gulf. Indeed, to Ruskin, Fawcett ‘was the 
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‘dismal science’ incarnate’.180 For Hyndman, however, at the beginning of 
1881, he was a useful repository of Socialist arguments. 
 To be sure, Fawcett upheld impeccably anti-Socialist beliefs. Nor 
was it just modern Socialism to which he was opposed. Fawcett was only 
slightly less unsympathetic to the ‘Communistic experiments’ associated 
with Saint-Simon and Charles Fourier in France, and Robert Owen in 
England.181 If his treatment of the latter group was marginally more benign, 
no amount of ‘dispassionate consideration’ could dent his ‘almost wilfully 
serene faith in the virtues of free competition’.182 For Fawcett, the early 
Socialists were ‘mistaken enthusiasts’ who underestimated the power of 
self-interest as an incentive to work.183 But, so long as their efforts ‘were 
restricted to the formation of voluntary organisations, there was no reason 
to regard their proposals with apprehension’.184 On the contrary, ‘no other 
charge could be brought’ against them on that front, ‘than that they showed 
too much zeal in their efforts to improve society.’185 Indeed, even ‘their 
failure did something to benefit mankind’, insofar as such experiments 
trail-blazed the path for a more moderate form of co-operation.186 Fawcett, 
of course, was one of the ‘loudest advocates’ of the co-operative movement 
during its post-Owenite phase: ‘its general adaptation to industrial 
undertakings’, he wrote, ‘would probably mark the greatest advance ever 
yet made in human improvement’; free of its former millenarian objectives, 
and content to retain the principle of competition, the new co-operative 
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movement promised to resolve the conflict between labour and capital once 
and for all.187  
On this at least, Mill and Fawcett were almost at one.188 Yet, unlike 
Fawcett, Mill was also prepared to give the systems of Owen, Fourier, ‘and 
the more thoughtful and philosophic Socialists generally’ a genuinely fair 
hearing, as opposed to the condescending kinds of ex post facto indulgence 
typically offered elsewhere.189 If not convinced theoretically, Mill 
nevertheless displayed an affinity for non-revolutionary Socialist schemes 
that was clearly alien to the ‘strong, but comparatively limited, intellect’ of 
his famous disciple.190 For example, for all his apparent tolerance, it is hard 
to envisage Fawcett describing ‘the picture of a Fourierist community’ as 
‘attractive’, as Mill did, or calling Fourier’s system ‘a specimen of 
intellectual ingenuity... highly worthy of the attention of any student’.191 
Like other proponents of the modern co-operative movement, Fawcett 
showed none of Mill’s muted unease ‘with the ideal of life held out by those 
who think that the normal state of human beings is that of struggling to get 
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on’.192 In any case, even if Mill and Fawcett did hold broadly homologous 
views on co-operation, the former, unlike the latter, was nonetheless ready 
to impose serious constraints on the operation of competition in the 
meantime, before, that is, the ‘merging or uniting of capital and labour’ had 
been achieved.193 
 
These views were set out by Mill in a series of chapters composed for an 
unfinished book on the topic of Socialism written in 1869. They were first 
published in 1879, six years after Mill’s death, in the February, March, and 
April editions of the Fortnightly Review. By that time, however, Mill’s 
arguments had already begun to acquire an outmoded semblance. 
Certainly, non-revolutionary Socialism had moved on from the schemes of 
the thinkers that he invoked. It was no longer permissible to distinguish in 
1879 between two classes of Socialism, one of which was pacific, gradualist, 
and voluntary, the other, revolutionary and Statist.194 For a third class had 
emerged, which incorporated components of both, advocating neither the 
formation of intentional communities, nor a revolutionary seizure of power 
with a concomitant transfer of ownership in the means of production to the 
State at one stroke. 
In Britain, the first articulation of that third class of Socialism was 
submitted by William Cunningham. It was published in the January edition 
of the Contemporary Review in 1879, just one month prior to the 
serialization of Mill’s Chapters. It was followed by an article written by 
Moritz Kaufmann, the author of several books on the topic of Socialism 
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dating back to 1874, published, also, in the same periodical in April 1880.195 
The modern co-operative movement was seen by these Socialists as a 
transitional phenomenon, not – pace Mill – as an end in itself. Inspired in 
part by Albert Schäffle, a German professor of political economy, and an 
exponent of Socialism in a severely guarded form, they enunciated 
arguments for Socialism which were gradualist, moderate, and Statist, thus 
confounding the dichotomy established by Mill. Indeed, by 1879 the word 
Socialism had become virtually synonymous with the core element of its 
various modern expressions, all of which were chiefly characterised, 
ostensibly, by a belief in the State.196 So much so, in fact, that Cairns felt 
obliged to register his regret that Mill had chosen to describe himself as a 
Socialist in his Autobiography, given the definite noncorrespondence 
between what Mill meant by that term and the meaning that it had 
subsequently contracted.197 It was precisely this, too – the growing 
predominance of modern Socialism – that agitated Fawcett. If early 
Socialism was both essentially harmless, owing to its voluntary nature, and 
even compatible with a more limited type of co-operation, modern 
Socialism, insofar as it actively discouraged self-reliance, was, on the 
contrary, a positively dangerous force.  
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 Unlike Mill, Cunningham and Kaufmann felt no need to reconcile 
their respective Socialist projects with the dictates of orthodox political 
economy. Responding to recent intellectual developments, they took their 
bearings, instead, from the burgeoning field of historical economics and 
evolutionary theory.198 In these articles, the concept of economic man was 
dispensed with, and the co-operative movement was perceived only as a 
symptom of the growth of Socialism, rather than as a feasible alternative to 
it. Whereas Mill approached Socialism on primarily moral grounds, their 
perspective was fundamentally economic (precisely the part of Socialism, 
that is, that provoked Mill’s dissent).  
According to Cunningham, in accordance with ‘the principle of 
natural selection’ the ‘fittest industrial system’ would survive, and while ‘a 
large field of industry’ would no doubt remain in private hands for some 
time, it was possible still to ‘confidently maintain that the dominance of 
competition’ had already ‘begun to pass away before the power of public 
organisation’.199 On this view, no rapprochement between the two 
organising principles would be required. It was not that either Cunningham 
or Kaufmann morally objected as such to the system of co-operation 
envisioned by Mill, Fawcett, and other proponents of political economy, as 
Frederic Harrison had done previously in asserting that it had wholly 
forgotten the ‘high aims’ which made the systems of Saint-Simon, Fourier, 
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and Owen ‘noble’.200 Rather, it was simply that Socialism was ‘making slow 
but sure and steady progress’ irrespectively, ensuring therefore the futility 
of any effort to stem its advance.201 
 The unintended consequences of such suggestions may have been 
deemed ill-considered, or worse, by Fawcett and others. But Cunningham 
and Kaufmann could not be charged with intentional malevolence. The 
‘animating principle’ of their Socialism was not the ‘hate’ that Mill 
attributed to other State-oriented Socialists.202 On the contrary, they 
pitched their arguments in largely dispassionate, class-neutral terms, with 
Cunningham insisting – in a kind of proto-Wildean way – that Socialism 
was not only ‘a remedy for the miseries of the poor’, but that it provided, 
also, much-needed ‘alleviation’ for ‘the cares of the rich’ overwhelmed by 
the anxieties of business.203 Like Hyndman, who went on, appropriately, to 
borrow their positive arguments, they were, in short, by no means obstinate 
and alienated critics. They, too, like him, enjoyed an easy, intimate 
relationship with the audience they elected to address; and they, too, 
expected to be taken seriously.204 In other words, Cunningham and 
Kaufmann were no more inclined to visualize ‘childish pictures of the social 
life of perfect human beings’ than Fawcett or Mill.205 Nor were they any 
more tempted to ‘demolish the framework of society as a prelude’ to the 
‘period of greater and better-divided wealth’ that they did indeed 
envisage.206 Instead, in anticipation of the seasoned Fabian stance on the 
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question of the transition to Socialism, they called on the governing classes 
to concentrate on ‘smoothing the way for its advent’.207  
 
The discussion of the merits and demerits of Socialism in the periodical 
press between 1878 and 1880 can be divided into two halves, with 
Cunningham and Kaufmann occupying one side of the argument, and 
Fawcett and George Jacob Holyoake the other. Mill’s posthumously 
published Chapters, meanwhile, settled the middle-ground between them, 
providing a useful repository of arguments and a source of legitimation for 
the later contributors, but appearing, at the same time, as a notably archaic 
piece. Far too much had occurred in the interval, between 1869 and 1879, 
for Mill’s unfinished meditations on the subject to have retained their 
relevance and force. The experience of the Paris Commune, the onset of the 
so-called Great Depression, the experiments in municipalisation 
undertaken by Birmingham City Council (and elsewhere), the proliferation 
of positive legislation enacted chiefly by Disraeli, and the emergence of rival 
economic and military powers, all contributed to changing the fundamental 
nature of that discussion. Moreover, with the implosion of the Briggs co-
partnership scheme in 1875 (which Fawcett had welcomed so 
enthusiastically), and other failures in the field of production, much of the 
wind had been taken from the sails of the co-operative movement too.208 Of 
course, these developments were necessarily absent from the analysis 
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presented by Mill. But in the analyses offered by the active participants in 
that debate they were, unsurprisingly, conspicuously present.  
 Furthermore, the beginning of that small burst of discussion also 
coincided, not accidentally, with the first of the five Anti-Socialist acts 
passed by the German Reichstag in October 1878. In fact, that legislation 
and the movement it was designed to suppress provided the immediate 
occasion for the articles published by Fawcett and Cunningham. However, 
their respective interventions in November and January had markedly 
discordant objectives. For while Cunningham endeavoured to silence the 
‘loud bursts of self-congratulation over the national common sense which 
saves us from being like our neighbours’ by showing, on the one hand, how 
even Britain was ‘slowly tending towards the realization’ of Socialism, and 
arguing, on the other, why that was not a bad thing, Fawcett, contrarily – 
but not altogether dissimilarly – admonished his readers not to take that 
exceptionalism for granted; he sought to find ways instead to buttress that, 
fast diminishing, national peculiarity.209 
 Clothed as an exposition of the recent development of Socialism in 
Germany and the United States, but intended as a cautionary tale for a 
domestic audience, Fawcett’s intervention in November 1878 was not his 
only set of musings on the subject of modern Socialism. Fawcett had 
already written an essay on the topic in 1872, following the fall of the Paris 
Commune, and the publication of Marx’s pamphlet, The Civil War in 
France, both of which engendered a frenzied reaction of sensationalist 
journalism.210 It was precisely that text, rather than the Fortnightly article, 
that Hyndman leant on most heavily in developing the negative section of 
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‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’. The language of impending 
catastrophe and the call to arms for ‘all thinking men’ to take stock of ‘the 
questions now being discussed by hundreds of thousands on the Continent’ 
were drawn directly from, and inspired by, Fawcett’s essay, as well as Mill’s 
retroactive parallel speculations.211 What is most striking, however, about 
Fawcett’s dual-contribution was both the shift in position it registered with 
regard to whom he identified as the potential agents of Socialism in Britain, 
and the much greater sense of urgency that his later article betrayed. In 
1872, Fawcett was chiefly concerned by the number of ‘English workmen’ 
who had been ‘powerfully influenced by Continental ideas’.212 Just six years 
later, however, that particular anxiety had subsided. By an act of 
transference, the ‘educated’ or ‘governing’ classes were now implicated as 
the agents of subversion instead. ‘If Socialism should ever spread among 
the English people,’ he wrote, ‘it seems likely that the movement will receive 
encouragement from above rather from below.’213 Moreover, on the 
remarkably inclusive criterion he established for measuring its progress, he 
did indeed have some cause for alarm.  
Fawcett argued in his Fortnightly article that each ‘fresh 
encroachment that the State is permitted to make on individual liberty, 
prepares a community more willingly to accept the principles of modern 
Socialism, by teaching them to rely less upon themselves and more upon 
the State.’214 ‘There is undoubtedly,’ too, he added, ‘at the present time, in 
our own country, a somewhat marked tendency to favour State 
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intervention.’215 Fawcett, to be sure, had been ‘complaining about the drift 
of legislation’ in Britain since the late 1860s.216 Long before Herbert 
Spencer and A. V. Dicey, he had been an energetic exponent of what has 
been aptly called ‘the germ theory of Socialism’.217 The ‘germ theory’, 
because it was felt that every ‘fresh extension of the principles of 
centralisation or of industrial protection’ increased the danger of 
contagion.218 Just as Spencer later rebuked politicians for failing to 
recognise the phenomenon of ‘political momentum’, Fawcett likewise 
insisted (in anticipation, too, of the Fabian viewpoint) that, ‘many of those 
who regard the spread of Socialism with so much alarm, have been 
unconsciously the chief promoters of the movement.’219 Thus, by the 
standard of the ‘germ theory’, the inflation of ‘positively coercive’ legislation 
passed by the governments of both Gladstone and Disraeli from 1868 on, 
culminating in the Factory and Workshop Act of 1878, gave Fawcett good 
reason to feel a heightened sense of unease.220 No less disconcerting, 
however, was the inordinate ‘reaction against the extreme doctrines of 
laissez faire’ exhibited by fellow Radicals like Joseph Chamberlain, Charles 
Dilke, and John Morley.221 
 Holyoake, meanwhile, Fawcett’s duelling partner, was more 
sanguine. While he, too, refused to surrender the principle of self-help (in 
                                                          
215 Ibid. 
216 Goldman, ‘Introduction ‘an advanced liberal’’, p. 15. 
217 John W. Mason, ‘Political Economy and the Response to Socialism in Britain, 
1870-1914’, The Historical Journal, 23/3 (1980), p. 567. 
218 Fawcett, ‘Recent Development of Socialism’, p. 611. 
219 Herbert Spencer, Political Writings, ed. John Offer (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), p.85. Fawcett, ‘Recent Development of Socialism’, p. 611. 
220 Helen Merrell Lynd, England in the Eighteen-Eighties. Toward a Social Basis 
for Freedom (London, Frank Cass, 1945), p. 156. 
221 Fawcett, ‘Recent Development of Socialism’, p. 614. Goldman, ‘Introduction ‘an 
advanced liberal’, p. 15. For the ‘New Radicalism’ see Wolfe, From Radicalism to 
Socialism, pp. 52- 65; and Finn, After Chartism, Ch. 7. For a more sceptical take 
see David Nicholls, ‘The New Liberalism: After Chartism?’, Social History, 21/3 
(1996), pp. 330-342. Joseph Chamberlain, for instance, spoke derisively of ‘a 
fashionable political economy, very popular in the parliament of the rich’. ‘The 
Liberal Party and its Leaders’, Fortnightly Review, 14/81 (Sep. 1873), p. 297. 
65 
 
its traditionally austere form), he was much less concerned than Fawcett by 
the programme of ‘Free Church, Free Land, Free Schools, and Free Labour’ 
promoted by the Radical party.222 Judging by the article he wrote on ‘State 
Socialism’ for the June edition of the Nineteenth Century in 1879, the 
legislation enacted by Gladstone’s first government caused him no real 
anxiety either. Instead, Holyoake took aim at two more conventional 
targets: the Comtists, and the Conservatives.223 ‘State Socialism,’ he argued, 
‘so far as any taste exists for it in England, is a growth of Toryism.’224 As 
Disraeli’s tenure in office had ostensibly shown, the ‘English Conservatives’ 
were ‘not averse to giving State aid’ in exchange for the retention of 
power.225 The Comtists, however, had ‘always been in favour of appeals to 
the public treasury’.226 Unlike the Conservatives, for them, the provision of 
State aid was no mere question of immediate expediency. Indeed, according 
to Holyoake, ‘had they the capacity of converting the populace,’ the 
Comtists ‘would soon spread the infection of State Socialism among the 
working class.’227 Fortunately, the ‘English working class’ showed little 
susceptibility to ‘the plague of State Socialism’.228 If not completely 
invulnerable, their ‘steady, dogged instinct of self-sufficiency’ kept them 
largely immune.229 As yet, they showed no inclination to heed the advice 
proffered by Harrison and other Comtists to ‘look to the State’.230 Of course, 
Holyoake was no more in favour of the ‘despotism of Trade’ than the groups 
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he picked out for criticism.231 He conceded that ‘a revolution of labour’ was 
indeed needed.232 But it should proceed, he urged, ‘on the lines of self-help 
upon which it had been founded.’233 That is to say, Holyoake, like Fawcett, 
refused to relinquish his belief in the efficacy of ‘co-operative devices’.234 
 
Despite the obvious failings of the co-operative movement, Fawcett and 
Holyoake stuck obstinately to the same Radical script that had been drafted 
for the 1850s and 1860s, a script, however, that seemed ever less credible as 
the 1870s wore on. Mill, of course, can be fully absolved of the charge of 
intransigence in his involuntary contribution to the debate on Socialism in 
the periodical press, owing both to the consistently pragmatic bearing he 
displayed there and the peculiar chronology of his articles. Industrial 
partnership now appeared much more problematic than he had supposed, 
and the notion of industrial monopolies no longer seemed so far-fetched 
either.235 But these were simply analytical failures, or deficient prognoses, 
rather than signs of inflexibility. Yet, while Cunningham and Kaufmann 
endeavoured to meet some of the new phenomena thrown up during the 
course of the 1870s head on, anticipating, or actively revising, Mill’s now 
seemingly anachronistic judgements, Fawcett and Holyoake refused to 
budge from the intellectual territory that they formerly shared with Mill, 
irrespective of recent developments. Unlike most of Mill’s other disciples, 
they showed no ‘impulse in the Socialistic direction’, even under duress of 
events.236 
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 The discussion of Socialism that Fawcett initiated in 1878 was not, 
however, incorrigibly polarised as a result. There were certain points upon 
which all contributors to the discussion were agreed. For example, the 
‘increasing separation of employers and employed, and the widening gulf 
between the very wealthy and the very poor’ was uniformly deplored, and 
‘the character of the English working classes’ was likewise confirmed to be 
of a uniquely congenial kind by all.237 In fact, Cunningham and Kaufmann 
did not object even to Fawcett’s avowal that the various inroads that the 
State had been ‘permitted to make on individual liberty’ had prepared the 
‘community more willingly to accept the principles of modern Socialism’.238 
What they did not accept, however, was the reason that Fawcett gave for 
that assent. That is to say, for Cunningham and Kaufmann, it was not the 
nominal depletion of self-reliance that made Socialism a more immediately 
realizable prospect. Rather, Socialism had been rendered feasible by ‘the 
increase of effective public spirit’ engendered, in part, by some of these 
changes.239 The action of the Education Department and the State’s 
assumption of the postal and telegraph services provided evidence of what 
could be accomplished by ‘centralized authority where private effort’ had 
been ‘comparatively unsuccessful’.240 The same was true of the experiments 
in municipalisation undertaken by ‘local bodies’ like Birmingham.241 But it 
was, above all, ‘the habit of associating together for public purposes’ which 
ultimately ensured the superior efficacy of ‘public organization’. 242 
Mill, to be sure, may still have required some convincing, but 
Cunningham had at least answered one of his most long-standing and 
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pointed objections. According to Mill, the practicability of Socialism on the 
scale of Owen’s or Fourier’s villages was one thing, and could admit of no 
dispute. But to ‘attempt to manage the whole production of a nation by one 
central organisation’ was a ‘totally different matter’.243 Cleaving still to the 
concept of economic man, Mill argued that, as matters stood, in the 
majority of cases, ‘public and social feelings’ provided no substitute for self-
interest as an economic motive power.244 He was ‘quite ready to admit’ that 
‘this inferior efficacy’ was ‘not inevitable’.245 Nonetheless, ‘much time’ 
would be required, he insisted, to redress the ‘general infirmity’ in matters 
of ‘public spirit’.246 
 Cunningham, by contrast, was considerably more optimistic when it 
came to chronology. Starting from an ontological position akin to Marx’s, 
he argued that ‘regard for the public weal’ had actually already become 
effective due to structural changes that had materialised in the economy.247 
For similar reasons, he was also less bullish than Mill about the prospect of 
the continued efficiency and success of private industry and individual 
competition. The emergence of foreign rivals and the tendency toward 
monopoly intrinsic to the ‘regime of competition’ had begun to neutralise 
‘the stimulus of private enterprise’.248 By increasing the scale on which 
production was carried on, monopoly capitalism had prepared the ground 
for the ethos of collectivism that would eventually replace it economically 
too. Thus, armed with the notion of ‘effective public spirit’ and other 
context-specific details, Cunningham was able to repudiate antecedently – 
successfully or otherwise – many of the complaints about the so-called 
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‘revolutionary Socialist’ schemes that Mill outlined in his unfinished 
Chapters. Soon after, the baton was taken up by Kaufmann.  
Over and above the content of Cunningham’s efforts, Kaufmann 
chiefly took umbrage with Mill’s suggestion that ‘the compression of 
individuality’ would ‘be much greater under Communism’.249 Long before 
the philosophical Idealists had given the concept real currency and 
theoretical weight, he invoked the idea of ‘self-development’ in response. 
Rather than diminish, individuality would expand, he argued, in the same 
proportion as the ‘spiritual and moral development of the people’ had 
already been materially catered for.250 Like his Idealist successors, 
Kaufmann emphasised that the opportunity to develop one’s faculties 
presupposed certain anterior conditions. By itself, self-help would never 
suffice. The depression no doubt had helped to focus minds on some of the 
structural causes of poverty, and Kaufmann believed, just as T. H. Green 
and his followers did, that a change of social organisation would activate a 
corresponding release of latent individual potential. However, to realise this 
ideal the sacrosanctity of the notion of economic independence harboured 
by Liberals like Fawcett and Holyoake would have to give. The concept of 
self-reliance would have to take a new conceptual load, compatible with 
State intervention.251  
 As we have already heard, this much had been recognised by Mill 
well over a decade in advance. Prompted by Robert Lowe’s obstructive use 
of arguments derived from political economy in the House of Commons, he 
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set about establishing a considerable number of exceptions to the ‘Laissez-
Faire principle’ in 1868.252 He recorded some of them in his fragmentary 
work on Socialism, which he began the following year. For example, he did 
not rule out there the possibility of nationalizing ‘great joint-stock 
enterprises’ (still few in number, he argued) like the railways, insisting that 
‘when not reserved by the State itself’ they ‘ought to be carried on under 
conditions prescribed’ by it.253 Furthermore, it was perfectly conceivable 
that ‘all the land might be declared the property of the State, without 
interfering with the right of property in anything which is the product of 
human labour and abstinence.’254 But that, of course, did not prevent Mill 
from declaiming against the ‘very imperfect and one-sided notion of the 
operation of competition’ observed by ‘Socialists generally’.255 Mill readily 
conceded that the moral ‘judgement of Socialism on existing institutions 
and practices and on their results’ was scarcely contestable.256 But ‘the 
various plans... propounded for doing better’ still left much to be desired.257  
Setting aside the marked flaws of the particular metonym, it is, then, 
highly unlikely that Mill would have elected to insert himself among the 
first Fabians had he lived to see the Society’s formation.258 Unlike the far-
reaching social evolutionary prognoses outlined by Cunningham and 
Kaufmann, and echoed later by Bernard Shaw and Sidney Webb, in which 
planning gradually superseded competition, the entire tenor of his Chapters 
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was prophylactic. Mill’s posthumously published articles were singularly 
lacking in bold, optimistic pronouncements. The hinge on which his main 
argument rested was not some idiosyncratic combination of ‘Comte, 
Darwin, and Spencer’, but rather the Reform Act of 1867.259 That is to say, 
for Mill, it was not only an ‘obligation of justice’ to institute at least some 
modest modifications to the laws of property as a concession to sound 
economic reason, but in the light of the extension of the franchise it was an 
‘injunction of prudence’ too.260 Moreover, on this, Mill was of one mind 
with Hyndman, who was no less keen in ‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary 
Epoch’ to keep the ‘principle of State management... within certain 
limits’.261 
 
Published on the same day as the Employers Liability Bill came into 
operation, Hyndman’s article was temporally removed from the other 
contributions to the discussion of Socialism in the periodical press.262 The 
entire controversy had taken place within the space of fourteen months, 
whereas Hyndman’s article was separated from Kaufmann’s, the final 
instalment, by a further year. Moreover, he made no effort either to situate 
his article against that specific background, neither citing where 
appropriate, nor invoking the relevant names to legitimate some of its more 
obviously more contentious claims. It was presented, rather, as a blank 
slate. Yet ‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’ belonged no less squarely to 
the discussion carried on there for that reason. In fact, Hyndman could 
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have been no more indebted to that specific repository of arguments – and 
in Fawcett’s case, its spiritual antecedent – for the substantive remarks that 
he belatedly posited on the same topic in the Nineteenth Century. His 
article should therefore be read as a long-delayed extension to it. 
The article that Wolfe chose to isolate as the inaugural moment of 
the remaking of Socialism in Britain embodied three principal aims, none of 
which were unique. In the first instance, Hyndman, echoing Fawcett and 
Mill, sought to demonstrate the immanence of the threat that Socialism 
posed in Europe. Across the Continent, he argued, ‘poor men bound 
together by an enthusiasm for what is little more than an abstraction’ had 
resolved ‘to carry out that programme which to most of us Englishmen 
seems a very midsummer madness, of elevating the whole race of civilised 
men by a complete change of the conditions in which man has yet been 
civilised.’263 Hyndman warned that: ‘Those schemes for the reorganisation 
of society which Fourier, Saint Simon, Owen, Lassalle, Marx, and others 
propounded are no longer the mere dreams of impracticable theorists or 
the hopeless experiments of misguided enthusiasts’; rather, they had ‘been 
taken down from the closet of the Utopian investigator into the street,’ and 
moved ‘vast masses of men to almost religious exasperation against their 
fellows.264  
Here, the coupling of the modern Socialists, Ferdinand Lassalle and 
Marx, with their earlier forebears betrayed a lack of caution absent 
elsewhere in the article. Hyndman’s exposition of the progress of Socialism 
in Europe was typically more judicious. He showed himself well-informed 
about the movements in France, Germany, and other European countries. 
No doubt, Marx had helped to give some shape to Hyndman’s 
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understanding of those contemporary national movements during their 
first meetings together in late 1880. And, indeed, Hyndman’s observations 
on Russia registered the retreat that Marx had performed in the 1870s on 
the unilinear character of his theory.265 But what is most striking about 
Hyndman’s account is the critical distance that he put between himself and 
the Socialist theorists he invoked, the author of Capital included.  
 Hyndman’s unflattering description of the modern Socialist 
movement and its intellectual pilots was emphatically not a rhetorical 
strategy; allusions to the process of ‘so-called primitive accumulation’, 
cyclical crises of overproduction, and the phenomenon of surplus-value 
were omitted for an altogether quite different reason. Simply stated, 
Hyndman had not imbibed much of Marx’s theory. His primary frame of 
reference was provided, instead, by Fawcett, and he made no bones about 
recycling some of the latter’s seemingly unpromising claims. Thus, the poor 
law was declared by Hyndman to be ‘distinctly communistic’.266 Indeed, ‘it 
is difficult to see how any system could be more completely so in intention’, 
he argued, in direct imitation of Fawcett, ‘than that which puts it in the 
power of an able-bodied man to live upon the earnings or savings of others, 
because he has been unlucky or lazy himself.’267 The tone paralleled that of 
his former lecturer in political economy, too – shrill, despite its objective 
pretensions. Like Mill’s Chapters, as well as Fawcett’s twin-cautionary 
statements on Socialism, the tenor of Hyndman’s article was anticipatory 
and preventative rather than outrightly constructive. Unlike Cunningham 
and Kaufmann’s contributions, he did not elucidate a rigorous and 
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sustained analysis of the superiority of Socialism to Capitalism as a mode of 
production. Nevertheless, he did borrow, unashamedly, from 
Cunningham’s materialist inquiry to fulfil the second aim of his article, 
namely, to show that ‘Communism in the sense of State and Municipal 
management’ was ‘making head continuously’, not only in Europe, but in 
Britain and the other ‘Anglo-Saxon communities’ too.268 
  Hyndman averred – as Cunningham had done before him – that,  
whilst we are arguing about Communism, and in some directions 
upholding the old idea that competition, not State management, 
must be the rule, we ourselves are slowly advancing, without 
perhaps observing it, towards the system which when proposed in 
all its bluntness we denounce as a chimera under the present 
circumstances of mankind.269  
He recycled the assertion posited by Cunningham and Kaufmann that, 
taken together, the postal and telegraph arrangements, the proliferation of 
instances of municipal organisation and control, and the free-school 
system, all provided evidence that competition was ‘being given up as a 
principle in favour of organisation for the common benefit’.270 Yet, in 
contrast to Cunningham and Kaufmann’s overall line of argumentation, 
Hyndman’s contention was not underpinned by a social evolutionary 
theory, less still by a ‘historical materialist’ philosophy. Rather, like Mill, 
Socialism, for Hyndman, was primarily a question of expediency. In fact, it 
is no exaggeration to suggest that the third and final aim of Hyndman’s 
article – to organize a compromise position – revealed a remarkable affinity 
between his sense of the specific conjuncture and the intellectual legacy 
bestowed in Mill’s Chapters. Indeed, in insisting that those to whom the 
article was addressed urgently recognise the implications of the extended 
franchise in the context of ubiquitous poverty and injustice, while the 
                                                          





circulation of Socialist ideas increased meanwhile in intensity on the 
Continent, Hyndman was perhaps truly Mill’s rightful heir. 
Of course, there can be no doubt that the main thrust of Hyndman’s, 
notably imprecise, idea of ‘social reorganisation’ substantially exceeded the 
much more limited purview of Mill’s own economic proposals. There was 
no mention in ‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’ of co-operative stores, 
industrial partnership, and small-scale practical experiments. Instead, 
Hyndman argued that ‘the tendency of the time’ involved ‘the principle of 
the State or Commune’s control.’271 Just what that meant exactly in practice 
was not entirely clear, since he expounded no specific programme of 
reform. But it certainly did not entail ‘dealing with all property for the 
benefit of the mass, and not for the individual’.272 Indeed, the following 
catalogue of grievances gives some indication of the relatively modest scope 
of Hyndman’s ambition: 
The large blocks of city property concentrated in the hands of 
individuals; the entire exclusion of the poor man from the 
possession of the land; the manner in which in municipal 
arrangements the poorer quarters are sacrificed to the rich; the 
indifference too often shown to the interests of the wage-earning 
class when whole neighbourhoods are swept out of their place to 
benefit the community without proper provision for the housing of 
the inhabitants elsewhere; the impossibility of obtaining real 
consideration for the needs of the masses in the matter of 
recreation, fresh air, and pure water, especially where vested 
interest are involved; the general inclination to consider the 
ratepayer first and the benefit of the population afterwards; these 
and other like points are now being talked over by men who have 
experienced the evils of the present system, and are ready by fair 
means to put an end to them.273 
Hyndman and Mill shared a fear of ‘ignorant change and ignorant 
opposition to change’.274 That meant that ‘some of the cherished theories of 
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ordinary political economy’ had to be overridden.275 But it did not mean 
that society was ‘prepared to transcend all previous experience of human 
motives’ to realise a ‘materialist Utopia’.276 
 
If, then, Cunningham and Kaufmann can be said to have articulated, 
according to the criterion established by Mill, a form of ‘revolutionary 
Socialism’ with the revolution taken out, then Hyndman’s call for reform 
was even more circumspect. While the latter pair forecast a total eclipse of 
the Capitalist mode of production, it seems that Hyndman did not envisage 
any particularly far-reaching change. Hyndman’s article in the Nineteenth 
Century may have been a patchwork assembled from arguments borrowed 
from Cunningham, Fawcett, and Mill, but on a map of the discussion of 
Socialism in the periodical press the coordinates of his location were 
doubtlessly nearest to the latter’s position. Certainly, there was nothing 
remotely utopian in what he had to say there. Nor was there the slightest 
sign of any of the ‘social and psychological stresses’ that induced others to 
embrace Socialism during the 1880s.277 While that was also true of 
Cunningham and Kaufmann, Hyndman betrayed a reticence akin to Mill’s 
that was plainly absent from their much more optimistic analyses. Neither 
did that change dramatically in Hyndman’s next significant literary effort, 
England for All, the manifesto he drafted for the founding conference of the 
Democratic Federation in June 1881.  
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If the re-reading of ‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’ produced a certain 
unease for Hyndman from the vantage-point of thirty years hence, his next 
effort – that which led to the breach with Marx – caused him no such 
retrospective discomfort. It may have taken him two years to ‘comprehend 
fully Marx’s economics and philosophy of history’, or at least Engels’s 
rendering of that so-called philosophy of history, but the policy ‘sketched 
out for Home, Colonial, Irish, Indian and Foreign affairs’ in England for All 
was still pertinent, he held, in 1911.278 Although historians have typically 
characterised Hyndman’s book as a ‘programme of Tory Democracy’ with a 
summary of Marx’s economic ideas thrown in for good measure, it was 
precisely the fact that the Tory Democrats, or Fourth Party, led by 
Randolph Churchill had begun to ‘make way’ in 1880 that convinced him to 
‘take the plunge’ and formulate a definite policy of his own for the 
consideration of the first members of the incipient Democratic Federation – 
that, and the no less important fact, of course, that ‘Liberalism had given 
itself over to Coercion and Aggression’.279  
Two issues loomed particularly large during the opening months of 
1881 and 1882. Taken together, they precipitated a wave of disaffection 
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from the Liberal Party among members of London’s Radical clubs, making 
the prospect of a revival of Chartism, as Hyndman had hoped, seem 
possible for a short window of time. Namely, the government’s policy in 
Egypt, but, above all, its policy in Ireland.280 ‘It seems incredible, at this 
time of day,’ Hyndman wrote in his autobiography,  
that a Liberal government, headed by Mr. Gladstone and comprising 
such men as the extreme Radical Mr. Chamberlain then was, Sir 
Charles Dilke, Mr. Henry Fawcett, and others, with a strong Radical 
party behind them numbering some one hundred and thirty strong, 
should have been engaged in putting down in Ireland, by sheer force 
of arms and police brutality and buck-shot, those ordinary 
commonplace liberties which on this side of the Channel are 
regarded, too laxly, as beyond even Whig interference; and that this 
should have been done in the interest of one of the worst land-
owning classes that ever preyed upon a community, whose 
outrageous proceedings that very same Government had vainly 
attempted to check.281 
‘It was an extraordinary position’, he rightly concluded.282 And by taking 
steps to form a federation of the advanced Radical workingmen’s clubs of 
the capital in the spring of 1881, Hyndman sought to capitalise on its 
fallout. 
At its inception, the Democratic Federation comprised an unsteady 
union of estranged popular Gladstonian Liberals, similarly disaffected 
metropolitan Secularists, and a smaller number of followers of the former 
Chartist leader, James Bronterre O’ Brien.283 Its preliminary meetings were 
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attended by the Positivists, Edward Beesly and Henry Crompton, and the 
Radical M.P. Joseph Cowen was expected to play a leading role in its 
prospective career. As it turned out, the leadership fell to Hyndman. But 
there was nothing inevitable about that eventuality.284 Within months of its 
founding conference, most of the Radical clubs withdrew from the nascent 
organisation when an election committee formed to assist the Land League 
candidate in the Tyrone by-election in September, headed by Hyndman, 
issued a manifesto criticising ‘the hollowness and hypocrisy of capitalist 
Radicalism.’285 Thenceforth, the Federation was left only with its O’ Brienite 
backers and the disparate, and numerically slight, set of popular Radicals 
convinced by Hyndman’s arguments in England for All.286 Its constricted 
ranks were replenished by an influx of middle-class supporters at the end of 
1882 in the wake of Henry George’s tour of England. However, it was the 
outgoing mass of popular Radicals, adherents of the kind of ideas 
articulated by Fawcett and Holyoake – devotees of anti-Statist, pro-free 
trade, and Malthusian attitudes – that encompassed the imagined 
community of readers that Hyndman envisaged for the manifesto he wrote 
for the new organisation.287 That being so, it was specifically tailored 
therefore to persuade that audience, and Hyndman attempted to strike the 
right chords to resonate with that distinctively inauspicious milieu.  
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As Edward Pease later put it, England for All was an ‘extremely 
moderate proposal’.288 Notwithstanding Hyndman’s retrospective 
affirmation of its content, it exhibited both continuities and discontinuities 
with ‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’, his previous intervention on the 
topic of social reform, which he had, of course, retrospectively spurned. 
Aside from its length and detail, it evinced at least two pronounced breaks 
with its predecessor. The first fissure was represented by the social group to 
whom Hyndman appealed. Between January and June 1881, Hyndman’s 
confidence in the upper classes as potential agents of change had begun to 
recede, and in England for All he exhorted the working class to ‘rely on 
their own power and peaceful strength’ instead.289 The second rupture, 
meanwhile, was that Hyndman had completely absorbed Marx’s critical 
analysis of capitalist production, and he recycled it wholesale in that 
contribution along with allusions to a materialist view of history.  
In many respects, Hyndman’s unauthorised manifesto was clearly 
an altogether more audacious and iconoclastic affair. But, despite its 
fiercely unheterodox leanings, and its numerous rhetorical flourishes, the 
programme remained, above all – like its precursor – resolutely Millian in 
detail nonetheless. Economically, the specific ‘stepping-stones to further 
development’ that Hyndman advanced stayed more or less within the remit 
of the framework set out in Mill’s Chapters.290 The intention, of course, was 
to eventually go further. But in the meantime Hyndman cleaved to a 
strikingly modest set of legislative targets: the railways for management by 
the State, for example, and mines, factories, and workshops merely for 
supervision. Moreover, in a more general sense too, Hyndman’s programme 
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remained firmly in step with the arguments of other New Liberals like T. H. 
Green and Arnold Toynbee. 
 
Like ‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’, England for All was not an 
original work. Rather, it faithfully mirrored, or was parasitic to, a series of 
extant intellectual and political trends. In addition to its debt to Marx and 
Mill, it took its bearings on the question of the trajectory of English history 
from Thorold Rogers, another figure, like Cunningham, associated with the 
emerging historical school of economics.291 Its proposal to intensify, rather 
than reverse, imperial federation, and transform the House of Lords into a 
Great Council for the direct representation of all of Britain’s colonies and 
dependencies, was likewise little more than an inchoate imitation of the 
prevailing tendency among many public moralists during the 1870s, 
spanning both Conservative and Liberal political camps, to construct 
elaborate plans for a range of hybrid colony-state architectures.292 Finally, 
the ‘positively coercive’ legislation that had accrued over the preceding 
years, and intensified in quality since 1880, which had previously caused 
such alarm to Fawcett, provided a series of precedents upon which 
Hyndman could hang his own constructive arguments.  
Of these acts of legislation, the Irish Land Bill was undoubtedly the 
most important. Toynbee, for instance, described it in 1882 as a ‘most 
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startling piece of Socialistic legislation’, and positioned it historically as the 
direct heir to the Factory Acts of the 1830s.293 Like Hyndman, Toynbee 
regarded ‘the principle of the Irish Land Act’ as progressive. ‘That Act’, he 
insisted,  
marks not only an epoch in the history of Ireland, but also in the 
history of Democracy. It means – I say it advisedly – that the 
Radical party has committed itself to a Socialist programme. I do 
not mean the Socialism of the Tory Socialist; I do not mean the 
Socialism of Robert Owen; but I mean that the Radicals have finally 
accepted and recognised the fact... that between men who are 
unequal in material wealth there can be no freedom of contract.294 
Donald Winch usefully characterised Toynbee’s standpoint as a ‘One 
Nation version of New Liberalism’, and that cap fits Hyndman perfectly 
too.295 The Socialist arguments propounded by Hyndman and Toynbee 
coincided not only in the constraint of their – immediate – respective 
ambitions, but also in their appeal to the republican discourse of duty 
articulated by Mazzini and others.296 Moreover, similar parallels are 
available between Hyndman and Toynbee’s mentor, Green, the 
quintessential Victorian exponent of ‘neo-Roman’ values.297  
In the first instance, both Hyndman and Green were agreed that 
freedom from constraint or compulsion – ‘negative liberty’ – was freedom 
of only a nominal kind. Freedom was meaningful, for both men, only in a 
‘positive sense’, as a ‘positive power or capacity of doing or enjoying 
something worth doing or enjoying’.298 Hyndman’s rhetoric may have 
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attained Ruskinian proportions in places in England for All, in contrast to 
Green’s more measured prose, but he and Green were nonetheless at one in 
the opinion that ‘it is the business of the State’, as the latter put it, ‘to 
maintain the conditions without which a free exercise of the human 
faculties is impossible’.299  
Equally, both men refused to believe that anything much would have 
changed over the preceding fifty years in the absence of State intervention. 
As Green enquired rhetorically: 
Could the enlightened self-interest or benevolence of individuals, 
working under a system of freedom of contract, have ever brought 
them [the suffering classes] into a state compatible with the free 
development of the human faculties? No one considering the facts 
can have any doubt as to the answer to this question. Left to itself, or 
to the operation of casual benevolence, a degraded population 
perpetuates and increases itself.300 
Unlike Hyndman, or the late Mill for that matter, Green did not 
deploy the language of slavery to describe the condition of a certain stratum 
of workers in Britain. But he did not refrain from designating, at the same 
time, various forms of freedom of contract as ‘an instrument of disguised 
oppression’.301  
Of course, the parallels between Hyndman and Green were merely 
incidental. Not surprisingly, given his rationalist credentials, Hyndman 
showed no interest in philosophical idealism. By the same token, despite a 
subsequent affinity, Toynbee’s utterances on Radicalism and Socialism 
were issued after Hyndman had written England for All, playing therefore 
no part either in its creation. Certainly, there is no suggestion here of 
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anything more, at this stage, than mere resemblance. Rather, the 
consonance between the various writings of Hyndman, Green, and Toynbee 
serve simply as a useful index of contemporary Radical thought.302 In any 
case, the lack of certain qualifying clauses in Hyndman’s book – namely, the 
retention of the language of self-help – constitutes a notable discrepancy 
between his work and that of other Radicals, providing an indication of the 
course that he alone would later travel.303 For while Green, Toynbee, and 
other New Radicals of their generation attempted to manipulate the criteria 
for applying existing commendatory terms like self-help and self-reliance, 
Hyndman, by contrast, simply dropped them from usage altogether.  
In England for All, Hyndman concentrated his innovatory energy 
on neutralising the negative evaluative force attached to the words 
communism and Socialism.304 Hyndman, to be sure, maintained his 
pronounced reservations about Socialism in its numerous Continental 
configurations. But, like Cunningham and Kaufmann before him, he 
assigned value to the enhanced role assumed by the State in modern 
Socialist theories. He sought to legitimize the gradualist and constitutional 
acts and proposals hitherto stigmatized as Socialistic – State provision of 
fitting dwellings for the working classes, for example, or the Irish Land Bill 
– not by reversing the evaluative charge of such descriptions, but by 
portraying them rather as preposterous.  
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In 1885 Arthur Balfour announced to the delegates of the Industrial 
Remuneration Conference that ‘In England it has been land rather than 
capital,’ which had historically borne the brunt of attacks on ‘existing social 
arrangements’.305 ‘In England,’ he continued, ‘where socialism has never as 
yet taken profound root, political events and economic theories have 
combined to turn the attention of would-be social reformers in the direction 
of land’.306 In issuing these dual-statements, Balfour was undoubtedly right. 
As Mill’s remarks in Chapters cited in the previous section indicate, the 
possession of land had been attributed a peculiar status in Radical 
discourse: the ‘unearned increment’ of mere ownership – as opposed to the 
merited profits of active cultivation – rendered it an exceptional case, 
exempt from the principles governing the rights enjoyed by other forms of 
property.307 Besides, owing to a series of ostensibly anomalous laws its 
distribution in Britain was also abnormally limited, thus fomenting the 
more moderate, and more pervasive, Cobdenite demand for free trade in 
land.308 In the years between the Second Reform Act and the formation of 
the Democratic Federation, the most notable extra-parliamentary 
organisations took the question of land as their central concern: the Land 
Tenure Reform Association formed by Mill and his supporters in 1868, the 
working class Land and Labour League founded a year later, and 
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Bradlaugh’s short-lived Land Law Reform League established in 1880.309 
Yet Balfour’s observations gestured, also, at something more: it shed light, 
too, on the task confronting any would-be social reformer just as anxious to 
attack capital, as others had been, traditionally, to mount an assault on 
land.  
In order to legitimate strikes on the former category of property, 
social reformers like Hyndman would, in short, have to attempt to show 
how at least some of the appraisive language of land reform could be 
applied to their own prospective schemes.310 In the period before he became 
a ‘doctrinaire’, Hyndman therefore sought to bring that precise manoeuvre 
off.311 Hyndman hoped to demonstrate that the concept of the ‘unearned 
increment’ on land was commensurable with Marx’s notion of surplus 
value, and he deployed a Radical vocabulary in an effort to make the charge 
stick. Thus, in England for All, he argued that, ‘Those who own the soil, and 
those who manufacture... live alike in luxury and in idleness out of the 
sweat and the misery of others.’312 Hence, Joseph Chamberlain who 
extracted ‘unearned profit’ from ‘the working classes by extra labour, and 
owns a rigid monopoly,’ was condemned for duplicity (along with the other 
‘plutocrats’ peopling the Liberal benches in the House of Commons) by 
simultaneously ‘posing as a leader of the democracy.’313 It ‘behoves us to be 
careful,’ he counselled, 
lest, in getting rid of the excessive influence of one dominant class, 
we do but strengthen the power of a meaner and a worse one in its 
place. If possession of land – as all reformers agree – should be 
                                                          
309 See John Saville, ‘Henry George and the British Labour Movement’, Science & 
Society, 24/4 (1960), pp. 321-333; and Wolfe, From Radicalism to Socialism, pp. 
52-65, 79-93. 
310 See Skinner, again, Visions of Politics. Volume One, Ch. 8. 
311 G. D. H. Cole, A History of Socialist Thought. Volume 2. Marxism and 
Anarchism, 1850-1890 (London, Macmillan, 1954), p. 409. 
312 Hyndman, England for All, p. 63. 
313 Ibid., p. 56. 
87 
 
regulated in the interests of the country in time to come, so also 
must capital, machinery, and the national highways. Conservatism 
has come to mean the dominance of landowners: Liberalism has 
been degraded to the service of capitalists. There is little perhaps to 
choose; but for the people it is to the full as important in the future 
that capital should be controlled as the land.314 
Simply stated, Hyndman was at pains to make clear that, under 
conditions of an increasingly monopolistic capitalism, the opposition 
between the industrious and the idle was no less relevant to the social 
relations surrounding the use of capital than it had been, and still was, 
when it was a question of land. In the new conjuncture, he suggested, Mill’s 
notion of the ‘wages of the labour of superintendence’ was obsolete.315  
 For a social reformer trying to convince an audience primarily 
composed of popular Gladstonian Liberals and Secularists schooled in the 
parallel politics of Bradlaugh of the need for an unprecedented expansion of 
the State and a concurrent circumscription of free-trade – a very tall order, 
needless to say – there can be no doubt that the strategy that Hyndman 
deployed was a shrewd one.316 However, the purported identity between 
certain aspects of the Radical tradition and Marx’s critique of capitalism 
was not actually so far-fetched. For different reasons, W. H. Mallock, for 
example, also pointed to their congruity: ‘the whole Liberal party,’ he wrote, 
‘if it does not consciously endorse these doctrines, at least more or less 
timidly, is pledged to many of their corollaries.’317 The ‘doctrines’ that 
Mallock had in mind belonged to Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, Marx, and 
Lassalle, and he summed them up in the following aphorisms: ‘‘Property is 
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theft.’ ‘Capital is fossil labour.’ ‘Physical labour is the source of all wealth 
and culture’’.318 As Mallock essentially implied, and Hyndman attempted to 
realise, if capitalists could be shown to be simple beneficiaries of the labour 
of others with little or no input of their own, land and capital could be 
brought convincingly under the same umbrella. The novelty of England for 
All resided, not in its practical proposals, but in its execution of that 
rhetorical move.  
 
For Ruskin, social reform demanded only procuring ‘a sufficient quantity of 
honesty in our captains [of industry]’.319 The Positivists too went no further 
than the notion of ‘moralisation’.320 For Hyndman, though, social reform 
entailed the complete displacement of the capitalist class from the field of 
production. However, in the interim, Hyndman cleaved to a set of demands 
in keeping with Toynbee’s binary-principle that State interference was 
justified, firstly, ‘where individual rights conflict with the interests of the 
community’, and, second, ‘where the people are unable to provide a thing 
for themselves and that thing is of primary social importance’.321  ‘To 
expect that the nation will at once abandon its idea of fancied individual 
freedom, in favour of a real collective freedom which shall consult and care 
for the interests of all, is a chimera’, Hyndman wrote. ‘But seeing, as we 
cannot but see,’ he continued, ‘the plain economical basis of so much of the 
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misery we all deplore, is it not reasonable that more rapid steps should be 
made in the direction of general improvement?’322  
Hyndman confined his initial proposals to the following: [i] an eight 
hour day; [ii] free and compulsory education; [iii] compulsory construction 
by the municipalities and county assemblies of fitting dwellings for the 
working classes; and [iv] the provision of really cheap transport. Hyndman 
entertained no illusions that ‘these changes would check the fearful crises 
consequent upon the capitalist system of production’.323 All the same, he 
was confident that ‘they would lead the way gradually to a better system’.324 
‘Private enterprise has been tried and found wanting’, he insisted: 
laissez-faire has had its day. Slowly the nation is learning that the 
old hack arguments of “supply and demand,” “freedom of contract,” 
“infringement of individual liberty,” are but so many bulwarks of 
vested interests, which inflict misery on the present, and 
deterioration on the next, generation, in the name of a pseudo-
science of government.325 
Notwithstanding either the intimation of Marx or the ratcheted up 
rhetoric, Hyndman maintained the wary attitude to impulsive action 
recommended by Mill and other Liberal social reformers. That is to say, he 
maintained the attitude displayed in ‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’. 
It goes without saying that Hyndman no longer viewed Socialism primarily 
as a question of expediency. But Hyndman still sought to erect a barrier 
between his own programmatic proposals and the schemes proffered by 
Continental Socialists, as the following statement, and strategic slippage, 
made clear: 
Mere destruction for its own sake – anarchy, where the demon of 
Socialism may take the foremost and the hindmost together – is not 
in accordance with the views of Englishmen. To pull down a system, 
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however bad, they must see that something is ready to take its 
place.326 
 
To the four demands enumerated above, Hyndman added three more; and, 
in so doing, he re-engaged directly with Mill’s Chapters. Writing in 1869, 
Mill argued that, 
The richest competitor neither does nor can get rid of all his rivals, 
and establish himself in exclusive possession of the market; and it is 
not the fact that any important branch of industry or commerce 
formerly divided among many has become, or shows any tendency 
to become, the monopoly of a few.327 
In England for All, Hyndman issued a temporally fractured retort. ‘This 
question of monopolies is rapidly coming to the front’, he replied: 
The old notion that competition would always come in to serve the 
community, has proved wholly fallacious... the power of the great 
companies to fight off those whom they consider intruders, has been 
exercised without any scruple whatever. All the recent evidence 
tends in the same direction. The railway companies treat their 
customers as if the public had been specially created by some 
beneficent providence for these monopolists to prey upon and get 
interest for shareholders... and we see in America that the system is 
carried yet further.328  
Despite Mill’s disinclination to believe that competition might 
eventuate in monopoly, he commended a course of action for that 
eventuation nonetheless. Mill argued that, 
businesses which require to be carried on by great joint-stock 
enterprises cannot be trusted to competition, but, when not reserved 
by the State to itself, ought to be carried on under conditions 
prescribed, and, from time to time, varied by the State, for the 
purpose of insuring to the public a cheaper supply of its wants than 
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would be afforded by private interest in the absence of sufficient 
competition.329 
Here, Hyndman followed Mill’s lead. Like Mill, he isolated the railways – 
his fifth demand – as a fitting candidate for State management, adding that 
‘in certain matters management by the State is essential to efficiency.’330 
Even more important, though, there were moral issues to consider: 
uppermost in Hyndman’s mind was less the ‘prices of commodities’, but 
ensuring that the organization of combinations redounded to the 
‘advantage of all’.331 
While Hyndman’s other demands may not have directly echoed 
Mill’s Chapters – namely [vi] the establishment of a department for the 
main watercourses, canals, and forestry to mitigate environmental 
destruction; and [vii] an extension of the Factory and Mines Acts, and 
inspection of shipping – they were at least issued in the same spirit. The 
grounds for making them were also covered by a clause which Mill inserted. 
Mill argued: 
A proposed reform in laws and customs is not necessarily 
objectionable because its adoption would imply, not the adaptation 
of all human affairs to the existing idea of property, but the 
adaptation of existing ideas of property to the growth and 
improvement of human affairs. This is said without prejudice to the 
equitable claim of proprietors to be compensated by the State for 
such legal rights of a proprietary nature as they may be dispossessed 
of for the public advantage... [S]ociety is fully entitled to abrogate or 
alter any particular right of property which on sufficient 
consideration it judges to stand in the way of the public good.332 
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In conformity with Mill’s strictures, Hyndman proceeded with the same 
measured resolve in positing his suggestions for land reform, a much less 
controversial, but decidedly more proposal-laden field of inquiry than 
capital and labour. Hyndman began by invoking the popular idea of ‘merrie 
England’, the idea that the fifteenth century constituted a ‘golden age’ of 
agriculture when prosperous, independent peasants peopled the land.333 
Hyndman stressed, however, that the desire to ‘put the clock back 400 
years’ was indefensible.334  
Following Mill’s death in 1873, the Land Tenure Reform Association 
ran out of steam. It began to peter out shortly after. However, its 
programmatic successor, Bradlaugh’s Land Law Reform League, was still in 
the vigour of youth when Hyndman began writing England for All.335 At 
around the same time of the decline of the LTRA, the more ambitious Land 
and Labour League atrophied too. But its call for nationalization was taken 
up by Alfred Russel Wallace in 1880. The following year the English Land 
Nationalization Society was formed under Wallace’s guidance. The presence 
of these organisations, both actual and incipient, form the background to 
Hyndman’s utterances. 
Hyndman refused to believe that either free trade in land or 
compulsory subdivision would achieve any longstanding benefit to 
agricultural producers or the nation at large. Wallace’s scheme, on the other 
hand, first elaborated in the Contemporary Review in November 1880, 
                                                          
333 Biagini, Liberty, Retrenchment, Reform, pp. 86-89. Contrary to Bevir’s 
suggestion, Hyndman’s nostalgia for the ‘golden age’ was no different in spirit from 
the sympathy shown for the same phenomenon by Mill, Fawcett, Thornton, or 
Cowen. Making of British Socialism, p. 67.  
334 Hyndman, England for All, p. 27. For a discussion of some of the arguments of 
its other proponents see Antony Taylor, ‘Richard Cobden, J. E. Thorold Rogers, and 
Henry George’, in Matthew Cragoe and Paul Readman (eds.), The Land Question in 
Britain, 1750-1950 (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), pp. 146-166. 
335 Before, that is, the parliamentary oath saga effectively deprived it of its leader, 
inaugurating its own descent. Wolfe, From Radicalism to Socialism, p. 82. 
93 
 
came considerably closer to the mark.336 Wallace’s proposal was the most 
far-reaching of its kind to have received widespread public attention. Yet it 
was notably cautious. In the first instance, land would be permitted to 
legally descend for four generations beyond the existing owner before 
passing on to the State. And, secondly, it would be distributed among a 
large number of small cultivators paying ground rent for their plots to the 
Government directly.337 Hyndman, by contrast, had a more ambitious plan, 
involving the maximization of the country’s productive resources. However, 
the ‘period’, he averred, was a transitional one. Hyndman proposed, 
therefore, the following four reforms as an intermediary solution: [i] reform 
of the law of entail and settlement; [ii] compulsory registration of title; [iii] 
extension of the power of local bodies to acquire land for all purposes and 
to lease it in small portions; and [iv] compensated expropriation of 
property-owners in large cities. Notwithstanding their comparative 
imprecision, and their Millian regard for compensation, even these 
outstripped Wallace’s plan for verve. As Hyndman argued: 
No confiscation or revenge for the forced removal of the people from 
the land is asked for. But the unborn have no rights, and the nation 
has always both the power and the right to take any land at a fair 
valuation. By immediate limitation of the right of inheritance, and 
an application of the power of purchase, the State or the local 
authority would speedily come into possession of land, which could 
be used for the common interest, and some comfort and security 
obtained for those who at present have neither.338 
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With the most vexatious subjects – i. e. those topics of an explicitly 
economic nature – thus dealt with and put to one side in the first three 
chapters, the remainder of Hyndman’s book, the final five chapters, was 
turned over to questions of political reform, the colonies, and foreign 
affairs. In the second section of England for All, Hyndman therefore moved 
on from Mill’s Chapters and adopted his Representative Government as a 
template to work with, and controvert, instead. However, it was not only 
the ‘moral benefits of democratic self-government’ that closely paralleled 
Mill’s ruminations on desirable forms of government.339 Rather, 
Hyndman’s arguments shadowed Mill’s thesis in numerous ways, charting 
meticulously its chapters dedicated to the extension of the suffrage right 
through to its final portion on the government of dependencies by a Free 
State. Moreover, although the historiography is almost uniformly silent on 
this engagement with Mill’s ideas, herein lies one of the most important 
sources of many of the positions for which Hyndman has been condemned 
as a Conservative or Tory Radical. For example, as we shall see, Hyndman’s 
notional chauvinism, his so-called imperialism, and the ambivalence he 
displayed over full manhood suffrage, among other items, can all be traced 
to Mill’s book. 
 To begin with, Hyndman received encouragement from 
Representative Government in formulating his view of the British Empire, 
and, more particularly, in the role he accorded to the colonies composed, in 
Mill’s words, ‘of people of similar civilization to the ruling country’.340 To be 
sure, the presiding impulse in Hyndman’s scheme for imperial federation 
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was provided by Dilke’s Greater Britain.341 But the reasons that Mill gave 
for ‘maintaining the present slight bond of connexion’, as well as the 
assessment he made of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ character also contributed to the 
rationalization underlying Hyndman’s overall plan.  
Hyndman, for instance, echoed Mill’s contention that the union of 
Britain and its colonies formed ‘a step, as far as it goes, towards universal 
peace, and friendly co-operation among nations.’342 Unlike Mill, however, 
Hyndman believed in the efficacy of an equal federation, and his 
enthusiasm for the retention, and enhancement, of the existing union was 
consequently of a much more thoroughgoing kind.  
Furthermore, the import that Hyndman invested in the English-
speaking democracies cohered neatly, too, with the vision set out by Mill.  
According to Hyndman, 
The Anglo-Saxon race, which has shown the world how to reconcile 
freedom and order with steady progress, can by combination and 
determined effort secure for themselves and their children the 
leadership in the social changes and reforms which are close at 
hand.343 
And, similarly, for Mill, in a much more unpolemical mode: 
The striving, go-ahead character of England and the United States is 
only a fit subject of disapproving criticism, on account of the very 
secondary objects on which it commonly expends its strength. In 
itself it is the foundation of the best hopes for the general 
improvement of mankind.344 
Hyndman also echoed Mill’s pronouncements (published elsewhere) 
on non-intervention in foreign affairs, in insisting that a ‘great country has 
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moral duties’ to perform in the same way that an individual person has.345 
Yet, these minor forays aside, the bulk of Hyndman’s engagement with 
Mill’s Representative Government was reserved for his observations on 
political reform. 
 As Logie Barrow and Ian Bullock observantly, but not altogether 
accurately, remarked, in England for All ‘Hyndman gave the impression of 
arguing himself into support for universal suffrage through many 
misgivings.’346 Following Mill’s commentary, Hyndman re-posited the ‘two-
fold danger’ inherent in the problem of the extension of the franchise that 
Mill isolated.347 ‘We are now in a vicious circle’, Hyndman reiterated, 
depositing, at the same time, evidence of the ongoing equivocation that 
Barrow and Bullock underscored: ‘Shut men out from voting,’ he claimed, 
‘and a minority unjustly controls the country: give the vote to all, and there 
is the risk of wholesale corruption, as well as that ignorance should become 
the ultimate court of appeal.’348 Still, Hyndman departed from Mill in 
arguing that, be that as it may, ‘Manhood suffrage could alone supply the 
power to carry out genuine reform’.349  
While Mill insisted that ‘universal teaching must precede universal 
enfranchisement’, Hyndman countered that, under present conditions, the 
prospect that parliament might legislate for ‘free compulsory education to 
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remedy this ignorance’ was wholly illusory.350 In contrast to Mill – and pace 
Barrow and Bullock – Hyndman did not sanction the latter’s disregard for 
‘the accident of sex’, confining his proposed reforms to men only.351 
Nonetheless, he did reject the concept of plural voting, Mill’s panacea for 
the problem of ‘ignorant democracy’. Thus, while the latter maintained that, 
‘though every one ought to have a voice – that every one should have an 
equal voice is a totally different proposition’, the former insisted that, ‘The 
right of all to a vote once conceded, no man can claim a greater share in 
representation than another.’352 
 In addition to these skirmishes, Hyndman also followed Mill on 
other issues. For example, in his proposal for a Great Council composed of 
representatives of the commonwealth and dependencies to replace the 
House of Lords Hyndman endeavoured to make it cohere with Mill’s 
prescriptions for a second chamber by insisting that to ‘sweep away any 
institution altogether’ is ‘scarcely our English way’.353 Likewise, following 
Mill’s argument that, ‘the chief magistrate in a republic should be appointed 
avowedly... by the representative body’, Hyndman averred that, ‘a reformed 
House of Commons should exercise far more direct control, delegating its 
authority... to a great officer of State and his department.’354 At the same 
time, however, Hyndman echoed Mill in arguing that ‘greater powers 
should be given to local assemblies to deal with many matters which now 
come before the House of Commons’; both men considered the ‘enormous 
amount of private business which takes up the time of Parliament, and the 
thoughts of its individual members, distracting them from the proper 
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occupations of the great council of the nation... as a serious evil’.355 As Wolfe 
acknowledged, Hyndman and Mill were agreed that local administrative 
institutions were the best instruments for procuring what Mill termed ‘the 
public education of the citizens’.356 Thus, Hyndman wrote that, a ‘wide 
scheme of decentralisation, carried out with a view to interesting the whole 
population in their local business’ would ‘give the working classes that 
impetus towards social improvement by their own energy which is so 
manifestly necessary’.357 Furthermore, it would have the additional merit of 
serving, as Mill suggested, ‘to strengthen the House of Commons for 
dealing with affairs now pushed aside by less important matters to the 
injury of the whole community’.358  
 
These utterances put paid, then – in a theoretical sense at least – to the 
charge that Hyndman’s attitude to social reform was at bottom 
paternalistic.359 In similar fashion, Hyndman’s clear-cut intellectual 
obligation to Mill, and his proximity to Toynbee and Green, should also put 
an end to the reputation he has acquired for espousing a form of Tory 
Radicalism.  The programme of social reform that Hyndman outlined in 
England for All was, to deploy an anachronistic term, a version of 
Municipal Socialism, more ambitious in the long-term than Chamberlain’s 
Birmingham experiment, but, in conformity with his Millian principles, 
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minus the regimentation associated with Fabian municipal schemes.360 
Moreover, besides the light it sheds on Hyndman’s liberal intellectual 
genealogy, his preoccupation with Representative Government was 
revealing in another sense. Obviously, Hyndman did not envisage either a 
revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat or the withering away of the 
State. Rather, in his relatively detailed exposition of organisation, 
Hyndman anticipated the improvement of the representative State instead.  
Before long, Hyndman, to be sure, moved on to the obstetric view of 
political practice promoted by Marx and Engels – the view, that is, that the 
task of Socialists ‘is not to design solutions to social problems but rather to 
facilitate the delivery of the solution which is already being produced by 
historical development’ – thus negating the need for scrupulously detailed 
proposals for political reform.361 Over time, he ceased, too, to appeal to 
considerations of justice.362 But in England for All Hyndman argued that, 
‘the working of capital is essentially immoral’, putting him therefore closer 
to Mill than Marx, who professed to tie every principle of justice to a 
specific mode of production.363 Although he now believed that the working 
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classes should rely on themselves alone, for Hyndman, the refusal of the 
upper classes to instigate social reform was still a moral failure. 
Consequently, like Mill and Mazzini, but decidedly unlike Marx, he sought 
to compensate for that dereliction with a plea for ‘some higher ideal of 
patriotism’.364  
Be that as it may, as Marx’s own remarks on the matter indicate, 
Hyndman’s overall reconstruction of the principal arguments outlined in 
Capital was generally error-free. The chapters on labour and capital were 
indeed ‘only literal extracts from, or circumlocutions of,’ Marx’s book. In 
short, Hyndman’s understanding of Marx’s economic principles as 
expounded in England for All was on the mark. The same, however, cannot 
be said of Bax’s exegesis of Capital, published in Modern Thought six 
months later. Without doubt, Hyndman was far less forthcoming than Bax 
in endorsing modern Socialism. But of the two pupils Hyndman’s grasp of 
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A Real Enthusiasm for the New Ideas 
 
In his letter to Sorge Marx praised the article that Bax had written for the 
journal Modern Thought, in which Bax outlined Marx’s central economic 
ideas. Yet, as we heard in Chapter 1, Marx also acknowledged that Bax’s 
article was not flawless. Firstly, the ‘biographical notices’ that Bax recorded 
were ‘mostly wrong’, Marx wrote; and, second, ‘In the exposition of my 
economic principles and in his translations (i.e., quotations of the Capital)’, 
he continued, much was also ‘wrong and confused’.365 Perhaps the most 
important aspect of that distorted exposition, however, was Bax’s 
reconstruction of Marx’s notion of surplus value. For, unlike Hyndman, Bax 
presented a garbled account of that pivotal concept, failing to make the 
distinction adequately between labour and labour power. Clearly, then, 
what Marx admired most about Bax’s article was, above all, its spirit. 
According to Marx, it was not only ‘pervaded by a real enthusiasm for the 
new ideas themselves’, but it also stood up ‘against Brit. Philistinism’ in a 
way that Hyndman nominally failed to.  
In contrast to Hyndman, Bax imposed no constraints on the ambit 
of his utterances. Established in 1879 under the editorship of the Fabian-to-
be J. C. Foulger, Modern Thought was an avant-garde journal.366 Thus, at 
variance with Hyndman, Bax was neither speaking to the governing classes, 
nor to a popular Radical audience. He therefore made no concessions to 
established conventions or native traditions of belief. Instead, Bax struck a 
                                                          
365 Marx and Engels, Collected Works. Vol. 46, p. 163. 
366 Race Mathews, Australia’s First Fabians. Middle Class Radicals, Labour 
Activists and the Labour Movement (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1993), p. 84; Pierson, Marxism and the Origins of British Socialism, p. 107. 
102 
 
far more insurgent note. Hence, he showed no reservations about 
describing Marx as ‘the greatest living exponent of the economical theory of 
Modern Socialism’, nor in suggesting, in what was probably a jibe at 
Hyndman, that,  
Socialism has little in common with that form of Radicalism so 
much favoured in England, which consists in the promotion of 
“reforms by constitutional means,” in vague spouting about 
progress, and general expressions of an amiable disposition of 
mind.367 
In political terms, far from constituting a virtue – pace Marx – Bax’s 
intransigence would prove rather to be a significant weakness. This forms 
the theme of Chapter 10. But Bax’s indifference to strategies of legitimation 
bore testament to the cosmic optimism that permeated his earliest writings, 
all of which were also published in Modern Thought between 1879 and 
1881. This chapter recovers the ideas set out in those articles. 
 
Marx’s appraisal of Bax’s article was positive. But Bax’s assessment of 
Capital, the consummation, he judged, of all of Marx’s previous work, was 
even more flattering.368 As we shall see here, however, between 1879 and 
1882, Marx’s critical analysis of capitalist production had to contend for 
space in Bax’s work with a conception, first, of Socialism based on the 
political ideas of Auguste Comte, and a social evolutionary theory, second, 
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derived from Herbert Spencer. The article on Marx marked the beginning of 
an intellectual transition for Bax. This chapter pursues how that played out. 
It charts how Bax’s Comtian Socialism was subsumed by an idea of 
Socialism based on an amalgam of Spencer and Marx instead. But before 
taking that trajectory on it is worth isolating here three claims that Bax 
issued in an otherwise largely unremarkable précis of Marx’s life and 
thought.  
The first of these claims was the ‘great discovery’ that Bax attributed 
to Marx, namely his discovery of ‘the real source and processes of industrial 
production’.369 The second was Bax’s choice of analogy: ‘The Kapital’, he 
wrote, ‘embodies the working out of a doctrine in economy, comparable in 
its revolutionary character and wide-reaching importance to the 
Copernican system in Astronomy, or the law of gravitation in Mechanics 
generally.’370 Needless to say, what makes these claims noteworthy is not 
their intrinsic merit – i.e. an understanding of Marx notable for its subtlety 
– but rather the evident absence of Engels’s mediation in their 
construction.371  
Marx’s main achievement had not yet been fixed as the discovery of 
the ‘law of development of human history’. Nor had the alleged parallel with 
Darwin’s discovery of ‘the law of development of organic nature’ been set in 
place.372 In the absence of Engels’s mature gloss, Bax, like Hyndman, had 
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scope to interpret freely. Yet, unlike Hyndman, Bax drew revolutionary 
conclusions from his encounter with Marx’s work. 
Bax’s revolutionary reading of Marx forms the third notable aspect 
of the article. Counter to ‘that excellent body of persons, the followers of M. 
Auguste Comte’, to moralise capital, he claimed, was on a par with ‘the 
moralisation of brigandage.’373 It was futile to attempt to ameliorate ‘the 
evils of capitalism’.374 As Bax pointed out in a previous article, what was 
needed was a total overhaul instead, a ‘form of social reconstruction... 
inaugurated on a higher and more enduring basis.’375 Writing just days 
before Hyndman distributed England for All at the inaugural conference of 
the Democratic Federation, Bax argued that, 
This basis it is vain to expect will be founded on the compromises 
which modern Liberalism affects, and which consist, for the most 
part, in attempting, to use the old metaphor, to put new wine in old 
bottles, or, in other words, to infuse the spirit of the new order into 
the forms of the old.376 
In contrast to Hyndman and Mill, Bax was not opposed to a 
revolutionary transition to Socialism. Nor, in opposition to Cunningham 
and Kaufmann, did he refrain from anticipating the realisation of ‘a 
millennium’.377 Rather, alone among the contributors to the discussion of 
Socialism in the periodical press between 1878 and 1881, Bax conformed to 
the revolutionary pole of Mill’s Socialist dichotomy. Indeed, in many ways, 
as we shall see in further detail in Chapters 10 and 11, he was a perfect 
example of the Socialist in possession of the ‘serene confidence in their own 
wisdom on the one hand and a recklessness of other people’s sufferings on 
the other’ that Mill held up as the ideal-typical representative of 
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revolutionary Socialism.378 For Bax, revolution was an unfortunate, but 
necessary prelude to the society of the future: 
That the revolution through which we are now passing will be closed 
by a purely peaceful process and without a convulsion of some kind, 
is to me scarcely credible. The opposing forces appear far too strong 
and uncompromising to admit of any well supposition. International 
warfare must, we are afraid, be succeeded by international 
revolution before the reign of force shall be finally ended.379 
 In adopting that standpoint, it helped no doubt that Bax belonged 
to a different generation and social milieu to Hyndman and other public 
moralists. Born in 1854 to a lower-middle class nonconformist family, Bax 
inhabited a comparatively disadvantaged social space. There was no public 
school and university education, for example, no membership of a Pall Mall 
gentleman’s club, nor, in consequence, did Bax enjoy that sense of intimacy 
with the practical concerns of the Victorian governing class shared by men 
like Hyndman.380 It was therefore much easier for Bax to take a more 
extreme stance, and his cultural preferences matched his iconoclastic 
political disposition.  
In philosophy, Bax championed Arthur Schopenhauer, and in the 
arts, he admired Richard Wagner. Bax wrote about them both for Modern 
Thought in the same series of articles as his subsequent submission on 
Marx.381 Bax’s main intellectual commitments, however, resided elsewhere. 
Before adopting Idealism once and for all as a starting-point in metaphysics 
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in 1882, Bax had been ‘captivated’, first, by Spencer, and his ‘thoroughgoing 
empiricism’ had ‘suffered a shock’ after a reading of Kant.382  
Bax’s early political connections, on the other hand, centred on the 
‘Positivist body’, whose meetings he had begun to attend following the 
overthrow of the Paris Commune in 1871 – a formative experience in his 
‘mental career’.383 On 18 March 1879, Bax attended the last annual dinner 
held in celebration of the Commune in London.384 And there, he met 
Hermann Jung, a French Swiss watchmaker residing in the metropolis. A 
former member of the First International, and an erstwhile disciple of 
Marx, Jung facilitated Bax’s entrance, both intellectually and 
organisationally, to the incipient Socialist movement. Jung introduced Bax 
to other revolutionary exiles like Johannes Most and Prince Kropotkin, who 
in turn introduced Bax to Hyndman.385 
 
Shortly after his introduction to Jung, Bax wrote his first article on modern 
Socialism in Modern Thought in August 1879. Not surprisingly, then, given 
his political background, the article bore the impress of Comte. Moreover, 
Holyoake had not been without some justification in making the connection 
between the Comtists and State Socialism in his article in the Nineteenth 
Century. Of course, neither Comte nor his British disciples were Socialists. 
But, even more than Mill, they were given nonetheless to treat 
‘Communism’ (a vague term, connoting in this context the various schemes 
of the former Saint Simonians, the contemporary Fourierists, Louis Blanc, 
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Etienne Cabet, and Proudhon in France, as well as the Owenites in 
England) with ‘indulgence’.386 To be sure, insofar as they sought to 
eliminate the division between directors and workers, Communists cleaved 
to a false view of the modern industrial system. But Comte and his disciples 
accorded value to the dissension of Communists from orthodox political 
economy, their appreciation of the social nature of property, and the 
‘generous sympathies’ by which they were inspired.387  
On Jung’s prompting, Bax first read Capital (in the original 
German) in the middle of 1879.388 However, Bax’s grasp of its argument was 
even less satisfactory then than it had been in 1881, and he showed no 
particular preference for Marx over other Socialists in the article. For 
example, Proudhon, Hartmann, Friedrich Albert Lange, and Eugen 
Dühring, the titular adversary of Engels’s groundbreaking book published 
the previous year, were all cited approvingly. Bax may have invoked Marx in 
a cack-handed reconstruction of his explanation of the origin of profit in its 
opening passage, but Royden Harrison was close to the mark in suggesting 
that this was ‘Socialism as seen through the eyes of a well-disposed 
Positivist’.389 
Bax was not, however, a Positivist. Even in 1879, he contravened 
Comte’s metaphysics, deviating from his empiricist epistemology on the one 
hand, and from his deterministic ontology on the other. In his first article 
for Modern Thought, for example, Bax posited a theory of knowledge based 
partly on Kant, and he repudiated Comte’s contention that human beings 
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‘are powerless to create’, that is, the idea that ‘all we can do in bettering our 
condition is to modify an order in which we can produce no radical 
change.’390 The article was entitled ‘The Word “Religion”’. In it Bax sought, 
like Comte, to rehabilitate religion by expunging it of its theistic content, 
giving it a modern, secular guise instead. Yet, as we shall see , the symmetry 
between the idea of the religion of the future that Bax set out and Comte’s 
Religion of Humanity was more apparent than real.  
Bax’s religion of Humanity was not inspired by Comte.391 
Nonetheless, Bax’s description of Socialism was inflected by Comtian 
theory. In his article on modern Socialism, Bax compared Positivism and 
Socialism as parallel attempts ‘to render progress systematic.’392 He also 
issued three Comtian proposals: firstly, inspired by Comte’s notion of a 
‘spiritual power’, Bax envisaged a Socialist society split into ‘two main 
divisions’, namely into a ‘working class proper... and a classe d’intelligence’, 
each performing distinct social functions; second, following Comte’s 
transitional policy, Bax posited the possibility of some kind of political 
dictatorship; and finally, Bax’s description of the political basis of modern 
Socialism also plainly had its origin in Comte: ‘The political goal of 
Socialism’, he wrote, 
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is the destruction of the current national boundaries... and the 
reconstruction of Europe as a Federal Republic, of which the larger 
cities would constitute the units, and which would unite the greatest 
possible local autonomy with solidarity as based on the authority of 
a central power, consisting of a bureau, or Federal Council, sitting 
probably at Paris.393 
For the rest, Bax disregarded Comte, and the objections to Communism he 
enunciated. The same was true of his conduct towards other receptive 
critics.  
 
It would be fair to say that Bax was aware of, but not part of, the discussion 
of Socialism that began the previous year in the Contemporary, Fortnightly 
and Nineteenth Century journals.394 In his own article on the same topic, 
for example, Bax registered his approval of Cunningham’s contribution. He 
also remarked that Mill’s ‘more than partial adhesion to Socialism’ in his 
‘last published writings’ was a ‘noteworthy fact’.395 However, Bax deviated 
from the arguments set out by both authors. As his comments on each of 
them suggest, Bax had a greater affinity with Cunningham’s projection than 
he did with Mill’s more inhibited account: of the former, he wrote that the 
‘general tendency of economic matters in a Socialist direction has been... 
ably pointed out’; Mill, meanwhile, merited mention only for the fact of 
conversion.396  
Still, Bax demurred at Cunningham’s application of the principle of 
natural selection. Although Cunningham used Darwin’s theory 
idiosyncratically, taking the society rather than the individual as the unit of 
adaptation, Bax insisted that it was ‘no less unphilosophical than immoral’ 
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to ‘attempt to carry Darwinism into the social sphere’.397 ‘Darwinism is true 
in the natural, viz., pre-Human order of things,’ he wrote,  
and so long as human progress is unsystematic, viz., unguided by 
reason, it obtains there also. But the true aim of human progress is 
to follow the human ideal, and not external nature. Nature is the 
lower, humanity the higher. The need of systematic progress is 
becoming more and more felt; the previous unsystematic or natural 
progress being seen no longer to answer to human needs.398 
Bax adhered to a slightly revamped Spencerian interpretation of 
evolutionary theory. It dispensed with the mechanism of natural selection 
in favour of a Lamarckian hypothesis compatible with the notion of 
progress.399 However, that notwithstanding, Bax and Cunningham were at 
least broadly in agreement.400 Bax and Mill, on the other hand, were 
divided by a notable gulf. 
 Bax was familiar with Mill’s Chapters. But Bax made no effort to 
engage with the constructive criticism that Mill levelled against 
revolutionary Socialist schemes. Instead, as with his approach to Comte’s 
objections, Bax sidestepped Mill’s censorious remarks. He did not 
acknowledge Mill’s attempt to set aright the nominally ‘one-sided notion of 
competition’ that ‘Socialists generally’ were purported to entertain. Nor did 
he endeavour to refute the ostensible ‘disadvantages’ that Mill held to be 
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‘inherent to’ Communist systems – the supposed ‘sacrifice of the economic 
advantages of the division of employments’; the ‘attempts to obtain 
exemptions by favour or fraud’; the ‘rivalry for reputation and for personal 
power’; and ‘the compression of individuality’.401 Rather, Bax persevered 
irrespectively. He outlined a vision of Socialism in which ‘no wealth could 
exist as capital apart from the State’.402  
In a passage that betrayed both his misapprehension of Marx and 
his defiance of Mill, Bax asserted that, 
By the Socialist State in its administration of industry, having no 
profit to deduct, but having solely public benefit in view; on the one 
hand, adequate remuneration would be ensured to the artificer, and 
on the other hand, the consumer would receive the commodity at 
the precise cost of production and not plus two or three layers of 
profit as at present.403 
Simply stated, Bax’s sanguine vision of the future remained undimmed by 
the problems that Mill anticipated. In the light, however, of the teleological 
forecast of ‘a collective consciousness’ that he posited elsewhere, Bax had 
good reason not to pay too much attention to such apparent trifles. The 
same was true of his failure here to assimilate Marx’s theory of surplus 
value – his ascription, that is, of the realisation of profit to the ‘increment 
over and above the cost of production’, rather than to the process of 
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capitalist production itself.404 All such attention to detail amounted to only 
so much pettifogging.  
 However, when it came to the ‘question of the manner in which the 
re-organized State should obtain possession of the requisites for 
production’, Bax found it convenient to lean on Mill. He argued that, as 
‘regards the land, it is admitted even by political economists to exist as 
private property only by a so-called prescriptive right’.405 To be sure, Bax 
was much less obliging than Mill on the question of compensation: ‘so far 
from its resumption by the people entitling private “owners” to any 
compensation,’ he wrote, ‘it is the latter who in strict justice ought to 
compensate the former for having been allowed to hold it as a source of 
profit for so long.’406 Nonetheless, Bax conceded that non-landed property 
was a different matter: ‘Although it may be alleged that as much of the 
private wealth of the community has been wrongly as rightly acquired 
under the present system,’ he averred, ‘it would be obviously an absurdity 
to attempt to institute any general distinction; therefore,’ Bax continued, 
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‘all property not landed or immediately derived from land must be 
considered as carrying with it a right of ownership’.407  
On this issue at least, Bax’s position in 1879 was conciliatory. 
Indeed, Bax even presented an alternative mode of transition to ‘the 
temporary concentration of power in the hands of a dictatorship’. It too, like 
Cunningham’s, was gradualist in ethos.408 He proposed, for example, firstly, 
‘the passing of a law of maximum and minimum… ensuring to the workman 
his adequate remuneration, and… fixing the price, at least, of all 
necessaries’;  and second, Bax proposed ‘the reduction of the existing 
system of rates and taxes to one progressive  income-tax on an ascending 
scale’.409 Still, Bax’s overall conception of Socialism remained Elysian. Its 
‘three bases’, he wrote, 
may be said to be in Industry the direction of a democratic State to 
take the place of private capitalists; in Politics a universal Federal 
Republic to take the place of the present Nationalist system; in 
Religion a human ideal to take the place of theological cults.410    
In contrast to Cunningham, then, Bax offered a cosmopolitan notion 
of Socialism which had nothing to do with shoring up Britain’s place in a 
rapidly changing international economic and military order.411 Similarly, in 
contrast to Mill, Bax’s conception of a Socialist economy did not involve the 
retention of the market; and it certainly had nothing to do with shoring up 
Britain’s ailing domestic order. Rather, the ‘human ideal’ contained the key 
to Bax’s notion of Socialism. For example, in a statement unlikely to curry 
favour with Marx, Bax averred that,  
Whatever prejudice may exist amongst many of the Socialist party 
against the word religion (owing to its lingering theological 
associations), Socialism is not opposed to religion, if the word be 
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meant to cover a purely human ideal; it indeed essentially implies 
such an ideal as its foundation.412 
‘This ideal’, he insisted, ‘animated… the greatest practical Socialist 
movement the world has yet seen – the Paris Commune’.413 
 
Bax’s article on modern Socialism and his next, more oblique, contribution 
to the same topic in Modern Thought were separated by an interval of 
twenty two months. Bax spent the best part of the intervening period in 
Berlin. He worked in Berlin for the Standard newspaper as assistant 
correspondent to the comparative philologist, Carl Abel.414 Bax did not meet 
any German Socialists during his sojourn in the capital of the newly-
founded German Empire.415 He did, though, befriend Eduard von 
Hartmann, the author of the immensely successful book, The Philosophy of 
the Unconscious.416 As with Schopenhauer, Bax rejected the pessimism that 
suffused Hartmann’s philosophy. But, as we shall see in Chapter 9, 
Hartmann’s effect on Bax was long-lasting. However, in the two-part article 
that Bax wrote for Modern Thought on his return from Berlin in 1881, it 
was, above all, to Spencer, ‘the great English philosopher of the seventies 
and eighties’ to whom Bax turned for inspiration.417  
 The first part of ‘The Ideal of the Future’ was published in April. 
What Bax sought to achieve in the first instalment was the reconciliation of 
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Religion and Science that Spencer had attempted in First Principles. The 
second part of the article was published in June. In that section Bax posited 
a critique and a rehabilitation of utilitarian morality galvanized, similarly, 
by Spencer’s appraisal of the ‘expediency philosophy’ in Social Statics. 
Taking as a starting-point Spencer’s assertion that, ‘there can never cease to 
be a place for something of the nature of Religion’, Bax insisted that the 
‘discovery and formulation’ of a ‘true and objective human ideal’ was ‘the 
great and all-important speculative problem of the age’.418 His main 
intention in ‘The Ideal of the Future’ was thus to explicate the ‘human 
ideal’. The following sections reconstruct how Bax accomplished those three 
tasks. 
 
To begin with, Bax argued that, taken alone, materialism and idealism were 
unsatisfactory bases for a convincing philosophy of knowledge and being. 
Dualism offered no alternative either. Rather, ‘mind-matter and subject-
object are inseparable correlative terms’, he wrote, the one essentially 
implying the other.419 Following Spencer’s analysis in First Principles, Bax 
posited that, ‘while conscious-experience is conditioned, there is an 
unconditioned element in the mind. This notion of unconditionedness,’ he 
continued, ‘though it can never become an object of thought, is nevertheless 
a permanent factor in consciousness.’420 Hence, ‘the primal error of theism’, 
on this view, entailed ‘separating the conditioned from the unconditioned, 
and thus erecting a dualism’, or, in other words, ‘in conceiving the Absolute 
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as transcendent rather than as immanent’.421 Empiricism and materialism, 
on the other hand, were guilty of the opposite fallacy, that is, the fallacy of 
denying the legitimacy of the idea of the unconditioned ‘as the essential 
basis of the conscious or phenomenal world.’422 Theism, then, according to 
Bax, ‘could defend itself against the assaults of a scepticism’ which ignored 
that elementary fact, ‘despite its weakness otherwise.’423.424 Bax believed, in 
accordance with Spencer, ‘that religions, even though no one of them be 
actually true, are yet all adumbrations of a truth’, namely ‘that the Power 
which the Universe manifests to us is inscrutable.’425 He did not treat 
religion instrumentally.  
For Bax, as for Spencer, the prospect of ‘our knowledge ever 
extending beyond the phenomenal’ was impossible.426  For the noumenal 
order, ‘as that of which the phenomenal order is the expression’, was 
essentially unknowable.427 The Absolute revealed itself ‘only as manifested 
in the Relative’. 428 Bax and Spencer were at one in the view that, as science 
advanced, ‘every addition to its surface does but bring it into wider contact 
with surrounding nescience.’429 ‘The explanation of that which is 
explicable,’ Spencer wrote, ‘does but bring into greater clearness the 
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inexplicableness of that which remains behind.’430 In any case, as Bax 
added, mere sense perception was an unreliable guide to the world:  
The fallacy of looking at the objective side of existence alone blinds 
us to the all-important truth that the conscious is not a constant but 
a variable quantity... The cognition of qualities in the object-world is 
consequent on differentiation of faculty in the subject-world. Our 
actual objective sense faculties (the five senses) afford us five 
different sets of perceptions or qualities in things. Another sense 
would afford us another set of perceptions or qualities, and so on ad 
infinitum.431 
What was true of ‘special sensation’, Bax observed, was ‘true of 
consciousness as a whole’.432 Hence, he concluded the first part of the 
article with the claim that, when considered from the standpoint of the 
‘doctrine of Evolution’, ‘a fundamentally higher form of consciousness than 
the present is not merely possible but probable’.433 
 Imitating Spencer’s evolutionary schema, Bax distinguished three 
successive epochs of evolution: the inorganic, the organic, and the 
superorganic. The first two of these epochs had been completed, he argued. 
But the third had only just commenced, with the consummation of the 
individual personality in society. Drawing further support from Spencer, 
Bax suggested that analogies between ‘the cell, the biological unit, and the 
individual, the sociological unit,’ lent  
a high degree of probability to the assumption that the mode of 
evolution in the less known and less complete, the sociological or 
conscious order, presents in the more advanced stages at which we 
have not yet arrived similar broad analogies with the corresponding 
known stages of the biological or organic order, as in the less 
advanced.434 
If, then, he concluded,  
                                                          
430 Ibid., p. 48. 
431 Bax, ‘Ideal of the Future (Part One)’, p. 93. 
432 Ibid. 
433 Ibid. 
434 Bax, ‘Ideal of the Future (Part Two)’, p. 137. 
118 
 
From the barest sentiency pertaining to the lowest form of organism 
through the more and more definite sentiency of organisms higher 
in the scale finally issues the consciousness of the individual man, 
which consciousness merely represents the differentiated aggregate 
of sentiencies present in the cellular constituents of his organism. 
May we not thence infer... the evolution from the superorganic or 
social unit, viz., the individual, or personality, of a form of 
consciousness, based on superorganic conditions, inconceivably 
higher than the individual or personal consciousness which is based 
on merely organic conditions; a form of social or collective 
consciousness as much higher than individual consciousness as that 
is higher than the simple sentiency of protoplasm, or as we may 
term it, “cellular consciousness”.435 
That, in any case, seemed to Bax to be the ‘inevitable and logical 
consequence of an acceptance of the doctrine of evolution.’436  
 
With the above arguments set in place Bax could thus now proceed with the 
task of formulating the human ideal. He endeavoured to conclude that task 
in two stages. Like Spencer, Bax argued, firstly, that a human ideal must be 
based ‘on the feeling of happiness’.437 But with that admission, he conceded, 
one was immediately confronted with ‘the apparent ethical antinomy’ 
established by Mill. That is, ‘the distinction between quantity and quality in 
happiness’.438 For Bax, however, this was merely an ‘essential 
preliminary’.439 The fact that so many ‘intellectual’ men opted for the 
miserable state of Mill’s hypothetical Socrates where ‘the reverse of 
happiness is pictured’, rather than the happy condition of Mill’s 
hypothetical pig, indicated that there ‘must, therefore, be an element in the 
problem other than the pleasure or happiness at present realisable or even 
conceivable by us.’440 That additional element, Bax posited, echoing again 
the early Spencer’s teleological argument, ‘is an extra-individual or social 
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impulse at present for the most part unconscious, towards an ideal goal 
which, though in a higher grade of evolution coincident with happiness, is 
not invariably so at the present time.’441  
In the light of that deduction and the others outlined above, the 
‘condition of the realisation’ of the human ideal resided, then, for Bax, ‘in 
the intensification of the Conscious’.442 In the second stage of his task, Bax 
isolated the three central ideas constitutive of the Human Ideal, namely ‘the 
moral idea in its widest sense, whether it be termed Love, Social sympathy, 
Goodness; the aesthetic idea, Beauty; and the intellectual or philosophic 
idea, Truth.’443 ‘The fallacy of Theism’, he averred, ‘consists in transferring 
these ideas, given only in the consciousness of humanity to an 
anthropomorphic fiction outside that consciousness’.444 Bax summarised 
his argument as follows: 
It is the innate feeling in men of the transcendental character of the 
Human Ideal, and of the insufficiency of its mere empirical 
realisation which has led them... to refer these ideas of love, beauty, 
and truth, to an extra-human source, rather than to regard them as 
the essential though as yet undeveloped element in consciousness 
itself, or, in other words, in Humanity.445 
Bax borrowed the notion of a collective human consciousness from 
Hartmann. He simply inverted Hartmann’s pessimistic verdict on its 
historical import.446 Instead of bringing the world to an end upon attaining 
that collective mental state Bax envisaged new vistas. ‘Western Europe’, he 
wrote, ‘representing as it does, the highest society as yet evolved, may be, 
nevertheless, deemed to occupy a position in the super organic scale no 
more than parallel to the mollusc in the organic’.447 The ‘waves of 
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enthusiasm which at times sweep over whole communities’; ‘the 
simultaneous though entirely independent discovery or invention’; the 
‘widespread intellectual and moral movements such as that of the sixth 
century before Christ, or of the Modern Revolutionary period’; as well as 
‘the phenomena known to social pathologists as epidemic mania and 
epidemic delusion’; although only ‘dim indications’, were evidence , Bax 
argued, ‘of a collective psychic development of the social man in the 
future.’448  
Bax’s cooptation of Hartmann was a singular event.449 However, Bax 
was not travelling entirely against the prevailing intellectual winds. 
Spencer, for example, was also an exponent of perfectionism.450 Spencer 
may not have subscribed to Bax’s ideas on human agency and the potential 
mastery of nature – that, in short, ‘the psychical progressively tends to 
supplant the physical as a causal agency’ – but he did have confidence in 
the notion that, ‘the belief in human perfectibility, merely amounts to the 
belief, that... man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of 
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life.’451 The ‘scientific morality’ that Spencer attempted to construct on the 
back of the existence of an innate ‘Moral Sense’ functioned as a model for 
Bax’s own reinvention of utilitarianism.452 Bax’s human ideal was akin to 
the necessary, but, as yet, unrealized, perfect condition of morality that 
Spencer argued mankind was ineluctably tending toward.  
 
As to ‘the question of the immediate future of society’, here too, Bax took 
inspiration from Spencer.453 Adopting Spencer’s evolutionary ‘law’ of the 
development from homogeneity to heterogeneity, Bax suggested that 
‘Society has passed through the stage of primitive communism, or, as it may 
be termed, undifferentiated socialism, from which every successive stage of 
civilisation has been an increasing divergence in the direction of 
individualism.’454 Pure individualism, however, was only a ‘transitory 
phase’. It had, moreover, ‘well-nigh run its course’.455 In keeping with the 
Spencerian framework, it appeared to Bax, then, that the ‘modern 
revolution’ would be ‘a fusion of these two principles’, namely, 
undifferentiated Socialism and individualism, emanating in ‘a 
differentiated communism or socialism.’456 In the summary of Socialism 
that Bax framed in the closing passage of ‘The Ideal of the Future’, the 
Comtian inflections of his previous effort were thus gone. By 1881, that 
influence had been conspicuously purged from his writing.457 In its stead, 
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Bax inserted an amalgamation of Spencer and Marx. He invoked, on the 
one hand, the language of militarism and industrialism intrinsic to 
Spencer’s sociology; and, on the other, he invoked the language of class 
struggle and revolution as expounded by Marx in the Communist 
Manifesto. 
Of course, for Spencer, Socialism was an extension of militarism, 
not – pace Bax – its negation. His views on this issue are discussed in 
Chapter 10.458 Bax’s use of Spencer demonstrated, at the same time, 
however, the extensive distance between himself and Marx. Certainly, Marx 
had been right to isolate Bax as a potentially promising protégé. For Bax’s 
enthusiasm for far-reaching social reconstruction was surely beyond 
dispute. Yet, while Bax did not suffer from the kind of ‘British philistinism’ 
afflicting Hyndman and Mill, there remained a great deal to put Bax and 
Marx at odds. Bax’s emphasis on religion was one such issue. But his scant 
regard for Marx’s painstaking critique of political economy was an even 
greater deviation from the emphases afforded priority by Marx: i.e. the 
elucidation of the material preconditions of a feasible post-capitalist 
society. Over time, as we shall see in Chapters 8, 9 and 10, Bax moved closer 
to Marx. But, as we shall also see in Chapters 8, 9, and 11, Bax’s ideas would 
continue to conflict with Engels’s. Chapters 7, 8, and 9 discuss how Bax 
picked up the threads of the arguments set out here.  
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A Crowd of Young Bourgeois Intelligentsia 
 
In a letter to the German Socialist politician August Bebel written in August 
1883, Engels gave his estimation of the Democratic Federation, the British 
body led by Hyndman then entering its third successive year, the body, that 
is, that he had refused to support at its inception two years earlier. Engels 
counselled Bebel not to let himself ‘be bamboozled into thinking’ that there 
was ‘a real proletarian movement’ going on in England.459 Despite that 
injunction, though, Engels had revised his assessment of the fledgling DF 
favourably since his previous utterances on the subject issued in a letter to 
Eduard Bernstein the previous year. In May 1882, Engels wrote to 
Bernstein that the DF was ‘of no importance at all’.460 Yet, by August 1883, 
he had reversed that position. Engels conceded to Bebel that the ‘elements 
at present active might become important, now that they have accepted our 
theoretical programme and thus acquired a basis’.461 However, it was not 
just the ‘crowd of young bourgeois intelligentsia’ enthusiastic about the new 
ideas that had altered Engels’s perspective.462 Hyndman had been upgraded 
too. In 1882, Hyndman was capable, according to Engels, of playing only 
‘third fiddle’. By 1883, he was ‘hopelessly jingoistic but not stupid’.463 
Engels, besides, did not arrive at those conclusions alone. The DF and its 
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leader had begun to receive attention, as we shall see in Chapters 6 and 10, 
from other contemporaries. 
 Engels’s emended remarks on the prospects of the DF were, of 
course, hedged with qualifications. While Engels accepted that the DF ‘may 
become important’, he added that, it would only do so, ‘if a spontaneous 
movement broke out amongst the workers here and’ the new elements 
active within it ‘succeeded in getting hold of it.’464 Until then, he continued, 
‘they will continue to be so many isolated individuals with, behind them, an 
omnium-gatherum of muddle-headed sects, the remnant of the great 
movement of the forties, but nothing more.’465 Engels rehearsed in his letter 
to Bebel the argument he deposited more fully in Commonweal, in 1885. 
He assured Bebel that ‘a really universal labour movement will come about 
here… only when the workers become sensible of the fact that England’s 
world monopoly has been broken’, when, that is to say, ‘the economic basis’ 
of their ‘political nullity’ had finally been confounded.466 
Prior to the electoral fiasco of 1885, estimations of the size and 
strength of the Social Democratic Federation (the DF simply under a new 
name) were typically liberal.467 However, the DF occupied a subordinate 
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rung in the hierarchy of concerns for opponents of State intervention. The 
land reforms of the second Gladstone government, the New Radicalism of 
Chamberlain and Dilke, and the reception received by Henry George 
represented more pressing causes for disquiet for political individualists.468 
The DF, at any rate, as Engels indicated, was only just beginning to find its 
feet as a Socialist organisation. The manifesto, Socialism made plain, 
published in 1883, signified the consummation of the DF’s commitment to 
Socialist politics. The withdrawal of the Radical clubs after the Tyrone by-
election, discussed in Chapter 3, had made it possible. But the influx of 
middle-class Radicals receptive to modern Socialism, who helped to boost 
the DF’s diminished ranks between 1882 and 1883, still had to be won to 
the project of delivering the ‘scientific’ form of Socialism that Hyndman 
envisaged.  
 The DF had to compete for the allegiance of its members with at 
least three other contemporary groups: the English Land Nationalisation 
Society founded by Wallace in 1881, the Fellowship of the New Life – the 
parent body of the Fabian Society – started by Thomas Davidson in 1883, 
and the Land Reform Union organised around George’s ideas established at 
the same time.469 In other words, ‘scientific Socialism’ was by no means the 
only game in town: forward-looking, social-reforming Radicals could pick 
and choose from the various proposals for land reform like those suggested 
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by George and Wallace, from the numerous strands of Anarchism, which 
had received an impetus in England following the International Anarchist 
Congress held in London in July 1881, and from the revamped Christian 
Socialism of Stuart Headlam.470 
Viewed in that light, it is easy to see, then, why Engels revised his 
assessment of Hyndman. For it was Hyndman who almost single-handedly 
persuaded the ‘young bourgeois’ intellectuals who entered the DF’s ranks 
between 1882 and 1883 – young intellectuals like J. L. Joynes, R. P. B. 
Frost, and H. H. Champion, associated with the Christian Socialist – of the 
merit of Marx’s economics and philosophy of history. Hyndman did so, 
furthermore, with neither a newspaper nor a journal to assist him. Justice, 
the newspaper of the SDF, was founded in 1884. Likewise, To-day, the first 
expressly ‘scientific’ Socialist journal, began circulating also that year. So, 
although Hyndman had fully assimilated, by 1883, what he took to be 
Marx’s theory, he had no literary vehicle at his disposal to disseminate it. 
The public platform would have to suffice.  
Hyndman, in part, offset that deficiency by publishing The 
Historical Basis of Socialism in England. Struck by a remark made by 
Lassalle, the German Socialist and rival of Marx, ‘that he regretted he had 
not written what he had to write before he went out into the exhausting toil 
of public agitation’, Hyndman set to work on the book in the Spring of 
1883.471 It was published soon after in November. The Historical Basis was 
the first indigenous popularisation of ‘scientific’ Socialist ideas. As we shall 
see, it documented the distance, ideologically speaking, that Hyndman had 
                                                          
470 For the dissemination and uptake of Anarchist ideas in Britain see John Quail, 
The Slow Burning Fuse. The Lost History of the British Anarchists (London, 
Paladin, 1978); and Hermia Oliver, The International Anarchist Movement in Late 
Victorian London (London, Croom Helm, 1983). 
471 Hyndman, Record, p. 284. For Marx’s relationship with Lassalle see Stedman 
Jones, Karl Marx, pp. 437-448. 
127 
 
travelled in the space of just over two years. But, as we shall also see, it 
documented, in addition, the more general shift away from the dogmatic 
allegiance to the principle of laissez faire that Mill and Cairns had set 
themselves against over a decade before. This chapter takes up the first of 
those phenomena. Chapter 6 takes up the second. 
 
The Historical Basis has not fared well in the hands of historians of British 
Socialism. The first part of this chapter contests three claims issued by 
historians about Hyndman’s book. The first claim, issued by Hyndman’s 
only scholarly biographer, Chushichi Tsuzuki, is that there had been ‘little 
change in Hyndman’s political views’ in the interval between writing The 
Historical Basis and England for All.472 The second claim, posited by 
Willard Wolfe, has two parts: it is that, firstly, few vulgarizations ‘reduced 
Marxism so completely to the bare bones of economic theory and economic 
history’ than Hyndman’s efforts in the 1880s, and that, second, in The 
Historical Basis, Hyndman ‘attempted to synthesise the teachings of Marx 
with those of Rodbertus and Lassalle.’473 Finally, the third and most recent 
claim, issued by Bevir, is that The Historical Basis ‘owed as much to 
William Cobbett as it did to Marx’.474 The following paragraphs will respond 
to each claim in turn.  
First of all, unlike England for All, The Historical Basis was not ‘an 
extremely moderate proposal’, as Pease accurately described the former 
text. It betrayed no continuities with ‘The Dawn of a Revolutionary Epoch’; 
it accomplished a complete break with Mill; and the appeal to a ‘higher 
ideal of patriotism’ had also been axed. Hyndman, in short, had ditched the 
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‘One Nation version of New Liberalism’, which informed the earlier 
proposal. He inserted, instead, a model of Socialism plucked directly from 
Engels and Marx. Class struggle, Hyndman now posited, was ‘the necessary 
companion or fore-runner of all progress’; modern governments, he 
exclaimed, were ‘merely boards of directors elected in the interest’ of the 
ruling class; force, or ‘fear of force’, he averred, was ‘the only reasoning’ 
understood by a ‘dominant estate’; and Socialism, he now argued, meant a 
society where the maxim ‘from each according to his abilities, to each 
according to his needs’ had been made operative.475 While in 1881 the 
language of ‘scientific Socialism’ was still alien to Hyndman, by 1883 
Hyndman was a fully paid up member of the ‘scientific Socialist’ school, 
then beginning to emerge under Engels’s tutelage. Engels now occupied the 
position previously held by Mill in Hyndman’s mental landscape – a change 
of no small importance. 
Strictly speaking, turning now to the second claim, there was no 
such thing as ‘Marxism’ during the 1880s. As we heard in the introduction, 
the intellectual tradition that answered to that word in the 1890s did not 
answer to it a decade before. There was no theory – contrary to the opinion 
of Wolfe – going by that description for Hyndman therefore to vulgarize. It 
is clear that, to take a less pedantic stance, Hyndman had assimilated many 
of the basic precepts of the tradition later designated by the term. But it is 
still not the case that Hyndman’s ‘Marxism’ was curiously reductionist. He 
did not disregard the philosophical and sociological strands of the theory.476 
On the contrary, over the course of the decade, Hyndman incorporated the 
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dialectical ‘law’ governing ‘all organic and inorganic growths’.477 He also 
incorporated Engels’s appraisal of the ‘epoch-making’ work of Lewis 
Morgan.478 But, in 1883, Engels’s rendering of Marx was still under 
construction. His philosophical work – the only real source, in the absence 
of Marx’s own unpublished, early philosophical writings – was not yet in 
full swing.479 The first part of Wolfe’s claim does not thus bear scrutiny.  
The second part of Wolfe’s claim, namely, that Hyndman had 
attempted to synthesise Marx, Rodbertus and Lassalle in The Historical 
Basis, is no more credible.480 Certainly, Hyndman did appeal to both 
authors. But he also appealed to Cairnes, Henry Sidgwick, W. T. Thornton, 
and Francis Walker, among others. Hyndman, in short, had no scruples 
about combining apparently incongruous sources. He leant heavily, as we 
shall see in this chapter, on his own intellectual heritage, as well as on 
thinkers whom he associated with the German Historical School. The 
discrepancies were ironed out later. Wolfe, then, it is fair to say, grossly 
exaggerated the import of a few quotations.  At any rate, notwithstanding 
Hyndman’s promiscuity, The Historical Basis was still primarily derivative 
of the writings of Engels and Marx. More precisely, it was derivative of four 
chief texts: Capital, The Poverty of Philosophy, The Condition of the 
Working Class in England, and Socialism: Utopian and Scientific.481 Taken 
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480 See also Crick, History of the Social Democratic Federation, p. 33.  
481 It is worth noting that Hyndman was also familiar with Zur Kritik der 
Politischen Ökonomie, the introduction to which performed such a pivotal role in 
the subsequent history of ‘Marxism’. Historical Basis, p. 435. 
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together, they provided Hyndman with the empirical and conceptual 
framework of his account. 
The claim that The Historical Basis was equally as indebted to 
Cobbett as it was to Marx naturally elides this feature of Hyndman’s work. 
In contrast to Marx and Engels, however, Cobbett played only a walk on 
part. It is undeniably true that, in showing the useful functions that the 
Catholic Church nominally fulfilled in ‘the social economy’ of ‘English 
society in the middle ages’, Hyndman borrowed his argument from 
Cobbett’s iconoclastic book, A History of the Protestant Reformation.482 
But Hyndman borrowed no less frequently from Thorold Rogers’ A History 
of Agriculture and Prices and Lujo Brentano’s introduction to Toulmin 
Smith’s English Guilds in his history of pre-Reformation England.483 
Moreover all three sources were confined to the first two chapters of 
Hyndman’s book. Hyndman’s recourse to Marx’s work is, by contrast, 
integrated into The Historical Basis throughout. Those very chapters, 
furthermore, were directly modelled on a section of Capital. They were 
modelled on its final, most deeply historical part, ‘The So-Called Primitive 
Accumulation’, where Marx also deployed the aforementioned sources. The 
next section of this chapter examines this connection in further detail. 
 
In the final section of Capital, Marx sought to illuminate the process that, 
beginning in the sixteenth century, cleared the way for the capitalist system. 
He sought to chart the history of the expropriation of the agricultural 
population from the land, which precipitated ‘the English working class... 
                                                          
482 Hyndman, Historical Basis, pp. 16, 14. 
483 J. Thompson, ‘The reception of Lujo Brentano’s thought in Britain, 1870-1910’, 
http://research-
information.bristol.ac.uk/files/3005621/Brentano%20in%20Britain.pdf accessed 
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without any transition from its golden into its iron age.’484 In the first three 
chapters of The Historical Basis Hyndman followed suit. He recycled 
Marx’s periodisation; he reproduced the stages that Marx isolated in the 
historical process ‘divorcing the producer from the means of production’, 
stretching from the sixteenth century to the eighteenth; and he paraphrased 
extensively Marx’s more concise account.485 In The Historical Basis, 
Hyndman, in short, proffered a second circumlocution of Capital to rival 
the first that Marx complained of.  
For example, in describing the Fall from the period of prosperity 
enjoyed by the free peasant proprietors and craftsmen of the fifteenth 
century, Hyndman echoed the metaphor used by Marx to pinpoint the 
origin of the ‘capitalistic era’.486 Between ‘the early years of the sixteenth 
century until the accession of James I., the great mass of working 
Englishmen’, Hyndman wrote, ‘were reduced to destitution – plunged from 
the age of gold into the age of iron.’487 Following Marx’s analysis, Hyndman 
traced ‘the rise of our distressed proletariat’ back to the growth of sheep 
farming and the enclosures of land, to the suppression of the monasteries 
and the seizure of the Church lands, to the ‘bloody legislation’ which legally 
set it all in place, right through to the Glorious Revolution, which finally 
brought the middle class to power.488 For Hyndman, as for Marx, it was an 
immoral tale, characterised by conquest, enslavement, robbery, and 
murder.489  
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  Hyndman, meanwhile, based his fourth and seventh chapters on 
the more technical sections of Capital. In those sections of the book, 
Hyndman carried out, with two notable differences, the same kind of 
reconstruction of Marx’s economic theory that he performed in England for 
All. The first of those differences was that, this time around, Hyndman 
made sure to cite Marx in the relevant places. The second, more significant 
difference was that Hyndman posited the ‘iron law of wages’ that, 
unbeknownst to him, Marx had condemned eight years earlier in the 
Critique of the Gotha Programme. However, despite the criticism it elicited 
from subsequent Marxist historians, Hyndman’s statement of the case was 
less inimical to Marx’s theory than Marx’s polemical rejoinder to the 
German Lassalleans allowed for.490 In the first place, there was substantial 
give in Hyndman’s understanding of the theory. He presented it as a 
tendency rather than as an ‘iron law’. And second, the trend to subsistence 
level remuneration, in Hyndman’s rendering of the theory, was governed 
not by the Malthusian theory of population that Marx attributed to Lassalle, 
but by the competition between labourers and the introduction of improved 
machinery.491 Engels, however, also detected errors in Hyndman’s book.   
In the chapter on labour and surplus value, Hyndman condemned 
as ‘unjust’ the transaction between labourer and capitalist. He described the 
wage relation as ‘a barefaced though legal robbery’.492 In his preface to the 
first German edition of the Poverty of Philosophy issued the following year, 
Engels, in contesting the assertions of the so-called ‘Rodbertus movement’, 
                                                                                                                                                   
with a congenital blood-stain on one cheek,” capital comes dripping from head to 
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which had emerged in Germany during the late 1870s, indirectly set 
Hyndman right. He did so by reproaching Rodbertus, ‘the idol of the place 
hunters of today’, for precisely that kind of ‘application of morality to 
economics’.493 ‘Marx’, Engels averred, ‘never based his demands upon’ an 
equalitarian application of Ricardian theory, ‘but upon the inevitable 
collapse of the capitalist mode of production which is daily taking place 
before our eyes to an ever greater degree; he says only that surplus value 
consists of unpaid labour, which is a simple fact.’494  
Hyndman may not have been the main target. But he was almost 
certainly intentionally implicated by Engels’s utterances.495 Whether or not 
Engels’s relativist stance actually properly represented Marx’s position is 
another question. But Hyndman fell prey to having it both ways – that is, to 
denouncing capitalism as unjust on the one hand, while maintaining a non-
normative critique on the other. While Hyndman, evidently impressed by 
Charles Bray’s equalitarian judgements, sought to buttress his economic 
determinism with a trans-historical moral evaluation of the wage relation, 
Engels made sure in his preface to duly convict Bray of utopianism.496 In 
the following years Hyndman expunged appeals to rights and justice from 
his Socialist theory.497 
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In the event, Hyndman’s book owed almost as much to Engels as it did to 
Marx. In fact, as we shall now see, Engels’s self-styled ‘second fiddle’ was 
ultimately the more audible of the two.498 In the first place, as with the 
three chapters that Hyndman modelled on Marx’s survey of the so-called 
primitive accumulation, he modelled two more on two sections of Engels’s 
book, The Condition of the Working Class in England. In the chapter 
entitled ‘The Growth of the Proletariat’, Hyndman imitated the analysis 
presented in the introduction to Engels’s book, where Engels set out the 
contours of England’s ‘industrial revolution’. And in the chapter entitled 
‘Movements of the People’, Hyndman imitated the analysis laid out in 
‘Labour Movements’, where Engels delineated the history of resistance to 
capitalism on the part of the proletariat. 
In the first of those chapters, Hyndman, by way of introduction, 
paraphrased Engels’s claim that, ‘The industrial revolution is of the same 
importance for England as the political revolution for France, and the 
philosophical revolution for Germany’.499 Paragraph for paragraph, 
Hyndman followed Engels in charting the process, beginning with the 
introduction of the spinning-jenny, that transformed a ‘country, like other 
countries, with small towns, limited and simple industry, and a stupid but 
relatively large agricultural population’ into ‘a country like no other’ – a 
country, that is, ‘with a metropolis of three millions of inhabitants, with 
colossal manufacturing towns, with a world-embracing industry and 
commerce, a hard-working, densely crowded population, two-thirds of 
whom were engaged in manufacturing industry’.500 The victory of machine 
work in one English industry after another had ensured, he continued, that 
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there ‘was as much difference between the England of 1780 and the 
England of 1848 as between the France of the ancien regime and the France 
of the ‘48 Republic.’501  
But, Hyndman insisted – echoing the second section of Engels’s 
book – the ‘industrial revolution’ had not been achieved without resistance. 
Taking Engels’s history of defiance as a template, Hyndman stated that the 
‘first effect of the new methods’ was not to engender a struggle for a more 
favourable division of the proceeds of capitalist industry, but rather ‘to 
bring about a series of attacks by the workmen upon the machinery 
itself.’502 The ‘growth of definite working-class combinations for economical 
objects’ was a more protracted development, helped along by ‘the repeal of 
the law against combination, in 1824’ – ‘a concession’, Hyndman wrote, 
‘which would hardly have been gained from the House of Commons after 
1832’, when ‘the Reform Bill had legally sanctioned the distinction between 
bourgeoisie and proletariat, and made the bourgeoisie the ruling class.’503 
Hyndman agreed with Engels’s judgement that ‘something more’ was 
‘needed than Trades Unions and strikes to break the power’ of the 
bourgeoisie.’504 He also agreed that Chartism, as ‘the compact form’ of the 
workers’ ‘opposition to the bourgeoisie’, compensated for the isolation of 
industrial action.505 Still shadowing Engels’s interpretation, Hyndman 
argued that Chartism was a social as well as a political phenomenon, both a 
movement for democratic reform and ‘a knife and fork question’.506 The 
Chartists were ‘the first real working-class party’, he held, ‘that had come to 
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the front... for many generations’.507 Yet, while Engels, writing in 1845, 
predicted the ‘union of Socialism with Chartism’ as the ‘next step’ in the 
party’s development, Hyndman, from the vantage point of almost forty 
years on, had to account instead for its failure.508 He did so, however, by 
affirming Engels’s reasoning. Hence, according to Hyndman, it was 
precisely ‘the absence of sound social ideas of reconstruction’ that ‘brought 
the entire movement to a standstill.’509 
Unlike Engels, Hyndman had to account not only for the failure of 
Chartism, but for the failure too of the proletariat to perform its prescribed 
role in the thirty years following Chartism’s defeat. The fact that industrial 
capitalism had not imploded under the weight of its own contradictions, 
ushering into power a proletariat conscious of its world-historical task 
demanded an explanation. Hyndman furnished one in his eighth chapter 
entitled ‘The Period of Apathy’. Like Engels in Commonweal two years 
later, he blamed the workers’ quiescence on the so-called ‘aristocracy of 
labour’.510 By virtue of its indifference to the lot of the ‘unskilled worker’ 
and to ‘any attempt being made by the workers as a class to form a definite 
party of their own’, the labour aristocracy had impeded ‘the advance of their 
own class as a class’, he argued.511 For Hyndman, however, the impasse was 
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resolvable politically. It did not presuppose, as it did for Engels, the 
disintegration of ‘England’s world monopoly’. Rather, the return of just 
twenty ‘working-class members to Parliament’ would be sufficient.512 Part of 
the reason why that had not happened already, he posited, was that the 
‘cleverest of our artisans, the finest of our labourers, the clearest-sighted of 
our working-class politicians’ had ‘abandoned the apparently hopeless 
struggle against class inequality’ by means of emigration – the safety-valve 
of ‘the capitalist machine’.513 
The view that emigration provided a solution to the problem of 
‘surplus labour’ was a staple of mid-Victorian political economists, political 
economists, namely, like Fawcett and Mill.514 In invoking it as an 
explanation for the absence of a proletarian conquest of power, Hyndman 
betrayed again his liberal intellectual heritage. In the same chapter, 
Hyndman also echoed Fawcett’s appraisal of trade unions. It should not be 
disguised, he urged, following Fawcett’s analysis in the Manual of Political 
Economy, ‘that the Trade Unions enforced combination and maintained the 
rule of each for all among themselves by fierce terrorism’.515 Like Fawcett, 
Hyndman believed that they were more morally suspect than some of their 
advocates let on.516 The rise of the New Unionism did not alter his opinion, 
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either. In theory, Hyndman imbibed the materialist ontology, which 
asserted that ‘economical necessities are reflected in the thoughts of men’, 
that Engels attributed to Marx. But, in practice, his understanding of social 
development was less deterministic.517 Although he cleaved to it erratically 
during the 1880s, Hyndman reserved a special sympathy for parliamentary 
representation – and, later, he posited the need for a preparatory process of 
‘psychologic comprehension’.518 
That Engels’s so-called ‘second fiddle’ was really nothing of the sort 
in this context, does not become apparent in The Historical Basis until its 
final chapter. There we learn that, Engels’s ideas, however poorly imbibed, 
were, instead, the commanding presence throughout. In purely spatial 
terms, Marx, to be sure, had the better innings. But it was Engels who 
determined, crucially, how Marx was read. Thus, armed with Socialism: 
Utopian and Scientific and the report of Engels’s graveside speech, 
Hyndman recycled three of the four components of Engels’s gloss, as 
outlined in the introduction: namely, the materialist conception of history, 
the positivist rendering of Socialism as science, and the Marx-Darwin 
analogy, leaving only the materialist dialectic in abeyance.519 It was neither 
Marx nor Cobbett, Lassalle nor Rodbertus, but Engels, in other words, who 
provided the conceptual scaffolding for Hyndman’s book. That said, in 
invoking ‘the irresistible tendency of the time’ in chapter eight Hyndman 
did not take Engels’s remarks on the capitulation of capitalist society 
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‘before the planned production of the invading socialist society’ as a 
model.520 He fell back, instead, on the English ‘germ-theory’ of Socialism. 
More particularly, Hyndman fell back on John Morley, who authored the 
famous statement, in 1881, ‘that in the country where Socialism has been 
less talked about than any other country in Europe, its principles have been 
most extensively applied.’521 In so doing, Hyndman illuminated another 
persistent point of reference. 
 
To say nothing of his longer-term impact, Morley’s ideas are present as well 
in another section of The Historical Basis. They account, in fact, as we shall 
see, for Hyndman’s comparatively inflated estimation of the efficacy of 
political action. Besides, Morley was also the first source of Hyndman’s 
exposure to something like a philosophy of history resembling historical 
materialism.522   
Morley pursued both themes, in 1874, in a series of articles in the 
Fortnightly Review. They were collected and published that same year 
under the title, On Compromise. Hyndman’s sectarianism was undoubtedly 
encouraged by the position that Morley adopted in that book on where the 
boundary resides ‘that divides wise suspense in forming opinions, wise 
reserve in expressing them, and wise tardiness in trying to realise them’ 
from their injudicious opposites.523 In August 1884, for example, Justice 
printed the following quotation from the book: ‘It is better to wait, and to 
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defer the realisation of our ideas until we can realise them fully, than to 
defraud the future by truncating them, if truncate them we must, in order to 
secure a partial triumph for them in the immediate present. It is better’, so 
the passage continued, ‘to bear the burden of impracticableness, than to 
stifle conviction and to pare away principle until it becomes more 
hollowness and triviality.’524 That same month Hyndman imitated Morley 
in another article, adopting his prose in a parallel appraisal of causation in 
the French revolution. Needless to say, like Morley, he regarded it as 
mistake ‘to suppose that the destructive criticism of the French 
philosophers ... was the great operative cause of the catastrophe which 
befell the old social regime.’525  
For Morley, history provided no instance ‘of mere opinion making a 
breach in the essential constitution of a community, so long as the political 
conditions were stable and the economic or nutritive conditions sound.’526 
‘If dissolvent ideas’ did make their way it was ‘because society was already 
ripe for dissolution.’527 Among the agencies that brought social changes 
about, Morley ranked ‘economic and material conditions’ the highest.528 In 
this, the correspondence with Engels is obvious. Less obviously compatible, 
however, was Morley’s suggestion that ‘these changes can only be initiated 
by individuals or very small groups of individuals.’529  
‘The progressive tendency’, Morley argued, ‘can only be a 
tendency’.530 That is, ‘it can only work its way through the inevitable 
obstructions around it, by means of persons who are possessed by the 
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special progressive idea’. According to Morley, they were the holders of a 
‘trust’, upon whom ‘the advance of a community depends.’531 But the ‘fact of 
a new idea having come to one man’, he continued, was merely a sign that it 
was ‘already in the air’.532 ‘The innovator’, Morley argued, ‘is as much the 
son of his generation as the conservative.’533 In The Historical Basis, 
Hyndman echoed the point. ‘It is true,’ he affirmed,  
that given favourable opportunities, the enthusiasm of an individual 
and still more the organised enthusiasm of a group of individuals 
may increase the rate of progress by preparing men’s minds to take 
the earliest opportunity of giving shape to ideas which have long 
been floating hither and thither to the surface of the popular 
intelligence. But this is only to say in turn that stirring times 
necessarily produce active men534 
It is certainly true that Hyndman believed that Socialism was 
inevitable. However, that did not mean that Hyndman was content to 
simply await its arrival. Rather, Hyndman insisted that a well-directed 
intervention would foreshorten the intermission.535 Hyndman was less 
concerned than Morley about the enervating effect of an all too ready 
application of the Historical Method, on the misplaced confidence, that is, 
invested in the law of evolution. But he did mirror Morley’s view on the 
power of ‘social energy’.536 Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that 
Hyndman embodied the very ideal of energetic action – ‘both the 
prerequisite and the expression of the manly life’ – that so many mid-
Victorian Liberal intellectuals upheld.537 Like Fawcett and other ‘muscular 
Liberals’, Hyndman poured scorn on both ‘sentimentalism’ and self-
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absorption, the governing contrasts of the manly ideal.538 He shared the 
ethos as well as the character traits of ‘the straightforward, emphatic, and 
insufferably cheerful Fawcett’.539 Yet, while that debarred Hyndman from 
finding kinship with Socialists like Henry Salt, whom he dismissed as 
‘sentimentalists’, Hyndman’s admiration of Morris, another – more 
forthright – advocate of manliness, was plain.540 The final section of this 
chapter will briefly consider this connection.  
 
Often described as lacking the ‘utopian note’ that so conspicuously 
informed Morris’s Socialism, the association that temporarily united 
Hyndman and Morris between Morris’s entry into the DF in 1883 and his 
departure two years later with the formation of the Socialist League was less 
basic and fleeting than its organisational expression suggests.541 For 
example, as Hyndman’s uncompleted utopian romance, begun in 1913, 
attests, he continued to draw on Morris’s body of work well into the 
twentieth century.542 But, more importantly for the purposes of the chapter, 
Hyndman also imported some of Morris’s uniquely aesthetic insights into 
the concluding chapter of The Historical Basis. 
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The first lectures that Morris gave under the auspices of the DF were 
focused, as Thompson put it, on ‘those fields where his own experience gave 
him most authority.’543 That is to say, they were focused on art, or, more 
specifically, with the social conditions of art. Morris set out his stall most 
fully in two lectures in 1883: one first given to an audience at the 
Manchester Royal Institution in March, and the other first given in 
November at the Russell Club at University College Hall, Oxford. It was the 
latter lecture in which Morris first made his commitment to Socialism clear. 
Before an audience of primarily liberal undergraduate students, but also 
including Ruskin among its number, Morris set fourth what he felt were the 
‘hindrances’ that lay ‘in the way towards making art what it should be, a 
help and solace to the daily life of all men.’544 Morris’s conception of art was 
expansive. He extended the word to incorporate ‘the aspect of the externals’ 
of all life: not just painting, sculpture, and architecture, ‘but the shapes and 
colours of all household goods,’ ‘the arrangement of the fields for tillage and 
pasture,’ and ‘the management of towns’ and ‘highways’.545 The ‘instinct for 
beauty’, he argued, was ‘inborn’, and in the past, ‘when art was abundant 
and healthy, all men were more or less artists.’546 Morris drove a wedge 
between the ‘system of commercialism’, which had rendered art 
individualistic, ‘thwarted and checked’ the instinct for beauty, and therefore 
impelled art to the verge of death, and the preceding epochs, when art 
flourished in a ‘cooperative’ shape and men found happiness in labour.547 
Hyndman, to be sure, did not follow Morris ‘in attributing to all men’ what 
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Morris himself felt, namely the desire for an aesthetic life.548 Nor did he 
invoke the Ruskinian theme of joy in labour. Hyndman’s Socialism was 
ultimately of a much more modest kind. Nonetheless, the descriptions of 
industrial squalor and aesthetic blight that Morris proffered had clearly 
made their mark.  
 Borrowing directly from Morris’s repertoire of Socialist argument – 
with which he had become familiar over the course of 1883 – Hyndman 
suggested, for example, that ‘by combination and cooperation’ society 
would be restored in the future to a level of architectural beauty to rival that 
of the middle ages or Moorish Spain. The imagination, he averred, could 
‘proceed on the sure footing’ of what had been ‘accomplished in many 
countries by communal effort’.549 Next, working in a fully-fledged Morrisian 
key, Hyndman let rip on the destruction wrought by the capitalist mode of 
production: ‘Art fades away,’ he wrote, 
literature dwindles under the huckster principles which now guide 
society. The life of our great cities is devoid of all real beauty or 
magnificence; the rampant individualism which has hitherto 
exercised such baneful effects below still produces hideousness 
above. Can anything be imagined uglier than the great English cities 
of the nineteenth century? That there hangs around them a sense of 
power as well as a cloud of fetid smoke may be admitted. But the 
factory-owner and the jerry-builder, the advertisement contractors 
and the railroad companies, telegraphs and chimney-pots have 
taken possession, and we see a positive chaos of ugliness before 
which the most vigorous art-reformer slinks away hopeless. We of 
to-day are even worse than our immediate predecessors. They at 
least loved green trees and gardens even in the midst of the towns 
they built for us. But the greed of the speculator has taken order 
with the greenery too, and now there, as elsewhere, only municipal 
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or State organisation comes in to remedy but too feebly the anarchy 
brought about by individual grasping and indifference.550 
Hyndman deployed Morris’s narrative of cultural aperture as a 
further prong in his overarching rhetorical scheme. ‘If the working class 
have nothing to lose and all to gain by a change,’ he insisted, ‘so assuredly 
have the lovers of beauty, happiness, and freedom among the upper and 
middle classes’.551 Put slightly differently, if the aforementioned social 
groups could not be moved by exhortations of historical necessity or 
appeals to distributive justice, then they might at least be moved by 
entreaties to aesthetic self-interest instead.552 However, if Hyndman drew 
on Morris for the utterances he issued on the topic of art in the final section 
of The Historical Basis, he differed from him in one very important respect: 
in the lectures, ‘Art, Wealth, and Riches’ and ‘Art and Plutocracy’, Morris 
made no such concessions. Rather, so far from undertaking to meet his 
audiences halfway, Morris begged them ‘to renounce their class pretensions 
and cast in their lot with the working men.’553 Further, Morris did not 
relent; he finished his lecture at the Russell Club, for instance, a gathering 
of young men familiar with, and sympathetic to, Toynbee’s conciliatory 
social Radicalism, on the following belligerent note: 
One man with an idea in his head is in danger of being considered a 
madman; two men with the same idea in common may be foolish, 
but can hardly be mad; ten men sharing an idea begin to act, a 
hundred draw attention as fanatics, a thousand and society begins to 
tremble, a hundred thousand and there is war abroad, and the cause 
has victories tangible and real; and why only a hundred thousand? 
You and I who agree together, it is we who have to answer that 
question.554 
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Society had not yet begun to ‘tremble’, as Morris put it, but ‘attention’ – 
owing primarily to Hyndman’s efforts, and thereafter to Morris’s own 
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A Spirit of Social Revolution 
 
The Historical Basis was divided into two parts. The first part comprised 
the ‘sketch of the social and economical development of England from the 
fifteenth century to the present time’ outlined in the previous chapter.556 
The second part, on the other hand, was made up of a series of 
interventions in the domestic political arguments foremost at the time. The 
latter undertaking was not, to be sure, accomplished in all respects 
discretely. Hyndman’s strikes on other contemporary commentators on the 
British polity were integrated throughout. Nonetheless, Hyndman 
addressed the political debates most directly in the four chapters dedicated 
to the land, the position of urban workers, the poor laws, and the future of 
society, located in the second half of the book.  
The context of Hyndman’s utterances on these subjects can also be 
divided into two parts, one occupying the background and the other the 
fore. In the foreground were the various responses that Hyndman deposited 
in the text to the arguments levelled by a number of extant allies and 
adversaries – either specified by Hyndman himself or instantly recognisable 
for anyone familiar with their often widely circulated work: W. L. Blackley, 
Fawcett, George, W. H. Mallock, and Toynbee, for instance. The 
background, however, was taken up by the wider and more nuanced 
intellectual and political shift adverted to earlier. It comprised, among other 
phenomena, the widespread loss of faith in co-operation and profit-sharing 
schemes, the desertion of orthodox political economy, the ascendancy of the 
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historical method and the credit assigned to Henry Maine and his 
successors in anthropology and its ancillary fields, as well as the 
acknowledgment of the poverty reigning in many British urban centres; all 
of which contributed, in one way or another, to the texture of Hyndman’s 
ideas. 
Taking this more allusive, but no less crucial, contextual facet as a 
starting-point, the career of Henry Sidgwick epitomised the first pair of 
these generational changes. In ‘charting a course that avoided the excesses 
of dogmatic laissez-faire on one side and wholesale socialistic rejection of 
the status quo on the other’, Sidgwick was ‘typical of those who were... post-
Mill adherents of political economy.’557 In an indicative move, Sidgwick 
bypassed in his writings the voluntary experiments in Socialism that Mill 
had previously lauded, choosing German Socialism, instead, as the only 
relevant point of reference.558 His estimation of Marx was low. But 
Sidgwick, like other receptive proponents of political economy in the 1880s, 
regarded Schäffle with a degree of approval.559 Certainly, Sidgwick had not 
surrendered all hope in co-operative schemes. As a project of stores, co-
operation had proven effective and still retained its viability. However, 
Sidgwick spoke for many in suggesting that its failures in the field of 
production had rendered co-operation more or less redundant in the form 
of the more ambitious ventures envisaged by his Liberal forebears.560 
Profit-sharing fared little better. Edward Pease described it, not unfairly, as 
‘a sickly plant’.’561 And in a review of a collection of Sedley Taylor’s essays 
on the subject, John Rae expressed the increasingly pervasive fear that, far 
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from providing an equitable solution to the ‘social question’, ‘profit-sharing 
might become a more powerful instrument of capitalist exploitation than 
day wages.’562 Sidgwick was not, however, tempted to emulate the ‘general 
position’ of the German Socialists of the Chair, as Rae maintained of 
Toynbee.563 On the contrary, he continued to cleave to a more traditional 
understanding of political economy, while steering well clear, at the same 
time, of extreme Individualism. 
Sidgwick was emblematic of the public moralists of his day insofar 
as he was prepared to justify a much greater range of government activity 
on Individualist grounds; or, insofar as he was ready to countenance certain 
actions on the basis of simple expediency.564 Other economists, however, 
were keen to make morality the linchpin of their policy suggestions. 
Renouncing the excessive deductivism of the older generation of political 
economists who were felt to be over-obligated to Ricardian theory, this 
tendency was most clearly represented by William Cunningham, H. S. 
Foxwell, and, above all, Arnold Toynbee. There were, however, other 
exponents of historical economics who retained an aversion to the relaxed 
attitude towards State intervention adopted by the latter trio. 
The concept of the village community, first formulated in the 1860s, 
heralded the expiration of economic man in economic discourse. From then 
onwards, ‘the English economist of the future’ was required to ‘study in the 
schools of both Mr Stubbs and Sir Henry Maine, as well as in that of Mr 
Mill’, as T. E. Cliffe Leslie famously remarked.565 The consequences of the 
theoretical work on ‘primitive society’ were unavoidable. Nonetheless, it 
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was the climate created by Sidgwick, rather than the disclosure that the 
category of private property was historically unstable, that enabled Lord 
Salisbury to posit in November 1883 his proposals for the housing of the 
poor in The National Review. Greeted by howls of ‘Socialism’ and 
‘treachery’ in the press, it was expediency as opposed to conviction that 
induced him to intervene.566 Laissez-faire held good as a principle. But in 
the wake of the revelations concerning the depth of distress prevailing 
among the urban poor contained in Andrew Mearns’ pamphlet, The Bitter 
Cry of Outcast London, a consensus was beginning to emerge that some 
kind of action was required.567 
The Historical Basis bore the marks of all of these background 
factors. Indeed many were taken up directly, if albeit fleetingly, by 
Hyndman in the text; some on numerous occasions. Sidgwick’s book, for 
instance, The Principles of Political Economy, a discursive companion 
throughout, was condemned there as ‘most disappointing’.568 Cliffe Leslie, 
Foxwell, and Toynbee were all also mentioned, and Hyndman proclaimed 
his debt to the German Historical School.569 Although he did not dwell on it, 
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the concept of the village community also formed part of his arsenal of 
arguments.570 It is clear that Hyndman had not derived the concept from 
Marx and Engels either, whose interest in the subject – spurred on by their 
respective readings of Georg von Maurer, in 1868, and Lewis Morgan 
almost a decade later – post-dated the publication of Capital.571 These, 
rather, were simply ideas in the air, and Hyndman had imbibed them 
independently. Salisbury’s article was also included in Hyndman’s text, 
cited as a half-baked ‘semi-Socialist’ solution to the housing of the poor. 
And Mearns’ pamphlet was wielded by Hyndman as well, as further 
evidence for claims that he had already made on the topic of urban 
deprivation.572 Hyndman, in short, was well attuned to recent trends of an 
intellectual and political nature. He kept a particularly sharp eye out for 
validatory material, incorporating comments on other current analyses on 
themes of a comparable kind – Emile de Laveleye’s article on ‘The Progress 
of Socialism’ in The Contemporary Review, for example, or Samuel 
Barnett’s evidence before the Artisans’ and Labourers’ Committee.573 Of 
course, Hyndman’s rejection of co-operation and profit-sharing schemes 
went without saying. But the absence of any sustained discussion of these 
once ubiquitous proposals provides a measure of their decline as a Liberal 
panacea. 
Other mainstays of mid-Victorian orthodox political economy were, 
however, more long-lived. Strict adhesion to laissez faire no longer 
dominated as a principle, and the notion of the wages-fund was now largely 
in a state of disrepute. But free trade, freedom of contract, self-interest as 
                                                          
570 Hyndman, Historical Basis, p. 294. 
571 Hobsbawm, How to Change the World, pp. 139-140.  
572 Hyndman, Historical Basis, pp. 453, 353. 
573 Emile de Laveleye, ‘The Progress of Socialism’, The Contemporary Review, 43 
(Apr. 1883), pp. 561-582. Barnett also published an article in the periodical press, 
‘Practicable Socialism’, The Nineteenth Century, 13/74 (Apr. 1883), pp. 554-560. 
152 
 
an inducement to labour, the Malthusian theory of population, and the 
indispensability of ‘directing minds’ in the production process, all remained 
firmly in place – if, albeit, in a manner more markedly self-conscious than 
before. That being so, these categories demanded greater attention from 
Hyndman.  
Besides the obvious point that his book was intended as a critique of 
‘middle class political economy’ (as well as ‘the history of England’ written 
‘from the middle class point of view’), Hyndman was more forthcoming on 
these matters for two further reasons.574 On the one hand, the combined 
force of Fawcett’s article on ‘State Socialism and the Nationalization of the 
Land’, published earlier that year in Macmillan’s Magazine, the exchange 
of letters with the Liberal M.P. Samuel Smith on the topic of the DF’s 
manifesto (published later as Fallacies of Socialism Exposed), and the 
public assault unleashed by Mallock on England for All and Socialism 
made Plain in The Quarterly Review, had helped to focus Hyndman’s 
mind. None of these authors invoked, in these texts, co-operation as an 
ideal. But they did appeal to a remarkably unreconstructed form of 
orthodox political economy. In pursuing the logic of question and answer, 
Hyndman cleaved to the terms of the debate as he found it. He thus 
responded to the arguments of his detractors point for point.575 Moreover, 
the second subsidiary reason why Hyndman devoted protracted attention to 
these concerns was that they formed the principal ramparts from behind 
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which the leaders of the National Secular Society – an important source of 
recruits for the nascent movement – waged war against Socialism.576 
In shifting consideration now to the foreground, the NSS occupied 
terrain in Hyndman’s book similar to the above-named interlocutors. 
When, for example, Hyndman insisted that the ‘idea of Socialism’ was ‘no 
foreign importation into England’, and that revolutions were by no means 
alien to its inhabitants either, the profoundly anti-Socialist leadership of the 
NSS constituted his primary target.577 He was responding, on this occasion, 
to a characteristic pair of barbs regularly issued in the National Reformer. 
Like Fawcett, Smith, and Mallock, Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant 
continued to champion the extreme form of political Individualism that had 
been recently moderated.578 They, too, were censured therefore by 
Hyndman’s retorts to the former triumvirate by implication. They were not, 
though, the main object of his attacks.579  
Although Hyndman acknowledged organisations like the NSS and 
the Fellowship of the New Life in a number of speech acts, the overall force 
of his argument was directed at far less parochial targets. Hyndman’s 
strategy may ultimately have ‘failed to fit the mood of the people that’ he 
‘had to win over in order to make’ the ‘movement a national force’. But what 
cannot be denied was the immense scale of his persuasive ambition.580 
Thought, as Mallock aptly put it, had been ‘the origin’ of Hyndman’s 
‘fanaticism’, and he expected the same allegiance to ‘scientific’ candour to 
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be true of others too.581 Far better in that case to take on the most 
prominent political voices, recognisable to all, than to pore over more 
insular disputes. Moreover, in prosecuting that plan Hyndman was less 
insensitive to the political predilections of the popular Radical section of his 
audience than is often implied. Richard Cobden and John Bright were 
indeed doubtlessly given no quarter. But, as we shall presently see, George 
and Mill were treated with overt generosity.582 
 
In November 1878 The Nineteenth Century published an article entitled, 
‘National Insurance: A Cheap, Practical, and Popular Means of Abolishing 
Poor Rates’. Its author, W. L. Blackley, fretted about the unintended 
connotations of the title: ‘its very sound may induce most readers’, he 
wrote, ‘to pass it over as a matter so extravagant, impracticable, and 
Utopian, as to be unworthy of serious consideration.’583 He need not have 
worried – for events had ‘moved quickly in England’.584 There was a great 
deal more now to feel concerned over for Individualists of a particularly 
austere persuasion than a scheme of national insurance whereby 
improvident workers were goaded into a self-reliant condition by 
compulsory means. The appearance of Wallace, the traction gained by 
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George, the shape that English Radicalism had assumed under 
Chamberlain and Morley, as well as the DF’s arrival on the political scene, 
meant that English society could be compared in 1883, in Mallock’s 
equation, ‘to a house that is full of exceedingly inflammable materials’; 
hitherto unaffected, the country was now suffused with ‘a spirit of social 
revolution’.585 In that context, utopia would seem like an inappropriate 
referent for Blackley’s modest proposition, when, that is, genuinely utopian 
proposals had been drafted. 
The purpose of Mallock’s article was to take these dissident theories 
to task. Above all, however, he sought to discredit the doctrine of modern 
Socialism as purportedly represented by Hyndman. Mallock concentrated 
his attack on Hyndman because, he argued, unlike the English Radicals 
who irresponsibly disposed of political economy as and when it seemed 
opportune to do so, ‘the leading Socialists of the day’ indulged ‘in no such 
silly bravado.’586 ‘Political Economy’, he wrote, ‘is the very thing that they 
do care for’, and for that reason the economic theories of Socialism 
contained more than just a semblance of plausibility.587 Owing to the fact 
that aspects of the ‘old science’ had been ‘appropriated by the new’, ‘its 
falsehood’ was ‘apparent only on near inspection’.588 
‘The real leaders of the Socialistic movement’, Mallock argued, 
approached the subject of social change, ‘in the first place, as savants rather 
than philanthropists.’589 They professed ‘to stand or fall not on passion but 
on proof.’590 To disprove the economic theory upon which the movement 
rested was therefore to negate it. Hence, in an effort to achieve that 
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objective – i.e. to cut the ground from under the embryonic Socialist 
movement – Mallock isolated two doctrines on the truth of which, he held, 
every modern revolutionary system depended for speculative justification. 
The first of these was ‘the doctrine that, apart from the raw materials of 
nature, labour is the sole cause of wealth.’591 The second was the notion 
‘that the land of any given country belongs of right to the people of that 
country collectively.’592 To attribute that second doctrine to Hyndman was 
misleading. It functioned primarily as a rhetorical ploy, permitting Mallock 
to deal with George under the guise of dealing with Hyndman only.593 But 
the first doctrine that Mallock set out to refute did indeed cut to the quick of 
Hyndman’s Socialist schema. Between that, then, and the personal nature 
of Mallock’s polemic, the article demanded some sort of recognisable 
response. Hyndman acknowledged it therefore in the preface to The 
Historical Basis, disingenuously stating that the criticism had ‘been fully 
met, by anticipation’.594 
The crux of Mallock’s assault on Hyndman’s retelling of Marx’s 
economic theory hung on the contention that ‘all wealth is demonstrably 
not due to labour’.595 It is due, rather, he argued, to two things: ‘to 
machinery, and to the direction of labour.’596 Machinery, according to 
Mallock, varied the value of labour, but he did not press the point. He 
concentrated, instead, on explaining how the ‘direction or organisation of 
labour’ formed ‘the real heart of the matter’.597 It was admitted by Marx and 
Hyndman, he started, that division of labour increases production. But 
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what they did not grasp was what caused that division. ‘One would imagine, 
from the manner in which Mr. Hyndman speaks about it,’ he wrote, ‘that 
somehow or other it had taken place spontaneously, in accordance with 
some natural impulse on the part of the labourer’.598 ‘Of the real truth of the 
matter’, he continued, ‘neither Hyndman nor any of his instructors seem... 
to have had the smallest glimmering. They seem never to have suspected 
that in the advance of civilisation the division of labour will not take care of 
itself’.599 Moreover, they were just as credulous when it came to accounting 
for inventions and the transmission of knowledge. Again, ‘To judge from the 
language of Mr. Hyndman,’ Mallock persisted, ‘one would think that it was 
as easy a thing to have invented the steam-engine as to file the head of a 
nut, or to plane the surface of a slide-valve; and that it was as much a 
matter of indifference who was the engineer of a railway as who turned the 
first sod with a spade.’600 Mallock had already experimented with formulas 
elsewhere to illustrate the true source of wealth.601 But here, he arrived at a 
stable conclusion: ‘the rapid growth of wealth’, he argued, ‘has been the 
creation, not of the labour of many, but of the intellect, the ingenuity, and 
the perseverance of the few’.602 
Notwithstanding his claim to the contrary, Hyndman’s rebuttal of 
Mallock was tailored to meet these charges. He deployed two strategies to 
achieve this. The first of those strategies was simply to deny the cogency of 
Mallock’s case. Resorting to evasion rather than detailed retort, Hyndman 
issued a series of vague references to ‘the long, general, never-ending 
progress of human society’.603 Both the division of labour and human 
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inventions of various kinds were ‘due to small advances,’ he argued, ‘which 
together contributed to the general movement of mankind’.604 Some ‘lucky 
individuals may be honoured for the last crowning bit of work’, but 
mankind ‘hangs together from generation to generation; easy labour is but 
inherited skill; great discoveries and inventions are worked up to by the 
efforts of myriads ere the goal is reached.’605 If Hyndman’s response 
generally entailed the substitution of assertion for argument, here he 
sidestepped Mallock’s challenge completely. For he did not address the 
distinction laid down by Mallock that whereas manual skill ‘developed and 
dies with each generation that possesses it’, ‘the knowledge of the men by 
whom labour is directed’ is progressive – unlike the labourers, they ‘begin 
exactly where their fathers ended.’606 The second strategy that Hyndman 
deployed was more convincing. For Mallock, given the nature of wealth 
production as he described it, its proceeds were overwhelmingly in the right 
hands. To this, Hyndman countered, firstly, that there could be no 
‘pretence’ that the wealthy inhabitants of the ‘great lounger towns’ that had 
grown up in the second half of the century did anything to ‘“organise” 
labour’.607 But second, turning now to his other strategy, Hyndman issued 
an imminent critique of Mallock’s position: after illuminating the anarchy 
that resided in production, and its attendant social ills, ‘this’, he averred, ‘is 
the organisation of labour for which the labourers are asked to pay and be 
thankful for; this,’ he avowed again, ‘is the skilful management of 
production which the capitalist class and their hangers-on make a merit 
of’.608 
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Needless to say, if Mallock pursued the above-named point at the greatest 
length, he was by no means alone among contemporary critics of Socialism 
in making it. In his ‘Reply to the Manifesto of the Democratic Federation’, 
Smith, for example, also derided the claim that ‘all wealth is due to 
labour’.609 ‘The single invention of Watt – the steam-engine,’ he alleged, 
‘has added more to the wealth of this country than a million pair of hands 
could do.’610 Like Mallock, Smith complained that the Socialist formulation 
failed to acknowledge the intelligence and the skill of the employing classes. 
‘It would be just as sensible for the hands and feet to complain that the head 
was a useless member because it did not walk or dig, as to say that mere 
hand labour was the only source of wealth.’611  
Smith, furthermore, added two additional points that Mallock did 
not broach in his article. He asserted, on the one hand, that ‘the cause of the 
poverty of great numbers of distressed people’ was ‘largely the result of 
moral causes’ – ‘intemperance, and the want of thrift and forethought’ – 
and could be cured, in consequence, only ‘by moral means aided by wise 
legislation’.612 On the other hand, Smith contended that there was, 
nonetheless, another cause of poverty that ‘no human laws can deal with’: 
namely, the tendency to over-population.613 ‘The fact is’, he wrote, ‘the laws 
of political economy, like those of nature, are inexorable’.614 Not only did 
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they not permit State intervention in the trade and labour market, as 
proposed in the DF’s manifesto, but ‘where there is no check to population, 
through the difficulty of obtaining subsistence,’ the ineffectuality and 
unintended consequences of wage hikes and other infringements of the 
principle of freedom of contract would be compounded by something even 
more disagreeable: the people, Smith argued, would soon ‘die in millions by 
famine.’615 
In the opening passage of his review-article, Mallock bemoaned the 
state of disrepair of orthodox political economy. Echoing Walter Bagehot’s 
notorious statement – that ‘It lies rather dead in the public mind’ – he 
wondered just how many ‘members of the upper and middle classes’ would 
‘be able to indicate why and where’ exactly the modern Socialist theories 
were false.616 On that score, in the specific case of Smith, Mallock clearly 
had no reason to worry. Indeed, so far from disregarding ‘the dismal 
science’, Smith reduced it to its purest, most dogmatic form. He had not 
heard, plainly, that ‘the long and bitter controversy between economists 
and human beings’ had ended.617 Nor, evidently, that the latter had in fact 
won. As Toynbee, the author of that locution, put it in the first of his 
lectures on Progress and Poverty: ‘The economist now dares to say that the 
end of his practical science is not wealth, but man; and further, he owns 
that his intellectual theories have also undergone a vast change.’618 To be 
sure, the problem of distribution remained a thorny one, according to 
Toynbee. But the explanation framed at the beginning of the century by 
Malthus, James Mill, and David Ricardo for ‘the misery which they saw 
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before them’, an explanation ‘which denied hope to the human race’, had 
doubtlessly run out of steam.619 The economist, Toynbee continued,  
has learnt to recognise that the laws which he supposed were 
universal are often only partial and provisional; he has learnt to 
recognise that the method which he uses with such confidence – the 
method of abstract deduction – is a most dangerous one; that it can 
be used only by men who know that at every step they have to 
question their premises, and that at every step they have to test their 
conclusions by experience. Last of all, he recognises that the vast 
problems which we all now see are looming upon us cannot be 
solved by rash and hasty statements, but only by patient and vigilant 
science.  He recognises that to solve the problem of to-day we must 
go back far into the past.620  
 
Toynbee’s reappraisal of political economy was by no means representative. 
But it dealt a serious blow, at any rate, to those like Smith and Mallock who 
still believed in the inexorability of certain economic laws posited by a 
handful of late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth century thinkers. 
Moreover, in the lectures that he delivered on George’s book, Toynbee also 
inadvertently formulated answers to Smith’s, once ubiquitous, but now 
increasingly outmoded, remarks on the causes of poverty. Impressed by 
Toynbee’s analysis, they formed, in turn, the starting-point for the response 
to Smith that Hyndman deposited in The Historical Basis.  
In the first place, in contrast to the moral dichotomy that Smith 
outlined – the distinction between temperate and intemperate workers – 
Toynbee’s understanding of what constituted poverty was decidedly more 
expansive. He drew attention to what he termed the ‘more refined form of 
suffering’ that typified the lives of the multitude in Britain.621 That suffering 
may not have taken an acutely physical form since 1846, when the repeal of 
the Corn Laws ensured a constant provision of cheap bread. But it was no 
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less real for its spatial and temporal relativity. It was the suffering, Toynbee 
explained, of men and women in stable employment, the suffering of men 
and women whose labour, despite its intensity and lack of intellectual 
reward, ‘cannot obtain for them even a whole house as a home, nor the 
decent enjoyments of life, nor the certainty of an honourable old age.’622 
Worst of all, however, it was a form of suffering that was entirely avoidable.  
Contrary to the opinion of his doctrinaire opponents, Toynbee 
insisted that the untrammelled pursuit of economic self-interest was not an 
unalloyed good. Its results, rather, were distinctly mixed. The relationship 
between employer and labourer was characterised by an imbalance of 
power, which enabled the former to ‘practically dictate terms’ to the 
latter.623 But it need not be so. While competition resembled a ‘physical 
force’ presiding benignly over the operation of supply and demand in, say, 
the grain market, it was not, like a force of nature, unalterable.624 ‘Man’, 
Toynbee argued, ‘is pliable, and pliable to great ideas of justice.’625 The level 
of suffering borne by the labourers was ‘in the will of the employer’ to 
decide.626 Consequently, a better division of wealth was indeed possible. But 
to realise it, it presupposed ‘a passionate devotion to the community’ on the 
part of the middle classes hitherto absent.627 
In addition to his largely structural account of poverty, and the 
moral inversion that he effected, Toynbee also dismissed, secondly, the idea 
that Malthus’s doctrine of population had any ongoing relevance for the 
situation in late-nineteenth century Britain. Whereas Mill maintained that 
‘the tendency to over-population is a fact which Communism, as well as the 
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existing society, would have to deal with’, Toynbee argued that, ‘It, like the 
whole of the English school of thought, was the product of a peculiar and 
disastrous time.’628 The circumstances that fostered its growth – namely, 
‘bad harvests year after year, with a great war all through Europe’ – no 
longer obtained.629 There was therefore no reason to continue to cleave to it 
as a precept at present: ‘we need not trust, as the old economists did,’ he 
wrote, ‘to checks on population... or improvements in the condition of the 
workpeople; but we may trust to the organised work of the community, 
which will slowly lift them to a higher place.’630  
Toynbee, in other words, relativised Malthusianism. He also 
complicated, as his reference to ‘improvements in the condition of the 
workpeople’ indicates, some of the moral categories promoted by middle-
class champions of the scheme of national insurance devised by Blackley – 
that is, middle-class social reformers like Smith. In keeping with the 
Mazzinian theme of communal duty that formed one of the cornerstones of 
his work, Toynbee argued that what had been overlooked in these 
suggestions was ‘the fact that thrift may often brutalize a man as much as 
drink.’631 Toynbee warned how ‘a man may make huge efforts to save and to 
raise himself, and so become narrow and selfish and careless of his fellow-
men.’632 What was needed was not encouragement of a socially injurious 
and practically unreasonable kind of self-reliance, but rather ‘help towards 
doing without help’ in the form of a modest extension of the State to protect 
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vulnerable workers and promote the quality of life of the community at 
large.633 
 
If Toynbee provided inadvertent answers to Smith’s account of causation, 
Hyndman’s response to the arguments elucidated in Smith’s letter was 
necessarily esoteric, insofar as Smith had not yet published its content as 
The Fallacies of Socialism Exposed. However, in replying to Smith’s 
charges, Hyndman was killing two birds with one stone. His utterances 
applied as much to Bradlaugh and Besant and other unreconstructed 
Liberals as they did to their intended target. As we have already heard, here 
as elsewhere in the book, Hyndman took his lead from Toynbee’s lectures 
on George. He, too, considered poverty as primarily a structural 
phenomenon. In its modern incarnation it was simply the unfortunate, but 
time-limited, upshot of those presently at the sharp end of the class 
struggle.  
For this belief, of course, Hyndman had no need of Toynbee. That 
much he gleaned from Engels and Marx.  Hyndman had no need of 
Toynbee either for the conclusion that drink was for the most part the 
consequence of poverty as opposed to its cause. But he did borrow 
Toynbee’s turn of phrase, somewhat more emphatically put, that personal 
thrift was ‘but a low form of selfishness.’634 More significantly, though, 
Hyndman rehashed in The Historical Basis both the synoptic history of the 
‘controversy between economists and human beings’ that Toynbee laid out 
in his lectures, as well as Toynbee’s description of the defining economic 
characteristics of the era. 
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Firstly, Hyndman reproduced Toynbee’s narrative that the epoch of 
the industrial revolution gave birth to a ‘clique of economical fanatics’, men 
‘like Malthus and Chalmers, and Ricardo, and James Mill’, who ‘got hold of 
the machine of legislation and drove it completely over the interests of the 
mass of the people’.635 Like Toynbee, he isolated John Stuart Mill as the 
single exception, the one economist who did reveal ‘a deep sympathy with 
the people’.636 But, like Toynbee, too, Hyndman asserted that Mill was still 
culpable of considerable blindness.637 Above all, Mill was guilty, on 
Hyndman’s reading, of clinging to the superannuated ‘views of the 
Malthusian school’, views which had been ‘accepted more or less completely 
by the leading English economists of the bourgeois school to-day.’638 
Indeed, in this regard, ‘Mill, Fawcett, and Rogers, Walker and Sidgwick’ 
provided ‘a remarkable instance of the complete incapacity of men who are 
brought up with certain set theories, to cast them aside and think for 
themselves.’639 As Toynbee himself remarked of Malthus’s doctrine of 
population: ‘after a time the crisis passed away, although the theories which 
had grown up in the brief moment of agony dominated our thought for half-
a-century’.640 Even ‘wise men’ were capable of simplicity of explanation, he 
noted, particularly ‘when they are not in contact with those who suffer’.641 
Hyndman and Toynbee were at one in the belief that the ‘Malthusian theory 
in the present condition’ – in the more forceful language of the former – 
was ‘utterly misleading and foolish.’642 
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Naturally, much of Hyndman’s critique of Malthusianism was 
derived, not from Toynbee, whose utterances on the subject were, in any 
case, only fleeting, but from Engels and Marx. It was no accident that 
Hyndman should have held Toynbee in such high regard in the first 
instance, given their mutual affinity for Marx’s writings. But Hyndman 
dismissed the Malthusian theory of over-population for two separate 
reasons, one inspired chiefly by the former, and the other inspired by the 
latter pair.  
Firstly, taking up Smith’s claim that, ‘where there is no check to 
population... it doubles every twenty-five years’, Hyndman complained – à 
la Toynbee – about the ‘wholly unscientific metaphysical manner’ of 
proceeding, which proclaimed ‘as true a tendency which, among the well-
to-do of our existing society does not exist,’ and ‘which, therefore, may be 
entirely changed by a new order of things, and which cannot be worth 
consideration, even if true, for some ages’.643 More importantly, however, 
Hyndman – following Engels and Marx – put machinery at the centre of his 
second reason for disregarding Malthus. The ‘effect of the machine’, he 
argued, ‘is constantly to throw men out of employment, and to create, under 
existing conditions of production, a permanent over-population, in the face 
of increasing wealth.’644 Under these circumstances, the workers were 
emphatically not the authors of their own fate. ‘The tendency of our system 
of production’, he averred – the tendency for constant capital to increase 
proportionately over its variable counterpart – ‘is of necessity to increase 
the amount of over-population relatively to the means of employment’.645 
An ‘industrial army of reserve is maintained’, he continued, ‘ever at the 
disposal of capital for the enhancement of profit, ready to be absorbed into 
                                                          
643 Smith, Fallacies of Socialism, p. 13. Hyndman, Historical Basis, p. 391. 
644 Ibid., p. 239. 
645 Ibid., p. 256. 
167 
 
the whirl of production during times of expansion, only to be thrown 
workless on to the streets in periods of collapse.’646 
For Hyndman, then, the evidence did not suggest, firstly, that an 
expansion of population was the necessary corollary of an increase in 
wealth. Secondly, the surplus population extant under a capitalist mode of 
production was generated by that mode of production itself. Even if it did 
transpire, in the event, that life was in fact ‘a mad race between population 
and wealth’, wealth was in any case ultimately destined to triumph.647 For 
once machinery had been harnessed for the needs of the community – in 
contrast to its present role as a device to satisfy the inordinate wants of the 
few at the expense of the many – wealth, he insisted, would ‘be made as 
plentiful as water’.648 The conflict between the relations of production and 
the productive forces would resolve itself in Socialism, in a society, that is, 
where the collective exploitation of new technologies like electricity would 
quickly usher in the economy of superabundance imagined by Engels and 
Marx.  
Moreover, the logic of concentration that ostensibly formed the 
prelude to that process had, as Toynbee recognised, already taken hold. ‘As 
Karl Marx and other writers have pointed out,’ he wrote,  
gradually large industries are stamping out, or rather, large 
businesses are stamping out, smaller ones. Gradually capital is being 
accumulated in fewer and fewer hands, until at last some think we 
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shall have nothing but a handful of stupendous monopolists, with a 
struggling mass of labourers at their feet.649  
Yet, while Toynbee was to ready to proclaim ‘the era of free trade and free 
contract’ over, he was not ready to submit to Hyndman’s view that 
competition had proven both ‘historically and actually’ a failure.650 The ‘era 
of administration’ may have arrived, but it did not entail a sharp break with 
the status quo. It entailed just a better distribution of wealth.651 
Nonetheless, despite their discordant conclusions, Hyndman shadowed 
Toynbee’s analysis of what he called the ‘law of larger capitals’ as it applied 
to such issues as co-operation and land reform.652 Indeed, Hyndman’s 
greatest debt to Toynbee resided in his survey of George’s proposals on 
precisely the latter score.  
 
In refuting George’s proposals in The Historical Basis, Hyndman took his 
lead from Toynbee’s fraternal, but ideologically unsympathetic, review of 
Progress and Poverty, rather than from Marx’s hostile stance. Unlike Marx, 
Toynbee described George’s book in admiring tones. In addition to the 
‘acute dialectic and splendid declamation’ it revealed, Progress and Poverty 
merited praise, on Toynbee’s view, for the author’s ‘keen sympathy with the 
people’.653 Marx, by contrast, described it to Hyndman as the ‘Capitalists’ 
last ditch’.654  
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Like Marx, though, Toynbee insisted that George had ‘promulgated 
errors’, errors which he held ‘to be fundamentally dangerous’.655 Seeing 
‘how much wrong economists have done in the past by false theories,’ he 
wrote, ‘I will not sacrifice my intellectual conscience by supporting a fair, 
but delusive panacea.’656 Indeed, on the most crucial points, Toynbee’s 
appraisal of George’s scheme converged with Marx’s. He, too, regarded 
George as ‘a child of David Ricardo’.657 Toynbee also mirrored Marx in 
suggesting that, George’s land tax represented not a solution to the current 
inequitable distribution of wealth in society, but the completion rather of 
capitalist production in its most nefarious form: 
Mr George does not propose to touch the large farm system. He says 
the large farm system is due to a law of economic development, with 
which he will not meddle. But as long as vast accumulators of capital 
continue to deal thus ruthlessly with their human instruments, what 
good will the confiscation of rent do? The evil in this case plainly is 
not the ownership of land in large quantities, which is all that Mr 
George would prevent, but its tenure in large quantities, which he 
would allow.658  
Like Hyndman before him in England for All, Toynbee objected to 
the one-sidedness of George’s solution. ‘If we look at it closely,’ he argued, 
‘we shall find that this is but one typical form of a universal and urgent 
problem. It is not only in farms and in agriculture that great businesses are 
being formed, or have been formed, but in industry and manufactures’ 
too.659 On this point, there was unanimity between Marx, Toynbee, and 
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Hyndman. They were all agreed that, ‘it is quite ridiculous’, as the latter put 
it, 
to talk of the landlord as the sole and particular cause of the 
distressed condition of the mass of our agricultural population; still 
more foolish to argue that the exaction of rent for land is the chief 
cause of the sad condition of the mass of the workers in our great 
cities. If agricultural and ground rents were taken by the State 
tomorrow, the main difficulties of our social problems would be 
almost as far from solution as ever.660  
That said, Toynbee went much further than Marx in explaining just 
where George had gone wrong. Whereas Marx dismissed in broad-brush 
terms the ‘socialist panacea’ that George set out, Toynbee, by contrast, 
calculated, firstly, the revenue that State confiscation of the ‘unearned 
increment’ could expect to obtain, and he attempted, second, to debunk 
Ricardo’s theory of rent upon which George’s doctrine was largely based.661 
Hyndman followed suit on both counts. 
Taking Toynbee’s analysis as a model, Hyndman also disregarded 
Ricardo’s theory of rent, aping Toynbee’s argument that the law of 
diminishing returns simply did not stand up.662 He also deployed Toynbee’s 
figure of £60,000,000 to demonstrate the relative paucity of competition 
rents.663 More important than the sum, however, was the fact that such a 
policy should ‘put a great burden on one class alone’.664 The capitalists, 
‘who will be relieved of taxation to a large amount themselves, and who, on 
the taxation of the workers being lessened, would reduce wages on the 
average by the amount of such remittance’, would ultimately be the only 
class to gain in George’s ill-thought-out scenario.665 What was needed, 
Hyndman argued, was not the mere confiscation of competition rents, 
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‘without reference to the surrounding economical conditions of the people’, 
but the ‘complete reorganisation of production and exchange between town 
and country’.666 Here, at least, then, Hyndman’s survey exceeded Toynbee’s, 
insofar as the latter settled for a graduated income tax applicable to 
landowners and capitalists alike. 
 
In the light of what has been said in Chapter 2, it goes without saying that 
neither Hyndman’s proposal nor Toynbee’s could expect to gain the support 
of Fawcett. In his Macmillan’s Magazine article, Fawcett, likewise, objected 
to George’s scheme. But he did so, needless to say, for different reasons. 
Paradoxically, though, Fawcett shared Hyndman’s and Toynbee’s concern 
about the inequity of confiscating the ‘unearned increment’ on land alone. If 
‘the state’, he complained, ‘in prosperous times appropriates an increase in 
value, and if in adverse times the falling-off in value has to be borne by the 
owner, land would at once have a disability attached to it which belongs to 
no other property.’667 It was not only the question of land that concerned 
him, however. In what was essentially one last throw of the dice, in ‘State 
Socialism and the Nationalisation of the Land’, Fawcett reiterated, in finer 
detail, owing to the proliferation of State interventionist schemes, the 
criticisms he issued five years earlier in the Fortnightly Review. This time 
around, however, instead of drawing sustenance from Fawcett’s comments, 
Hyndman responded antagonistically. The precise nature of Hyndman’s 
response is not important. But it would be true to say that, by 1883, Fawcett 
was indeed the ‘brave defender of a lost cause’, in a way that was not strictly 
true of him in 1878. A spirit of revolution may not exactly have been afoot 
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as Mallock suggested; but Blackley could certainly rest assured that the 

























In The Historical Basis, Hyndman associated the work of Marx and Engels 
with that of the German Historical School. Strictly speaking, he was wrong 
to do so. Despite a superficial resemblance – i.e. the shared emphasis on 
historicism in their respective economic theories – there was no formal 
connection between them, and the political aspirations of the former pair 
were clearly ill-matched with the modest reforming commitments of the so-
called Socialists of the Chair.668 Nonetheless, Hyndman was not the only 
British intellectual impressed by Marx’s work to commit that error. In his 
first essay on Socialism, Karl Pearson also listed Marx among the leading 
Kathedersozialisten, next to Adolf Held, Adolph Wagner, and Albert 
Schäffle.669 In fact, mutual misapprehension of Marx’s intellectual heritage 
was not the only thing that these British intellectuals had in common. At 
the same time as Hyndman had begun to visit Marx’s home in Hampstead, 
Pearson had also begun to correspond with Marx after having become 
familiar with his work during a period of study at the universities of 
Heidelberg and Berlin. In a letter dated 9 February 1881, Pearson even 
proposed to Marx that he translate Das Kapital.670 Of course, Marx did not 
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accept Pearson’s proposal. The door was thus left open for Hyndman to 
begin his own unauthorised translation, in 1884, in To-day.  
By that time Pearson was known to the other Socialists receptive to 
Marx in Britain. Indeed, in announcing his adhesion to a ‘new school’ of 
Socialism distinct from that inspired by Marx, Pearson provoked the wrath 
of Bax.671 Bax responded to Pearson’s assault on ‘Revolutionary Socialism’ 
in an article published in Commonweal. It was reprinted in The Religion of 
Socialism, the only other book-length exposition of modern Socialism, 
besides Hyndman’s Historical Basis, to have been written, to date, by a 
member of the Socialist movement.672 The article is revealing for two 
reasons. On the one hand, it illuminates the trajectory that Bax had taken 
since 1881, where we left him in Chapter 4. On the other, it indicates his 
central preoccupations. It provides, therefore, a useful starting-point to 
explore Bax’s more mature Socialist thought. 
 
In 1884, the SDF underwent a split.673 It resulted in the formation of the 
Socialist League. Thenceforth, Bax and Hyndman were divided by 
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Socialism, Sex, and the Culture of Aestheticism, Ch. 3.  
671 Karl Pearson, ‘The Enthusiasm of the Market-Place and of the Study’, in The 
Ethic of Freethought and Other Addresses and Essays (London, Adam and Charles 
Black, 1903), p. 117. 
672 Speaking of the publication of Fabian Essays thirty years after the event, Sidney 
Webb wrote: ‘At the present day (1919), when almost a majority of the publications 
dealing with Political Science bear a Socialist imprint; and almost more is 
predicated about the Organization of the Socialist State of the Future than is 
revealed about the Capitalist Organization of today, it is hard to realize the extent 
of our innovation. There was available, in 1889, to the English reader, apart from 
the various manifestoes of the Social Democratic Federation and the Socialist 
League, principally by William Morris, Ernest Belfort Bax, and Henry Mayers 
Hyndman, with a dozen or so pamphlets by these and other writers, little else than 
Hyndman’s England for All (1881) and Historical Basis of Socialism (1883) and a 
volume of essays by Bax, The Religion of Socialism’. ‘Introduction to the 1920 
reprint’, in Shaw (ed.), Fabian Essays, p. 271. 
673 The best historical account of the schism is given by Bevir in Making of British 
Socialism, Ch. 6. While it does not challenge the misconceptions surrounding 
Hyndman, it does succeed in establishing a role for the ordinary members of the 
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conflicting allegiances to those organisations. The former occupied a 
position on the Provisional Council of the newly-founded body. The latter, 
meanwhile, continued to play a key role in the SDF. That, however, did not 
stop Bax from coming to Hyndman’s aid when Pearson characterized him 
as the titular ‘man of the market-place’ in the above-mentioned lecture. 
Pearson characterised Hyndman as a political actor motivated chiefly by 
ignorance and blind feeling, as opposed to the reason exercised by his (self-
referential) ideal-typical counterpart, the ‘man of the study’. Pearson had 
not retracted his Socialist views. Nor had he disowned his earlier 
admiration of Marx’s Capital.674 But he did insist, in contrast to Hyndman, 
that Socialism (which he envisaged in decidedly Statist terms, and which he 
viewed as ‘the logical outcome of the law of Malthus’) must be delivered 
gradually and by means of moral education.675   
To Pearson’s contemptuous treatment of Hyndman, Bax replied in 
kind. He argued that: 
Mr Pearson, whether he intended it or not, has stated a specious 
case for the nice young man fresh from the university, who shudders 
at the “coarseness” inseparable from a real working class movement, 
and prefers the attitude of missionary of culture to the benighted 
proletarian heathen to that of his co-worker in the cause of social 
emancipation and in the hurrying on of that class-struggle which is 
its necessary condition.676 
The ‘gospel of “sweet reasonableness”’ propounded by Pearson and others 
cut no ice with Bax.677 The swelling ranks of ‘moral’ reformers were guilty, 
                                                                                                                                                   
SDF who typically shared a political background in popular radicalism. Bax’s 
retrospective explanation of the ‘split’, meanwhile, put ‘personal questions’, rather 
than Hyndman’s nominal ‘chauvinism’, at its core. ‘As time showed,’ he argued, ‘the 
excuse or reason for the rupture, so far as its theoretical grounds were concerned, 
was utterly inadequate.’ Reminiscences and Reflexions, pp. 77, 79. 
674 Karl Pearson, ‘The Moral Basis of Socialism’, in The Ethic of Freethought, p. 
325.  
675 Ibid., p. 319. 
676 Ernest Belfort Bax, ‘The Two Enthusiasms’, in The Religion of Socialism. Being 
Essays in Modern Socialist Criticism (London, Swan Sonnenschein, Lowrey & Co, 
1886), p. 128. 
677 Ibid., p. 133. 
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he held, of treating ethics absolutely, ‘irrespective of such insignificant 
obstacles as economic conditions and social surroundings.’678 They ignored 
that ‘the intellectual and moral revolution of society rests primarily upon 
the conditions in which its wealth is produced and distributed.’679 The 
distinction that Pearson created between the ‘study’ and the ‘market-place’ 
did not stand up. For as soon as the structural supports which held it in 
place had been removed the distinction would collapse – and, for historical 
reasons, the ‘market-place’, not the ‘study’, would perform the job of 
removal. 
 Clearly, the economic structure of society, or the mode of 
production, now figured far more prominently in Bax’s thought than it had 
done at the turn of the decade. In the mental landscape that he now 
inhabited, Spencer was out and Engels was in. Bax’s rejoinder to Pearson 
shed light on that transformation. Bax may not have deployed the language 
of ‘scientific’ Socialism in the article, but his affinity with Engels is plain. 
What is also clear is Bax’s aversion to the ahistorical view of ethics, which 
received a new impetus in Britain with the emergence of the ‘Neo-Hegelian 
school’. Thinking aright about ethics would prove to be an enduring idée 
fixe. So, too, would Bax’s own interest in Hegel. For Hegel’s ‘reading of the 
riddle of Life and Knowledge’, he wrote in his rejoinder to Pearson, was ‘the 
least unsatisfactory up to date.’680 Certainly, Engels’s contribution to Bax’s 
intellectual formation following their meeting in 1883 was substantial. But 
Bax had developed an admiration of Hegel independently. The uses they 
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made of Hegel were in fact at odds. Engels, indeed, as we shall see in 
Chapters 8 and 9, disapproved of Bax’s philosophy.681  
 
By 1895, the year of Engels’s death, Bax and Engels were intimately 
familiar. From 1883 onwards, Bax had been a guest at Engels’s Sunday 
gatherings. On these occasions, Bax kept ‘the conversational ball rolling’ 
with his heterodox views.682 Combined with study of the relevant published 
writings, it was also there, in conversation with Engels, that Bax learnt to 
interpret Marx. Thus, he viewed Marx from that time forward through an 
Engelsian lens. The personal intimacy enjoyed by Bax and Engels did not, 
however, translate into its intellectual equivalent. Despite Engels’s forecast, 
Bax did not outgrow his youthful indiscretions. As we shall see in Chapters 
8, 9, 10, and 11, he cherry-picked, instead, from the developing ‘Marxist’ 
oeuvre, taking to heart, in a strongly attenuated form, what was shortly 
termed ‘the materialist doctrine of history’, and Engels’s observations on 
‘primitive society’; the rest he disregarded, particularly Engels’s positivist 
anti-philosophy, which he also conflated with Marx.  
 In the field of political economy – Marx’s real preoccupation – Bax 
developed a competency. But it was not one of his major concerns.683 To be 
                                                          
681 In a letter to Bebel in 1886, Engels wrote: ‘Bax is very talented and understands 
something – but after the fashion of philosophers has concocted his own form of 
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it. However, this is an infantile disease in his case and will pass, it is only a pity that 
this process is being gone through in public.’ Quoted in Thompson, William 
Morris, p. 422. Bax’s view of Engels’s efforts in the field of philosophy are 
expounded in Chapter 9. 
682 Bernstein, My Years in Exile, p. 202. 
683 On the question of competence, Bax, for example, wrote the introduction to a 
new edition of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations published by Bohn in 1887. He 
also took the lead in drafting the articles for Commonweal, ‘Socialism from the 
Root Up’, in 1886 and 1887. As Morris recorded in his diary: ‘Tuesday to Bax at 
Croydon where we did our first article on Marx: or rather he did it: I don’t think I 
should ever make an economist even of the most elementary kind: but I am glad of 
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sure, Bax was one of the leading participants in the reading circle held at 
the home of Charlotte Wilson, organised to discuss Marx’s Capital, known 
later as the Hampstead Historic Society.684 But he left the work of 
responding to the so-called ‘Jevonian Criticism of Marx’ that ensued from 
those meetings up to Shaw and Hyndman.685 Bax was more comfortable, 
intellectually speaking, at the Aristotelian Society, where he first met R. B. 
Haldane. Bax’s friendship with Haldane began in 1882.686 The following 
year, Bax contributed his ‘own quota to the dominant philosophical interest’ 
with a translation of Kant’s Prolegomena and Metaphysical Foundations of 
Natural Science, preceded by a short biography of Kant.687 Then, in 1885, 
he published his Handbook to the History of Philosophy. Shaw, the only 
other British Socialist to take a genuine interest in philosophy, studied 
Bax’s book.688 He and Bax discussed it together, in some detail, at the 
British Museum Reading Room. 
Bax, then, was well-integrated in the various circles interested in 
intellectual and social change in late-Victorian London. These connections 
helped to militate against the prospect of being absorbed by Engels’s 
intellectual and political project. However, as his comments on ‘nice young’ 
men ‘fresh from university’ indicate, Bax was no less critical of the other 
groups of intellectuals with whom he came into contact. On the contrary, 
Bax was more hostile to the Fabians and the Idealists who, as we shall see in 
                                                                                                                                                   
the opportunity this gives me of hammering some Marx into myself’. Quoted in 
Thompson, William Morris, pp. 752-753. 
684 For a short discussion of the Hampstead Historic Society see A. M. McBriar, 
Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884-1918 (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1966), pp. 30-35; and Pierson, Marxism and the Origins of 
British Socialism, pp. 119-130. 
685 The debate on Marx’s theory of value was a long drawn out affair, taking place in 
the pages of To-day. Shaw’s initial contribution is cited in fn. 59. His conversion to 
Wickstead’s position is recorded in ‘Bluffing the Value Theory’, To-day, 11/66 
(May, 1889), pp. 128-135. Hyndman’s contribution was issued the previous month 
in ‘Marx’s Theory of Value’, To-day, 11/65 (Apr. 1889), pp. 94-104. 
686 Bax, Reminiscences and Reflexions, p. 211. 
687 Ibid., p. 67. 
688 Cowley, The Victorian Encounter with Marx, pp. 51-52. 
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Chapters 8, 9, and 10, bore the brunt of his ill-natured polemics during the 
1880s and 1890s. 
 By contrast, Bax’s refutations of Engels were never bad-tempered. 
And unlike his altercations with other social reformers outside the 
revolutionary Socialist movement, his criticism of Engels was almost always 
esoteric. It was only in the freer environment of the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, between Engels’s death and the consolidation of the 
Soviet Union, that Bax posited a more candid appraisal. Thus, he conceded 
in 1918, in his autobiography, that ‘Engels had his limitations 
intellectually’.689 Engels’s greatest failing was the ‘crude and dogmatic 
materialism’ he cleaved to, a failing that Bax also attributed to Marx.690 Yet, 
notwithstanding that, and other intellectual faux pas, Bax showed an 
uncharacteristic leniency toward his friend. Throughout the 1880s and 
nineties Bax’s loyalty to the custodian of Marx’s legacy remained 
undimmed. He had no qualms, however, about taking broadly sympathetic 
adversaries to task. If Hyndman, then, gradually descended into a 
politically inauspicious, doctrinaire mode, Bax remained constant in his 
obstinacy. He began and finished his career as a Socialist leaving no 
hostages to fortune.  
For example, in an article, symbolically entitled, ‘Unscientific 
Socialism’, Bax brushed off the other ‘nominally socialistic’ ideas that had 
begun, by 1884, to circulate in Britain. ‘In the exposition of a subject such 
as Socialism,’ he wrote, 
as in the rebuilding of an edifice, there is a preliminary stage of 
destructive activity. Old material, in the one case, has to be carted 
away, and the ground to be generally dug up and cleared. In the 
other, we have similarly to clear out intellectual ground of theories 
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likely to interfere with our contemplated structure. Now, no 
material is so much in danger of cumbering us as that which 
superficially resembles our own, but is in reality old and rotten.691 
While Hyndman left his animadversion to the ideas of other social 
reformers implicit, Bax laboured to bring the various points of discord out 
into the open.  Moreover, given his close acquaintance with the embryonic 
Socialist intelligentsia and its associates he was peculiarly well-placed to do 
so.  
 
In the article mentioned above, Bax isolated four ‘codes of ideas’, which 
comprised, on his view, an ‘unscientific’ block of Socialist thought in 
Britain.692 In so doing, he was of course reproducing Engels’s famous 
distinction. However, in place of Engels’s straightforward, bifurcated 
model, ‘utopian’ and ‘scientific’, Bax elaborated a slightly more complicated 
scheme. As opposed to the dichotomy presented by Engels, Bax set out 
three further ‘unscientific’ alternatives to ‘socialism proper’, namely 
Christian Socialism, Sentimental Socialism, and Anarchism.693 Bax, like 
Engels, regarded each of these alternatives as utopian in the pejorative 
sense of the term. But he also viewed them as sufficiently distinct to merit a 
brief discussion of their own. The best part of Bax’s article was devoted to 
the discussion of Christian Socialism, specifically, to the Guild of St. 
Mathew, the latest incarnation of that recurrent tradition in British Socialist 
thought. He did so, however, not because of its influence, which remained 
                                                          
691 Bax, ‘Unscientific Socialism’, p. 92. ‘Unscientific Socialism’ was first printed in 
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692 Ibid., p. 92. 
693 In its fourfold form, Bax’s typology was closer to that set out in the Communist 
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negligible, but because the discussion coincided with the topic of moral 
philosophy. 
 Bax delivered his critique of Christian Socialism in two parts. In the 
first part he analysed its ‘economic basis’.694 In the second, he assessed the 
ethical teaching of its ‘titular founder’, Christ.695 Bax’s understanding of the 
current phase of Christian Socialism was impressionistic. He located its 
‘practical basis’ in trade co-operation and industrial partnership.696 
Accuracy aside, however, in conflating the old and the new, Bax was able to 
settle the score with that old Radical hobby-horse and Liberal panacea, a 
challenge he sidestepped five years earlier in his first article on Socialism 
published in Modern Thought.  
For Mill, as we saw in Chapter 2, co-operation and profit-sharing 
schemes not only compensated for the anticipated failings of Communism, 
they also provided relief, he argued, for the worst abuses of the ‘existing 
constitution of property’.697 Bax, by contrast, maintained ‘that all such 
schemes are not only within the lines of the current bourgeois system of 
ideas, habits, and aspirations, but that they reflect that system in some of its 
worst aspects.’698 That is to say, he posited the very reverse. Following 
Harrison’s assessment, Bax averred that the ‘trade co-operator canonises 
the bourgeois virtues, but Socialist vices, “over-work,” and “thrift.”’699 Far 
more optimistic than Mill about the potential for transformation of the 
human character – indeed incomparably so – Bax asserted that the values 
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695 Ibid., p. 96. 
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encouraged by those schemes were at odds with a system designed to 
facilitate the enjoyment of the products of labour. Co-operation, he 
therefore concluded, was ‘anti-socialistic’.700 In any case, insofar as ‘Trade 
cooperation is simply a form of industrial partnership, in which the society 
of co-operators is in the relation of capitalist to the outer world’, it in no 
way promised to solve the systemic problems of ‘the prevailing industrial 
anarchy’.701  
 The ‘ethical teaching of Christ’ was no more compatible with ‘the 
theory of modern scientific Socialism’.702 Its ‘one-sided, introspective and 
individualistic character’ was indeed just as ‘anti-socialistic’ as the 
‘bourgeois virtues’ embodied in the principle of co-operation.703 Like 
Aveling, a former bigwig in the NSS, Bax pulled no punches when it came to 
religion.704 And, as we have already seen, he was not hostile to religion as 
such. But Christianity, he felt, was particularly repugnant. Building on 
insights gleaned from Hegel’s Philosophy of History, he portrayed 
Christianity as uniquely individualistic, rendering it – pace Headlam and 
his followers – incompatible with Socialism.   
Moreover, the ‘impossible standard of “personal holiness”’ 
prescribed in the gospel discourses meant ‘hypocrisy’ flourished, a 
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phenomenon unknown in ‘the classical world’: ‘men are driven to the 
compromise of pretending to attain’ an ascetic, ethical standard, Bax wrote, 
‘which as a matter of fact no good man really thinks of attaining’.705 Besides, 
‘when realised’, it  
seldom resulted in anything but (1) an apotheosised priggism (e. g. 
the puritan type), or (2) in an epileptic hysteria (e.g. the Catholic 
saint type), and which at the best is a tour-de-force involving an 
amount of concentrated moral energy that may excite our wonder 
perhaps, just as may the concentrated physical energy of the tight-
rope dancer, but which we feel to be just as useless.’706  
Thus, against ‘the Semitic ethics of personal holiness’, Socialism, on Bax’s 
view, must align itself, instead, with ‘the Aryan ethics (whether classical or 
Norse) of social utility’.707  
These were themes that Bax would return to repeatedly over the 
course of his career. They also formed the subject matter of some of his 
most significant theoretical contributions written during the 1880s and 
nineties. Two of those contributions are expounded in Chapter 8. But the 
position he adopted on ‘the introspective attitude of the Christian ethics’ 
also informed his evaluation of the other sections of the Socialist 
movement.708 Even at this tentative stage, Bax held that British Socialism 
had acquired more than its fair share of the puritan and Catholic saint types 
whom he described. Neither phenomenon augured well for its future.  
Turning his attention to ‘Sentimental’ Socialism, that whole part of 
the movement, Bax wrote, ‘is born of the morbid self-consciousness of our 
Christian and Bourgeois civilization run to seed’.709 ‘The young men and 
women of our blasé middle-class civilisation require a stimulus’, he 
explained; ‘this stimulus may be aesthetic, philanthropic, or social. It may 
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consist in languishing vapouring on art, on improved dwellings, on social 
reconstruction. Just now it wears the latter aspect.’710 Of course, 
organisations such as the Guild of St. George, the Charity Organisation 
Society, and the embryonic Settlement movement were all implicated by 
Bax’s statement.711 But the intended target of these utterances was the 
Fellowship of the New Life, precursor to the Fabian Society. Bax attacked 
the programmatic vagueness of the body established by Thomas Davidson, 
satirizing the catholicity of the average ‘“Brother of the Higher Life,” or 
member of the “Communion of Noble Aspirations”.712 What he objected to 
most, however, in Sentimental Socialism was not its inadequacy as a 
practical political force, but rather its retention of the introspection of 
Christian morality, the preference, that is, among its number for analysis of 
the self over the social.713  
 For his survey of the ‘Utopian Socialist schemes of the first half of 
the present century’, Bax finally slipped into Engelsian gear.714 ‘Utopian 
Socialism’, he wrote, following Engels’s argument, ‘was only the pre-
scientific and infantile stage of that matured Science of society which 
modern Socialism represents on its practical side’;  ‘Socialism proper’, he 
continued, ‘presupposes the developed industrial system, the machinery, 
the population &c., of the most advanced countries of modern times as its 
essential antecedent condition, and... takes its stand on the continuity of 
                                                          
710 Ibid., p. 100. 
711 For the Guild of St. George see Mark Frost, The Lost Companions and John 
Ruskin’s Guild of St. George. A Revisionary History (London, Anthem, 2014). For 
Octavia Hill and the Charity Organisation Society see Elizabeth Baigent and Ben 
Cowell (eds.), ‘Nobler imaginings and mightier struggles’. Octavia Hill, social 
activism, and the remaking of British society (London, Institute of Historical 
Research, 2016). For the settlement movement see Standish Meacham, Toynbee 
Hall and Social Reform 1880-1914. The Search for Community (New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press, 1987). 
712 Bax, ‘Unscientific Socialism’, p. 100. 
713 See Bevir, Making of British Socialism, Ch. 12. See, also, Kristen Harris, Walt 
Whitman and British Socialism. ‘The Love of Comrades’ (London, Routledge, 
2016). 
714 Bax, ‘Unscientific Socialism’, p. 101. 
185 
 
historic evolution.’715 But, even here, Bax managed to inject a commentary 
on Christian ethics.   
Bax observed that ‘there are people who still believe in (more or 
less) select little bands going into the backwoods and founding colonies’.716  
In truth, while Edward Carpenter may have begun to enact his vision of the 
Simple Life at Millthorpe, inducing Shaw to label him the ‘Noble Savage’, 
there were no other steps taken to realise that ambition until the following 
decade.717 In anticipation, then, rather than reality, Bax warned that any 
‘“coming out of the world,” in the sense of establishing an independent 
“community of saints” is an anachronism.’718 The phrase ‘“community of 
saints”’ had been selected carefully. For no experiment of that kind, Bax 
averred, had had ‘any other than a Christian or sentimental basis.’719 It 
followed, therefore, that those responsible for the establishment of 
intentional communities had ‘no more right to the special appellation 
“Socialist” than a body of monks.’720 They, too, like their Christian and 
Sentimental counterparts, were also, Bax declared, ultimately more 
interested in themselves than society.   
 The final category of ‘unscientific Socialism’ that Bax drew attention 
to was similarly individualistic. However, the Anarchist, at least, was ‘a 
logical, thorough-going individualist’, however fundamentally illogical his 
or her plan to ‘destroy all organisation whatever’ might be.721  Self-regard, in 
this instance, was not dishonestly (or self-deceptively) dressed up as 
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something else, that is to say, as something other-regarding.  Here, Bax’s 
knowledge of the incipient Socialist intelligentsia determined not only his 
treatment of the subject, but the fact that it formed a point of discussion at 
all. For Bax’s final category, like his first and second, was not in the least bit 
abstract. Various strands of Anarchist thought had, indeed, penetrated – 
pre-dated even – the British Socialist movement. Josiah Warren and 
Benjamin Tucker both had their admirers in London clubland, and the 
Fabian Society was briefly struck down by ‘a sort of influenza of Anarchism’ 
in 1884.722 Moreover, Bax was already familiar with the conversation of two 
of its central proponents: the wavering Shaw, and the steadfast Prince 
Kropotkin.723  
Neglecting the nuances of which he was plainly aware for the sake of 
polemical impact, Bax confined his critique of Anarchism to two aspects: to 
the possibility, first, of its permanence; and second, to the desirability of its 
ostensibly destructive tactics. The latter, he argued right away, essentially 
precluded the former. Bax ruled out the prospect of any stability where ‘the 
destruction of those elements of the current civilization, bought by the 
bitter toil and experience of centuries of human effort’, had been carried 
out.724 Rather, a revolution executed on Anarchist lines could eventuate 
only in chaos. ‘The struggle between man and nature – including that which 
is natural, i.e., merely animal and brutal in man’, Bax wrote, taking up the 
closely related second aspect directly, ‘can with certainty only be 
maintained to the advantage of the former by organisation, and we think 
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that Anarchism stands self-condemned as to desirability when once these 
facts are clearly seen.’725 
 
That Bax repudiated Anarchism is not, of course, to say that he rejected it in 
toto. The more benign ‘Communist-Anarchist section of the party’ 
undoubtedly had its merits – much more so, at least, than the three other 
‘codes of ideas’.726 Indeed, Bax conceded that the goal of the Anarchist ‘and 
that of the collectivist is the same substantially.’727 The word ‘substantially’, 
however, was consigned a heavy load. Substantially was still a far cry from 
completely – and it was precisely the similitude obtaining between them 
that most necessitated their parting of ways: their likeness threatened to 
saddle ‘Socialism proper’ with unwanted baggage, and Bax’s article was an 
effort conceived to unburden Socialism of ‘old and rotten material’, or 
theories likely to interfere with its own prospective purchase. Fortunately, 
of the four ‘unscientific Socialist standpoints’ the Anarchist was the least 
important ‘numerically and influentially’.728 The Christian and Sentimental 
varieties were scarcely much more imposing. All such ‘red-herring’ Socialist 
projects had to be exposed nonetheless, irrespective of their deficit in 
political leverage.729 The only omission that Bax did make was Henry 
George. He was omitted because, Bax argued, land nationalisation was ‘the 
child of true Socialism’.730 It would be delivered, however, not through the 
Single Tax, but ‘as the natural issue of a general Socialist revolution.’731 
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As we have seen, Bax had no patience with the ideological impurity 
of other Socialists. He was also impatient with those ‘scientific’ Socialists, 
like Hyndman, who sought to pursue a parliamentary strategy post-haste.732 
Unlike the latter who never really budged from the gradualist, 
constitutional notion of the transition to Socialism, Bax was committed to a 
kind of proto-Bolshevism from the outset. As he later put in his 
autobiography: 
The idea implicit in not a few of those who belonged to the Socialist 
League was more or less that of a federation of Socialist societies 
throughout the country, bearing some sort of analogy to the 
federated Jacobin Clubs of the French Revolution, which should 
educate and organise public opinion, especially of the working 
classes, so that when the cataclysm to which the capitalist system 
was leading up should supervene, these societies might be in a 
position to give direction to the revolutionary movement.733  
All the basic tenets of the faction established by Lenin in 1903 – the notion 
of the vanguard party, the principle of the ends justifying the means, and 
democratic centralism – Bax endorsed in advance.734 His contempt for ‘the 
will of the majority’, however, had a more quotidian origin than the 
revolutionary Jacobin Clubs that Lenin likewise admired.735 Like Hyndman, 
Bax’s efforts in the field of political theory, as we shall see in Chapter 11, 
betrayed a significant debt to Mill. 
                                                          
732 On the issue of parliamentary participation see Mark Bevir, ‘The British Social 
Democratic Federation 1880-1885’, pp. 207-229; Ruth Kinna, ‘William Morris and 
Anti-Parliamentarism’, History of Political Thought, 15/4 (1994), pp. 593-613; and 
Barrow and Bullock, Democratic Ideas and the British Labour Movement, pp. 9-
29. 
733 Bax, Reminiscences and Reflexions, p. 81. Cowley, The Victorian Encounter 
with Marx, p. 35. Ruth Kinna, ‘The Jacobinism and Patriotism of Ernest Belfort 
Bax’, History of European Ideas, 30/4 (2004), p. 474. 
734 Robert Arch, for instance, wrote that, ‘If the Bolshevik seizure of power in 
Russia had occurred in the 1880s Bax would without doubt have supported it.’ He 
subtitled the section under which he issued that utterance, ‘Early Impossibilism’. 
Ernest Belfort Bax, Thinker and Pioneer (London, The Hyndman Literary 
Committee, 1927), p. 19. 
735 For Lenin’s political thought see Marcel Liebman, Leninism Under Lenin 
(London, Merlin Press, 1975). For a recent reassessment see Lars T. Lih, Lenin 
Rediscovered. ‘What Is to Be Done?’ in Context (Leiden, Brill, 2006). 
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 For a ‘scientific’ Socialist of his generation, Bax paid inordinate 
attention to institutions and arrangements during the transition to the 
stateless, post-scarcity society that they jointly envisaged. His endeavour to 
produce a concrete answer to the question of what came next was all the 
more striking given his earlier insouciance to detail, as outlined in Chapter 
4. The immediate cause of that shift of focus was provided by the so-called 
Dod Street affair, the perceived threat to freedom of speech among Radicals 
and Socialists in 1886, when a number of Socialist leaders were arrested for 
obstruction in the East End of London.736 Bax’s interest in individual rights 
received a further boost by his decision to embark upon a legal career in 
1889, following his departure from the SL the previous year. Yet Bax had 
already made headway in divesting himself of the former Spencerian views 
that diverted his attention from practical issues. The specifically Millian 
emphases in his thought may have been later additions. But by 1882 Bax 
was posing new questions about the role of the individual in history, about 
Spencer’s reconciliation of Science and Theology, and about the 
preconditions of knowledge that set him on a new course intellectually.737 
                                                          
736 For an account of the Dod Street affair see Thompson, William Morris, pp. 393-
403.  
737 ‘It is an important question for the student of the philosophy of history, Bax 
wrote in 1882, ‘indeed we say the great central question, in how far human 
development is determined, like lower forms of development, by inflexible cosmic 
laws, and where and in how far the individual may be viewed as a modifying cause, 
in other words, the precise point at which human will enters as an element of 
causation.’ Jean Paul Marat. A Historico-Biographical Sketch (London, Modern 
Press, 1882), p. 19. A year later, he wrote: ‘The tendency at present is to exaggerate 
the historical method, or at least to draw from it conclusions scarcely warranted. 
The sense of historic continuity, and of evolution, leads many thinkers to ignore the 
significance of epoch-making events and sudden changes, or of voluntarily-directed 
action in human affairs’. Kant’s Prolegomena, p. xvii. On epistemology, Bax argued 
in the same text: ‘Most savants of any eminence instinctively recognise the 
impossibility of a mere mechanical aggregate of phenomena being the “last word” 
of systematised human knowledge. Scientific Monism, as is perhaps only natural, 
seeks to attain satisfaction by mere phrases such as “unknowable,” “one reality,” 
&.c… rather than by a diligent investigation into the conditions of knowledge itself, 
the method inaugurated by Kant, and the only one which can lead to a permanently 
satisfactory synthesis.’ Ibid., pp. xcix-c. Bax took another dig at Spencer in 1886, by 
arguing that the reconciliation that the latter had professed to ‘effect between 
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Far more so than Hyndman, Bax fully imbibed the main currents of 
contemporary thought, which helped undermine some of the views 
espoused in his youthful writings. Bax’s consumption of advanced thought 
was not, however, uncritical. Rather, as with his interaction with Engels, 
Bax reinterpreted the beliefs and evidence he encountered.  
In philosophy, Bax hailed ‘the usefulness of the work done’ by the 
so-called ‘Neo-Hegelian school’.738 At the same time, though, he expressed 
regret at ‘the futile efforts of able and earnest men’ like Green, who ‘would 
stake their whole intellectual career in the forlorn hope of resuscitating the 
“ethics of inwardness.”’739 As might be expected, Bax rejected the Neo-
Hegelian morality of self-realization. He also rejected the Idealist view of 
free-will, not to mention the panlogical metaphysic the Idealists adhered to. 
Bax was similarly dismissive, however, of thinkers, including Marx and 
Engels, who sanctioned contrary points of view: above all, the ‘crude’ form 
of materialism, which he associated with the latter pair, and the refusal to 
accept the existence of what he termed the ‘Chance element’ in history (i.e. 
the part played by ‘the action of the individual’).740  
During the 1880s and nineties Bax pursued these themes in three 
texts. He pursued them, firstly, in the essays ‘Universal History from a 
Socialist Standpoint’ and ‘The New Ethic’, published in 1886 and 1888 
respectively. And he pursued them, secondly, in his first book-length work 
of philosophy, The Problem of Reality, published in 1892. However, 
notwithstanding moments of recognition, Bax’s work did not receive 
                                                                                                                                                   
science and religion’ rested on what was ‘almost a dualism’. Handbook, pp. 381, 
380. 
738 Bax, Handbook, p. 393. Kirk Willis, ‘The Introduction and Critical Reception of 
Hegelian Thought in Britain 1830-1900’, Victorian Studies, 32/1 (1988), pp. 85-111. 
739 Bax, Handbook, p. 402. 
740 Ernest Belfort Bax, The Problem of Reality. Being Outline Suggestions for a 
Philosophical Reconstruction (London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1892), p. 159. 
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attention from the philosophers whom he attacked.741 Bax’s more opaque 
criticism of Engels did, though, elicit a response. That exchange is 
reconstructed in Chapters 8 and 9, as is Bax’s critique of the British 
Idealists. 
 Elsewhere, Bax and Engels were, however, on the same page. 
Nowhere is that more apparent than in their uses of, and respect for, the 
‘remarkable work done in connexion with the early history of institutions, 
together with Comparative Mythology and the science of Anthropology 
generally.’742 The Liberal narrative of democratic Teutonism associated with 
the Oxford School of historians – Edward Freeman, J. R. Green, and 
William Stubbs – loomed large over the intellectual life of late-Victorian 
Britain. As did the work, as we have heard, of Henry Maine, Frederic 
Seebohm, and G. L. Gomme on the concept of the village community.743 Bax 
and Engels were well-versed in the work of these authors, and they 
appropriated the findings of their research for their own Socialist 
theories.744 Like Engels, who drew, above all, on the work of Lewis Morgan, 
Bax thus believed that ‘the evolution of human society is a progress from 
                                                          
741 J. H. Muirhead, for example, invited Bax to contribute to a two-volume work on 
contemporary British philosophy published in 1924, and Grant Richards held a 
dinner in Bax’s honour the following year for his service to philosophical thought 
and exposition. Cowley, The Victorian Encounter with Marx, pp. 59, 136. Arch, 
Ernest Belfort Bax, p. 5. 
742 Bax, Reminiscences and Reflexions, p. 69. 
743 See J. W. Burrow, ‘‘The Village Community’ and the Uses of History in Late 
Nineteenth-Century England’, in Neil Mckendrick (ed.), Historical Perspectives. 
Studies in English Thought and Society in Honour of J. H. Plumb (London, 
Europa, 1974), pp. 255-285. See, also, Simon John Cooke, ‘The Making of the 
English: English History, British Identity, Aryan Villages, 1870-1914’, Journal of 
the History of Ideas, 75/4 (2014), pp. 629-649. 
744 The pre-eminent work on this topic is Vaninskaya, Morris and the Idea of 
Community. For a shorter analysis see Anna Vaninskaya, ‘William Morris’s 
Germania: The Roots of Socialism’, in Phillippa Bennett and Rosie Miles (eds.), 
William Morris in the Twenty-First Century (Bern, Peter Lang, 2010), pp. 169-192. 
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From Socialism to Socialism 
 
As with Bax’s critique of Pearson, ‘Universal History from a Socialist 
Standpoint’ was published in The Religion of Socialism. It was the largest 
essay in the volume, and forms the best introduction to his Socialist thought 
at the time. ‘The New Ethic’ had much the same relationship to The Ethics 
of Socialism, the volume in which it was published in 1889. The essay was 
first published the previous year in Die Neue Zeit, the theoretical organ of 
the German SPD, and Bax justly regarded it as a ‘pendant’ to ‘Universal 
History’.746 That being so, the essays provide, in tandem, a singular 
vantage-point from which to assess his views on Socialism during the latter 
part of the decade.  
In the first essay, Bax expounded a philosophical analysis of history 
modelled on Hegel’s course of lectures on the same subject.747 The 
emphases of Hegel’s original survey were simply shifted around and 
inverted. The second essay was less parasitic. There, in its slightly revised 
state, owing to the need no longer to tailor its content to the prescriptions of 
the German Anti-Socialist Law, Bax issued a dual-commentary on the 
moral philosophies belonging on the one hand to the ‘old metaphysical 
schools’ and their ‘modern semi-theological’ counterparts and to the 
‘modern Empiricists’ on the other.748 He also set out there the ‘New Ethic of 
Socialism’.  
                                                          
746 Ernest Belfort Bax, The Ethics of Socialism. Being Further Essays in Modern 
Socialist Criticism, &c. (London, Swan Sonnenschein & Co, 1889),  p. iiv. 
747 G. W. F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (Mineola, NY, Dover, 
1956). 
748 Ernest Belfort Bax, ‘The New Ethic’, in Ethics of Socialism, p. 11. 
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The essays betoken the Hegelian and Engelsian registers in which 
they were written. They also record the continuity in Bax’s main line of 
thought since ‘The Ideal of the Future’. For Bax had not jettisoned his 
earlier ideas and arguments. He had revised them, rather, in the light of 
further reading in philosophy, history, anthropology, and by reading the 
work of Marx and Engels. The result was certainly distinctive. But to say 
that ‘Bax was little concerned with problems of economic, political or social 
analysis’ is to exaggerate his heterodoxy.749  
To imply that Bax focused on ‘changes in man’s consciousness’ at 
the expense of the categories enumerated above entails foisting a 
distinction onto Bax’s work which he did not cleave to himself.750 As we 
shall see in this chapter, Bax was not disproportionately concerned with 
‘mankind’s changing attitudes or values’.751 Nor was he inordinately vexed 
by ‘philosophical questions’ or ‘middle class mores’.752 On the contrary, as 
we shall see in Chapter 11, to a much greater extent than many of his 
contemporaries, Bax was alive to questions of practical Socialism.  
 
Following Hegel, Bax viewed history as a process synonymous with ‘the 
development of the State’.753 He averred that the ‘aim and meaning of the 
philosophy of history is the discovery of the Dialectic imminent in it, of the 
                                                          
749 The work of the French Socialist, Juan Jaurès, whom Bax held in very high 
esteem, and to whom he dedicated his second major work of philosophy in 1908, 
supplied probably the closest contemporary comparison. For Juarès see Leszek 
Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism. Its Rise, Growth, and Dissolution. 
Volume II. The Golden Age (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978), Ch. 5. It is also worth 
noting here, however, that Bax is not mentioned once in Kolakowski’s text. Ernest 
Belfort Bax, The Roots of Reality. Being Suggestions for a Philosophical 
Reconstruction (New York, R. W. Dodge & Company, 1908). Pierson, ‘Ernest 
Belfort Bax’, p. 44. 
750 Ibid. 
751 Ibid., pp. 45, 57. 
752 Thompson, William Morris, pp. 372-375. 




main process underlying the whole development.’754 History, in short, 
according to Bax, was not a capricious course of events. It was, rather, a 
meaningful process that worked itself out through ‘the unravelling of 
oppositions’.755 He isolated two, in particular, as key: the opposition 
between ‘Nature and Mind’ and the opposition between the ‘Individual and 
the Society’.756  
To be sure, the first opposition that Bax identified concerned the 
‘evolution of human consciousness’ – it was, he held, an antagonism of 
chiefly ‘speculative, religious, and artistic significance’.757 But the second 
opposition was ‘of more immediately practical interest’, for it ‘contained the 
notion of personal ownership of property,’ which, in turn, informed the 
nature of ‘the whole state machinery’.758 However, Bax did not treat these 
pairs as discrete phenomena. Bax made it clear, rather, that they were 
‘intimately connected with each other’, and that they advanced, as he put it, 
‘pari passu’.759 
If private property constituted the driving force of the antinomy 
between individual and society, the motive power behind the antinomy 
between nature and mind was provided, above all, by religion. In ‘Universal 
History’ Bax established the stages through which both antinomies passed. 
He also located their mutual destination – the return, on a higher plane, to 
their joint place of origin.  
Bax located the birthplace of both oppositions in ‘Primitive 
Communism’, ‘the earliest condition of man as a social being’, a form of 
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social organisation where both ‘individual interest and individual property’ 
was ‘unknown’, and in which religion ‘had for its end and object the 
society’.760 It was only when this harmonious, stateless form of society 
began to alter that the oppositions that Bax coupled with History itself 
began to unfold.  
The first line of demarcation was the product of new economic 
conditions – ‘the introduction of agriculture on a more extended scale, the 
taming of domestic animals, the acquirement of extensive property in flocks 
and herds and slaves (the captives taken in war),  the beginnings of 
manufacture,’ and, ‘perhaps more than all the improvement in weapons of 
war’.761 The outcome was the advent of the city – the first stage in 
civilization.  
With the termination of ‘primitive barbaric society’, for the first 
time, private property ‘entered into the constitution of society’.762 In 
addition to the division between slave and freeman, classes also 
consequently emerged. These initial cities, however, were of limited 
longevity. They were absorbed, first, into a larger federation of cities, then 
into a consolidated kingdom or empire – such as Egypt, Assyria, Babylonia, 
Phoenicia, China, or India. In short, they were quickly superseded by ‘the 
vast Oriental civilizations with which universal history begins.’763  
Yet, at this inceptive stage, ‘though the material antagonism 
between individual and community, no less than the speculative 
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197 
 
antagonism between nature and spirit,’ had begun, it had not developed 
very far.764 To develop further, more stimuli were needed.  
 The real spur to the unravelling of the antitheses that Bax presented 
started with the Greeks in the eighth century BC. Hitherto a dynamic 
historical force, the East became stationary, the free development of the city 
was arrested, and the ‘lead in human progress passed on to the peoples of 
Southeastern Europe’.765 It was in the cities of the classical world – first 
Greece, then Italy – that the ‘individual interest’ steadily ‘gained the upper 
hand over the social’.766 It was there, too, that ‘the supernatural view of the 
universe and man’s relation to it’ steadily supplanted the ‘old naive and 
natural one’.767 To begin with, though, these were merely tendencies. 
Despite the momentum they acquired there, they were not fully realised, 
Bax argued, ‘until the city-form had been reduced to a meaningless phrase’ 
and given way to the ‘great city-empire of Rome’.768 
 Bax’s periodisation already betrayed at this point its Hegelian 
origins. He simply added to Hegel’s account the more recent category of 
primitive communism. Bax also borrowed, however, a number of passages 
from Hegel’s Philosophy of History. He resorted, for instance, to the first of 
these in claiming that ‘In the “Know thyself” of Socrates we have the first 
expression of that personal morality as opposed to the old social morality, 
which culminated in the Christianity of later ages.’769 However, the words 
‘the first expression’ bore a heavy load.  
                                                          
764 Ibid., p. 13. 
765 Ibid., p. 14. 
766 Ibid., p. 15. 
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768 Ibid., p. 16. 
769 Ibid., p. 17. ‘The principle of Socrates manifests a revolutionary aspects towards 
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‘The races of Southeastern Europe’, Bax explained, ‘were destined in 
the ancient world to work out the opposition of interest between individual 
and society on its economical side’.770 For the prosecution of slave-holding 
production was exercised there ‘for the benefit of the individual rich 
citizen’, rather than to the advantage of the more survival-ridden 
aristocracies that dominated the Oriental world.771 For ‘a satisfactory ethic 
of Individualism’ the Romans would have to look, instead, to Western 
Asia.772  
The immediate descendents of Socrates, in other words – the Cynic, 
Cyreniac, Stoic, and Epicurean philosophical sects – merely represented a 
series of false starts in the progress of the nature-mind antithesis. For Bax, 
borrowing heavily, and idiosyncratically, still from Hegel, it was only with 
the establishment of Christianity that the principle of individualism 
properly asserted itself on the religious track. Then, and only then, 
‘personal as opposed to social morality and the religion of another world as 
opposed to the ancient religions of this world... received official 
expression.’773 Thus, he concluded: ‘The Christian empire accordingly 
presented both economically and ethically a more complete triumph of the 
principle of individualism over the principle of socialism than the world had 
seen before.’774 
 That, however, was not the end of the story. Economically, ‘the 
classical development’ had stalled.775 Leaning on Engels’s foray into ancient 
history to make the point, Bax argued that the collapse of the Roman 
Empire was due to the fact that, in the absence of any great industry and the 
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world market having collapsed, combined with the stigma attached to 
productive labour, slave-holding production had ceased to pay.776 The 
‘effete civilization of antiquity’ was, therefore, transformed ‘into a new 
world’ by ‘the German tribes, fresh from their primitive village 
communities.’777 Bax argued that ‘the feudal system’ that emerged ‘was 
nothing else than primitive communistic society, with the notion of 
sovereignty on the part of the head of the community super-added.’778 On 
the religious plane, the ‘barbarians’ accepted the Christianity of their 
Roman forebears. But much ‘of the old tribal morality of the Germans’ 
persisted.779 It was ultimately ‘only to the monastic recluse... that religion 
was a personal matter.’780 The principle of individualism would not reach its 
highest development until the medieval system had concluded its own 
process of decay.  
 Bax divided the Middle Ages into two epochs. The first of these he 
termed ‘Feudalism proper’, and he assigned it to the period stretching from 
the eighth to the thirteenth century.781 It was characterised, economically, 
by small-scale production ‘for use on the feudal estate’.782 Hence the 
exchange of goods was limited. With the expansion of markets, however, 
towards the close of this first epoch – once, that is, an economic surplus had 
begun to be produced – the second period of the Middle Ages then got 
underway, terminating in the sixteenth century. The chief characteristic of 
that epoch, in the economic sphere, was the flourishing of the guild 
industry. The industrial system presided over by these corporations gave 
rise to two forms of conflict: one incipient and implicit, the other advanced 
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and explicit. That is, the opposition, on the one hand, between middle class 
and proletariat, and, on the other, the struggle between burgher and noble. 
It was the latter conflict, Bax argued, that eventually led to the collapse of 
the medieval system. It resolved itself in the triumph of ‘the new 
individualist capitalism’.783  
Bax commandeered the narrative set out in the Communist 
Manifesto to bring the economic track of his argument to its highest point:  
History from the sixteenth century downwards is a picture of the 
struggle of the rising middle or manufacturing and trading classes, 
to emancipate themselves from the trammels of the feudal or 
landowning classes, and thereby to attain to individual freedom of 
action in the furthering of private interests.784 
The ‘meaning of history’, he went on,  
since the close of the medieval period is so plain as to be 
unmistakeable. Every political aspiration, every political reform, has 
meant a breaking asunder of the bonds which held the old 
civilisation together, the freeing of the individual from the duties 
now obsolete which bound him in some sort to the social whole.785 
Not surprisingly, Bax regarded the sixteenth century as pivotal too 
for the development of individualism on the religious track. In the 
Protestant Reformation, Christianity shed its medieval semi-pagan form. In 
an analysis not quite worthy of Weber, but broadly congruent with his 
thesis on the Protestant ethic, Bax averred that, in Protestantism the 
economic individualism of nascent capitalism found its religious match: 
Under Protestantism religion has become necessarily divorced from 
worldly avocations. The continual interruptions to industry, the 
time allowed by Catholicism in its festivals and holidays for 
enjoyment, not less than the time exacted for penance, etc., could 
not be tolerated. The rising middle class were beginning to find out 
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the “dignity of labour,” that it was appointed to men to work, etc., 
and that the longer the journeyman worked, and the less time he 
wasted in amusement the better it was for his soul and their 
bodies.786 
Following Hegel, Bax isolated the Reformation as the decisive 
waypost in the nature-mind spectrum. Individualism in religion reached its 
acme. For Hegel, of course, the rise of Protestantism represented a key 
landmark in the progress of freedom.787 For Bax, on the other hand, it 
amounted to Weber’s ‘iron cage’.788 The ‘middle class order’ that 
Protestantism both mirrored and promoted was not, however, on Bax’s 
view, history’s finale.789 Instead, he anticipated one further twist.  
 Bax asserted that ‘growth implies a process comprising three 
terms’.790 He described their relationship as follows:  
the first, indefinite and crude, with the seeds of its own negation 
present in it as part of its very nature from the first; the second, the 
accomplishment of this negation, which accomplishment, however, 
becomes the matrix whence issues the third and final term of the 
process, which is nothing else than the negation of the negation.791 
With the consummation of individualism in the middle-class order that 
began its tenure in the sixteenth century, the first two of those terms had 
been completed. The antitheses latent in primitive society had reached their 
fullest potential. Thus, it was only the third term that awaited actualisation. 
It did not have to wait long.  
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Individualism, Bax wrote, ‘has no sooner completely realised itself, 
than its death-knell is rung’.792 It ‘finds itself strangled’, he argued, 
imitating the Communist Manifesto again,  
by the very economical revolution which had rendered its existence 
possible. For that revolution which has brought about an absolute 
separation of classes, has deprived the one class of all individuality 
whatever, albeit their abstract freedom still remains to mock them. 
Production in its process has become more than ever before social 
and co-operative, notwithstanding that its end and object is more 
than ever before mere individual aggrandisement. The majority are 
the slaves of modern industrialism. Individualism, therefore, for the 
majority has become a meaningless phrase. The same with 
supernatural religion.793 
The third term, then, Bax concluded, meant ‘a return to the essential 
characteristic’ of primitive society: ‘i.e. Solidarity, Communism, or 
Socialism’.794 Hence the full import of history’s convoluted course now 
became clear: 
The passage from Primitive Communism to the Communism of the 
future was only possible through the mediation of History otherwise 
expressed, of Individualism... The early solidarity of kinship had to 
be resolved into its direct antithesis – individualism, universal and 
world-wide. Individualism in economics, in ethics, in religion, was 
the necessary intermediate step before the final goal of universal 
solidarity or communism, which unites the solidarity of early society 
with the cosmopolitan principle of individualism, could be 
reached.795  
 
So far, so unremarkable perhaps: going by ‘Universal History’ alone, Engels 
was surely right not to feel anxious about Bax’s intellectual trajectory. There 
was evidence enough within the essay to suppose that he would, indeed, 
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eventually fall in line. For, in the main, as we have seen, Bax recycled the 
economically determined, stadial conception of history set out in the 
Communist Manifesto.  The addition of the latest research on pre-history, 
moreover, was in line with Engels’s view on historical periodisation.796 On 
top of those points of congruence, Bax’s use of Hegel’s dialectical method 
formed an obvious third. Admittedly, Bax’s manipulation of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of History constituted a deviation; there was no counterpart in 
the work of Engels or Marx to Bax’s substitution of a self-centred and 
introspective individualism for Hegel’s ‘progress of the consciousness of 
freedom’.797 Like Weber, Bax sought to document non-economic 
phenomena in history to an extent unseen in the work of either of the 
former pair. But it was also apparent which of the two factors– economic 
and non-economic – that Bax chose to privilege in causal terms. On this, he 
nailed his colours to the mast erected by Engels and Marx.  
‘The New Ethic’, on the other hand, did provide cause for concern. 
The offending article was not of course the position of ethical relativism 
that Bax endorsed there – his subordination, that is, of ethics to economic 
relations.798 Rather, Bax’s infraction was to continue to cleave to the notion 
of a ‘religion of Socialism’. For Engels, to seek to establish a ‘new, true 
religion’ on the ‘basis of an essentially materialist conception of nature’, as 
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Bax attempted in ‘The New Ethic’, was risible. It was akin to ‘regarding 
modern chemistry as true alchemy.’799 
 In reality, ‘The New Ethic’ was not a new departure. The fact that 
Bax entitled his first collection of essays, The Religion of Socialism, 
indicates the importance that Bax attributed to the concept that clearly 
irked Engels so much. But religion was not the only source of conflict 
between them. This is not the place to explicate those further differences. It 
is enough to simply recall here Bernstein’s recollection of Bax’s ‘lively’ 
contributions ‘to the conversation round Engels’ table’ to infer that Engels 
was probably very well-aware of them.800 There is good reason in fact to 
believe that the real target of some of Engels’s utterances in Ludwig 
Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, from which the 
above quotation is extracted, was not so much the titular German author, 
but rather the young British intellectual. At the very least, as with Hyndman 
and Engels’s remarks on Rodbertus, if Bax was not the main target he was 
almost certainly intentionally implicated.  
Bax exchanged fire with Engels properly, if not explicitly, in The 
Problem of Reality. In ‘The New Ethic’, by contrast, Bax pursued a separate 
objective. Instead of putting Engels and others right on questions of 
metaphysics, he directed his attention there to the ethical misconceptions of 
the ‘old metaphysical schools’ and their ‘modern semi-theological’ 
equivalents and to the so-called ‘modern Empiricists’. Insofar as Bax 
attacked both groups for their ahistoricity, he and Engels were in 
agreement. But, unlike Engels, Bax also had much in common with the 
objects of his critique – not least, in the value they assigned to religion.  
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Bax sought, above all, to combat the moral prescriptions of the 
British Idealists. He wanted to reveal that, notwithstanding their ostensible 
collectivism, the ethic propounded by Green and his followers was no less 
individualistic than ‘the empirical or utilitarian’ theory.801 It was precisely 
because the Idealists offered a more persuasive account of the nature of ‘the 
social organism’ and the individual’s responsibility to it than Bentham or 
Mill that Bax felt the need to puncture any such misplaced pretensions.802 It 
was, in short, the proximity of the ideas formulated by the Idealists to some 
of Bax’s own that motivated him to provide a response. Like Pearson and 
other misguided social reformers, the British Idealists were guilty of 
muddying the waters of prospective social change by offering naive and 
improbable solutions.  
 In ‘The New Ethic’ Bax stated his case in abstract terms. The names 
of the individual theorists whom he had in mind as representative of the 
beliefs he attacked were mainly omitted.  Yet the targets were clear enough, 
nonetheless. Bax complained, firstly, that both ‘the ordinary spiritualistic 
theory, and the ordinary materialistic theory, alike regard morality as 
having for its end – the individual.’803 ‘Self interest’, he averred, ‘is the 
keynote of both moral systems.’804 On the one hand, ‘The theological or 
spiritualistic system apotheosises the “soul;” its method being a continuous 
introspection or communing of the individual with this apotheosised self’; 
on the other hand, ‘The empirical or utilitarian system apotheosises “self-
interest,” which for it is the ultimate fact in human nature.’805 Besides a 
shared telos, ‘both these theories’, Bax continued, ‘treat Ethic as a fact to be 
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explained apart from the concrete synthesis of human nature to which it 
belongs.’806  
Bax isolated Comte and Spencer as exceptions. They at least did not 
treat morality in a trans-historical way, instead of deducing it from ‘general 
social evolution’.807 However, ‘the empirical method’ which they adopted 
debarred them, at the same time, from gaining ‘any real insight into the 
matter’:  
The mere collation of the phenomena of the moral consciousness, 
and the forcing of them into accordance with the fundamental 
assumption that the antagonism of self interest and social interest is 
ultimate, and that morality must always imply a conscious effort to 
reconcile the two – can never afford any but a one-sided and 
fallacious view of things.808 
Bax disagreed widely with the philosophy of the British Idealists. 
But here Bax’s argument coincided with the position put by Henry Jones in 
a recent volume of essays dedicated to the memory of Green, co-edited by 
Bax’s friend Haldane, and published in 1883. Although Bax continued to 
admire Spencer, he and the Idealists were in accord in insisting that, 
we must... get rid of the notion that society is in the last resort, 
merely an aggregate of individuals, with its necessary corollary, 
that there must always exist a latent or overt opposition between 
individual and community; in short, that the category individual has 
any meaning per se and separated from the category community or 
society.809 
There was little difference between Bax and Green and his followers when it 
came to the significance they attributed to society for the development and 
realisation of the individual. Nor were they much at odds as to what 
constituted ‘the highest moral ambition’ – to sacrifice ‘particular ends’, as 
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Jones put it, for the sake of ‘the social organism’.810 They were also in 
accord in viewing history as a meaningful process. But Bax objected to 
Idealist ethical theory in two fundamental ways.  
Firstly, Bax protested at its fragility. ‘The individual and his god,’ 
Bax opined, ‘though professedly distinct, are really one and the same.’811 To 
forge a morality centred in divine disclosure was therefore ill-advised, to 
put it mildly. For no sooner than its fictitious Christian basis should 
collapse, with creeping secularisation, the reason that it provided for the 
pursuit of the common good – the actualisation of God’s will – would be 
rendered redundant.812 In the second instance, the Idealists, according to 
Bax, grossly misjudged the capacity of individuals to exercise ‘free-will’, or 
to act in a moral way under their own volition. Bax occupied a position 
between Spencer and the Idealists on the spectrum of moral possibility. Bax 
neither accepted the necessitarian perspective of Spencer, which essentially 
denied agency to individual actors in society, nor did he endorse the anti-
Spencerian arguments of Green and his acolytes, who adopted an equally 
exaggerated stance.813 Patently, men and women did not just passively 
reflect the conditions of their social being, or adapt submissively to their 
environment; but, at the same time, to suggest, as Jones did, that ‘man is 
free... his own limit, his own necessity, his own fate’ was nothing short of 
                                                          
810 Henry Jones, ‘The Social Organism’, in David Boucher (ed.), The British 
Idealists (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 10.  The essay was first 
published in Andrew Seth and R. B. Haldane (ed.), Essays in Philosophical 
Criticism (London, Longmans, Green and Co, 1883). 
811 Bax, ‘The New Ethic’, p. 7. 
812 Vincent and Plant summarised Green’s views – views echoed by most of the 
British Idealists – in the following terms: ‘for Green the relationship between God 
and the individual is to be found in moral endeavour. Moral activity is determined 
by an ideal which the agent presents to himself. In pursuing this end which is not 
actually present in reality I identify myself with it and so desire to be something 
which I conceive myself as capable of becoming… Morality is a matter of self-
realization in the sense of continually attempting to bring into being this desirable 
and possible self. This possible self, the telos of moral endeavour is identified by 
Green with God.’ Philosophy, Politics, and Citizenship, pp. 14-15. 




preposterous.814 The moral ‘ought’, of which the Idealists made so much, 
Bax argued, had strict limits. To be sure, individuals were capable of 
praiseworthy and blameworthy actions. But, Bax counselled, reformers 
should ‘seek not the ideal society through the ideal individual, but 
conversely the ideal individual through the ideal society.’815 To do otherwise 
was to profoundly misjudge the importance of ‘social surroundings’.816 
Like Engels, with whom, as we shall see in Chapter 9, Bax also 
differed on the question of individual agency, Bax tied all ethical belief 
systems to an economic base. For example, ‘The empirical utilitarian theory 
of the British school’ was, he insisted, ‘no more than the speculative 
formulation or expression of the principle obtaining under that competitive 
capitalism, which reached its earliest development in the Anglo-Saxon race 
of modern times’.817 Eliding complexity for the sake of rhetorical effect, he 
dubbed the concept of ‘enlightened self-interest’ ‘the formulated Ethic of 
the full belly and the full pocket’.818 It was, in short, he held, a subjective, 
bourgeois charade, whose days were numbered. Moreover, ‘The other and 
equally individualistic theory, that of the theologians,’ though not so 
obviously derivative of the same source was ‘none the less really so’.819 
However much the middle classes ‘occupied themselves with the endeavour 
to find out every conceivable compromise by which they might evade 
overtly breaking with the speculative tradition’ – the Positivists providing 
only the most clear-cut example of that undertaking – its days were no less 
clearly through.820  
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As Bax had sought to show in ‘Universal History’, the ‘individualistic 
ethic’ had lost its economic base.821 Its reason for being had therefore 
vanished too. Bax argued that a new, ‘objective social morality’ had begun 
to take shape.822 It consisted, he wrote in ‘The New Ethic’, ‘in a sense of 
oneness with the social body’, or, differently put, ‘in an identification of self-
interest with social interest’.823 It was underpinned by the fact that, 
The whole life of the working classes of to-day under the conditions 
of the great industry is a collective one, inasmuch as the labour of 
the individual is merged in the labour of the group; the group again 
in that of other groups, and so on throughout the entire industrial 
and commercial system.824 
Owing to these unprecedented structural conditions, Bax averred 
that traces of the ‘New Ethic’ were present already ‘even in the working 
classes of to-day’.825 It would not, however, become general until the new 
mode of production, the source from which it originated, still germinating 
within the old, had been fully realised. The ‘New Ethic’, as Bax conceived it, 
was the religion of the modern socialist system in its completed state. Thus, 
while the Russian Nihilist or Paris workman, ‘in deliberately exposing 
himself to certain death, believing in no personal immortality, that is, in no 
sort of continual existence for himself as individual, for the sake of human 
brotherhood,’ embodied ‘the highest expression of the new ethic the world’ 
had ‘yet seen’, the ‘New Ethic of Socialism’ would exhibit ‘for the first time 
in the world’s history the conscious sacrifice of the individual to the social 
whole’ as a matter of course.826  
Unlike Mill, Bax had no concerns about the rapidity with which the 
principle of self-sacrifice could be inserted as a substitute for the principle 
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of self-interest, or rather about the prospect of harmonising the two. At the 
same time, that is not to say that Bax was apt to romanticise the working 
classes as he perceived them. On the contrary, ‘Mere class-instinct’, he 
argued, ‘can never give us Socialism.’827 ‘All class character’, he continued, 
‘qua class character is bad.’828 But, he conceded, confronting the dilemma 
that arose from the preceding admissions head-on, ‘In no human being 
born in a class society can the class-element be altogether absent from his 
character.’829  
 Bax distinguished between two sets of qualities, the social and the 
anti-social. The first belonged to what he described as ‘the specifically 
human nature’ that ‘presided over the institution of tribal society’, whereas 
the second belonged to the ‘pre-human nature’ that preceded it, but which 
human nature had inherited nonetheless.830 The ‘social qualities’, he 
claimed, had ‘maintained themselves only in spite of the class-system’, and 
the ‘human or social character varies in an inverse proportion to the class 
or anti-social character of the man.’831 By virtue, however, of their unique 
position in the social structure, Bax averred that there was ‘a large section’ 
of the working classes ‘among whom the mere class-qualities’ had in fact ‘to 
a large extent succumbed to’ their opposite number, namely the ‘human 
qualities,’ even though ‘they necessarily and directly’ continued to ‘take a 
class form.’832 
It was precisely the genesis of these ‘public and social feelings’ – 
however inevitably partial – that Mill apparently overlooked in his 
Chapters, and that led him, in consequence, to ostensibly exaggerate the 
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length of time needed to address ‘the general infirmity’ in that area.833 For 
Mill, however, even had he agreed with Bax’s drastically more sanguine 
estimation of current moral fitness, ‘on which’, they concurred, ‘the success 
of Communism depends’, a ‘practical trial’ would still be required.834 
‘Experiments alone’, he argued, could show if ‘Communist associations’ 
could be ‘durable and prosperous’; they would ‘multiply’ or terminate 
according to their failure or success on that basis.835 Political revolution, in 
short, was not an option.  
Bax, by contrast, showed none of Mill’s caution, opting rather for a 
strategy that temporarily accentuated and exacerbated the ‘class-feeling’ 
that both he and Mill condemned. In a passage that applied more fully to 
Mill’s Fabian, Idealist, and New Liberal successors than to Mill himself, Bax 
wrote that, 
Classes exist; you may ignore them, but they exist still with the 
respective characters that they engender. Though you ignore them 
they will not ignore you. The difference between the Socialist and 
the benevolent bourgeois Radical in their respective crusades 
against classes is, that while the one would affirm the form of class-
distinction, knowing that thereby the reality of class-distinction will 
be negated, the other, though ostentatiously denying the form of 
class-distinction, would affirm the content or reality of class-
distinction, inasmuch as he would leave it untouched.836 
In other words, Bax continued to pay no heed to Mill’s exhortations 
against revolutionary action. Unlike Pearson and other contemporary 
advocates of gradualism, Bax argued, instead, that ‘we may expect to see the 
end of Classes... and the beginning of Men’ only after ‘one more decisive 
affirmation of class-interest’, that is to say, after a political revolution with 
the working class at its helm had been achieved.837  
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The Problem of Reality 
 
Bax’s religion of Socialism was thus clearly at odds with the other 
exclusively class-neutral variants of progressive religion on offer in late-
nineteenth century Britain – whether it be Positivist, Idealist, or some other 
more inchoate species. To have invoked the concept at all, however, also 
revealed a less intellectually self-sufficient side to Bax, which could 
otherwise be obscured when set alongside Engels and his colleagues in the 
burgeoning Continental Socialist movement alone.  To be sure, in the 
context of Continental Social Democracy Bax was travelling against the 
grain of what was fast-becoming established convention. But when situated 
within the context of Victorian intellectual life between the 1850s and 1880s 
the ethical and religious ‘bent’ of Bax’s mind looked by no means out of 
place.838  
Raphael Samuel attributed Bax’s appetite for questions of ‘social 
morality’ and ‘secular faith’ to his Nonconformist upbringing.839 And it is, 
indeed, plausible that Bax’s religious background predisposed him towards 
a certain evangelicalism in his formulation of Socialist theory, just as many 
of the Idealists, who came from similar religious backgrounds, were 
predisposed towards ‘the idea of doing ‘good works’ in society’.840 Even so, 
once it is recognised how widespread ‘the sensibility which found 
something repugnant in even the hint of self-regarding actions’ was among 
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mid- to late-Victorian intellectuals, such an exceedingly personal 
explanation becomes unnecessary.841 As Stefan Collini noted, Oscar Wilde’s 
somewhat flippant contribution to the literature on Socialism in the 
Fortnightly Review in 1891 provided ‘one obvious source of evidence for 
the sense that the demands of an altruism-centred morality had’ become, 
for some, ‘oppressive’.842 
 In that respect, at least, then, Bax was an exponent of convention. 
He endorsed the ‘culture of altruism’, so aptly named by Collini, which took 
off with Comte’s assistance in the 1850s.843 That being the case it should 
come as small surprise that Bax, unlike Shaw, and other slightly later 
Socialist avant-gardists, showed no interest in Nietzsche, the figurehead for 
many of those who rejected the moral culture that they inherited – most 
notably, the editors of the New Age, Alfred Orage and Holbrook Jackson, 
significantly younger men.844 Of course, it was not that Bax was in any way 
averse to iconoclastic new theories, as his interest in Marx, Schopenhauer, 
and Wagner attests. Indeed, he continued to praise Schopenhauer, 
Nietzsche’s own philosophical master, introducing a new edition of some 
his work in 1891. Bax also incorporated insights from Schopenhauer’s 
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Ch. 6.  
214 
 
philosophy into his own work at that time, informing, above all, elements of 
The Problem of Reality.845 Bax, however, never relented in his defence of 
altruism, the concept that enjoyed such great currency within the more 
staid domain of Victorian intellectual culture. There was, in his view, 
nothing wrong with the concept itself, only the way that it was deployed by 
its most fervent advocates. Simply stated, Bax held that much the same kind 
of hypocrisy at work in the denial of the existence of classes obtained here 
too. That is to say, while the principle of individualism had been ‘formally 
surrendered’ by Comte’s British disciples as well as its detractors in the 
Idealist camp, it had been ‘really maintained’.846 Masquerading as a 
singularly selfless ethic, the Idealist doctrine of self-realisation, he implied, 
was particularly insidious, amounting, when properly scrutinized, to ‘a 
double-dyed egoism’, or ‘individualism to the Nth’ degree.847   
In addition to the strikes against the Idealists deposited in ‘The New 
Ethic’, like the one documented above, Bax took up the cudgel against the 
Idealists again in The Problem of Reality. There, however, he made no 
attempt to conceal the object of his criticism. Instead, he subjected the 
Idealist theory to an explicit and, by nature of the book’s character, far more 
wide-ranging critique. At the same time, he also filled in some of the gaps of 
his proposed alternative, as he left it in ‘The New Ethic’, returning to some 
of the themes expounded over a decade before in ‘The Ideal of the Future’. 
The unusual metaphysical argument that he outlined in The Problem of 
Reality performed a double polemical service. Not only did it serve to 
undermine the philosophical objections to Hedonism posited by Green and 
his followers, it also functioned, secondly, as an implicit challenge to Engels 
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and his protégés in the movement of European Social Democracy.  
Moreover, despite their apparent incongruity, these goals were actually 
closely linked. In the process of sorting the wheat from the chaff in the 
metaphysic propounded by the Idealists, Bax found a means to address, in a 
non-confrontational way, what he felt were the numerous shortcomings of 
what he began to describe a short time later as ‘the orthodox Marxist 
position’.848  
 
In a work of conspicuous singularity, to say that one of the most striking 
features of The Problem of Reality, Bax’s first book-length work of 
philosophy, is the continuity that it evinces with ‘The Ideal of the Future’, 
the two-part essay that he wrote for Modern Thought over ten years earlier, 
is no small thing.849 Certainly, the argument he set out in 1892 had been 
sharply refined. In the new book, Bax heavily revised the technical side of 
his thesis. By that time, as we have seen, he was, moreover, well-equipped 
for that task. In contrast to the disorderly use made of Kant and others in 
the previous effort, Bax could now navigate the history of philosophy with 
exceptional ease, no longer having to rely on the second-hand appraisals 
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provided in the synthetic work of G. H. Lewes and others.850 However, the 
basic thread of argument remained constant.  Condensed to its foremost 
constituent – namely, the posited evolution of a collective consciousness 
and the formulation of an ethic that could properly account for it – the 
contention elaborated in ‘The Ideal of the Future’ abided, to an uncanny 
extent, intact. 
 Naturally, The Problem of Reality was a much more ambitious 
work. In fact, it more or less represented the consummation of all of Bax’s 
main ideas – historical, philosophical, and political – up until the date of its 
publication. By its very nature, it was, to be sure, an abstract treatment. But 
Bax had dealt with many of those ideas elsewhere, during the course of the 
preceding ten years, in a series of more concrete interventions – the 
historical account that Bax wrote of the role played by Jean Paul Marat in 
the French revolution, for example, and his contributions to political theory 
and organisational design. In The Problem of Reality, he revisited two 
themes, in particular, at greater length or more methodically than before: 
the issue of scientism and the issue of determinism. Taking ‘The Ideal of the 
Future’ as a base, on the first of these themes, Bax brought much greater 
precision to his analysis, having discarded Spencer’s ‘almost’ dualistic 
epistemology, and situated himself between Hegel and Kant instead.851 On 
the second, he effected a complete rupture, creating considerable space for 
the role of the individual in history. For the subsequent reception of Bax as 
a thinker, both were ominous moves.  
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It is perfectly possible to read The Problem of Reality as a rejoinder to, and 
would-be alternative for, Engels’s text, Ludwig Feuerbach, which, as we 
heard earlier, contained a number of speech acts aimed in Bax’s direction. 
In that pamphlet, soon to become ‘a canonical source of Marxist 
philosophy’, Engels sought to establish what he portentously described 
there (conjoining the view of Marx with his own) as ‘our relation’ to 
classical German philosophy.852 It was a view that not only did not cohere, 
but actively conflicted with Bax’s. Putting his pronouncements on Kant, 
religion, the conditions of happiness, and chance in history temporarily to 
one side, the death warrant that Engels reissued there for ‘philosophy as 
such’ was perhaps bound to antagonise into action a Socialist so deeply 
steeped in, and appreciative of, both philosophy in general, and German 
idealism in particular.853  
In his autobiography Bax complained that ‘Engels showed a 
tendency to regard all other studies and departments of knowledge... as 
appendices of his own special department, i.e. Political Economy’; and in 
The Problem of Reality he wasted no time in signalling the inadequacy of 
Engels’s position: 
The following pages contain suggestions for a reconstruction of the 
Philosophical Problem and for its solution, taking it up at the point 
at which it was left by the classical philosophical schools of 
Germany. To designate the subject-matter of the Problem, I have 
sometimes used the word “Metaphysic” for the sake of convenience. 
It would be useless to be deterred from this by any fear lest the 
ordinary philistine should, at the mere use of the word, be thrown 
into convulsions. Of course, its bare mention will cause him to froth 
at the mouth with inept common-places as to the impossibility of 
any science other than that of “phenomena.” He will kindly 
enunciate for you a variety of unimpeachable propositions, all as 
true as they are trivial, which he considers crushing, and which 
would indeed be so, had they anything whatsoever to do with the 
point under discussion... Those who dislike the term “Metaphysic” 
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may call it “Theory of Knowledge,” but there is no point gained by 
doing so. It is open to anyone to allege want of interest in the 
Problem, but not to deny that the Problem obtains.854  
In short, philosophy, according to Bax, was not ‘an extinct 
science’.855 He refused to accept that it had been ‘expelled from nature and 
history’, and that its only remaining domain was ‘pure thought’.856 He 
proposed, instead, an alternative route out of classical German philosophy 
to that suggested by Engels and, as he understood it, Marx, which left many 
of the basic presuppositions of thinkers like Hegel and Kant intact, 
including the notion (also accepted by Marx the historical figure) that ‘there 
can be no real apprehension of the world without its alteration, no 
perception without action on the object perceived.’857  
In a tactical calculation, Bax combined the chiding remarks that he 
levelled at Engels – which often went to the core of the latter’s system of 
belief – with criticism of Comte. He did so in an effort to obfuscate and take 
the sting from his most vituperative utterances, like the one cited above. For 
example, as Terrell Carver noted, Engels’s ‘notion of metaphysics was 
unusual in that he defined it as particular philosophical position’ as 
opposed to the more conventional meaning that Bax attributed to it in the 
passage quoted.858 Thus, in this instance, Comte could take the heat as ‘the 
ordinary philistine’ at the same time as Engels was implicated for 
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committing roughly the same misdemeanours. For while Comte alone 
deployed the term ‘metaphysical’ as a catch-all pejorative, they were both 
equally committed to the scientism that underpinned Comte’s derisive use 
of the word.859  
Notwithstanding such subtle (or not so subtle) evasions, the Social 
Democrats of the Second International, now an organised force to be 
reckoned with in a number of European countries, could scarcely have 
failed to take the point that Bax was making. Four years before the so-called 
Revisionist Controversy got underway in Die Neue Zeit – inaugurated by 
Bax himself, and during which the terms ‘Marxist’ and ‘Marxism’ were 
‘officially consecrated’ – Bax offered an intellectual alternative to the theory 
proffered by Engels in Marx’s name.860 Well in advance of the similarly 
critical questions posed by Bernstein, a dissimilarly celebrated episode in 
the career of the tradition of thought that encompassed them both, Bax also 
attempted in The Problem of Reality to unsettle what had become some of 
the foremost components of the so-called ‘Marxist world outlook’ – above 
all, its positivism, its one-sided ‘materialist doctrine of history’, and its 
theory of economic collapse.861 For those who spoke the same incipient 
political language, his intentions can only have been transparent. Moreover, 
it was a timely intervention. On the one hand, it followed the Erfurt 
Programme, which embodied the ‘broad position advocated by Engels’, and, 
more particularly, his ideas about the collapse of capitalism, by just a single 
year; and, on the other, it was published alongside the first English edition 
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of Engels’s prodigiously influential text, Socialism: Utopian and 
Scientific.862 The latter translation, furthermore, included a new 
introduction by Engels; and in it he attacked Bax’s critique of ‘historical 
materialism’.  
In the new introduction Engels noted how in Britain, while ‘the 
word materialism grates upon the ears of the immense majority’, 
agnosticism, by contrast, ‘might be tolerated’; ‘though not yet considered 
‘the thing’ quite as much as the Church of England,’ it ‘is yet very nearly on 
a par’, he wrote, ‘as far as respectability goes, with Baptism, and decidedly 
ranks above the Salvation Army.’863 No doubt, to the uninitiated, in these 
remarks Engels would seem to have been invoking T. H. Huxley, the author 
of that newly minted word, and the other public moralists like him who had 
also embraced the position to which his neologism referred. In making that 
assumption, they would, besides, be partly right. Engels was attacking the 
growing number of middle class advocates of agnosticism in Britain.864 Yet 
Bax also described himself as an ‘agnostic’; and the substance of the 
criticism that followed was, in fact, very obviously levelled at him.865 Engels, 
to be sure, played fast and loose with the actual objections that Bax had 
made to what he described in an essay published the year before The 
Problem of Reality as ‘the cruder materialism’. But Engels’s complaints, 
some of which had already been set out in Ludwig Feuerbach, were no less 
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patently intended for Bax, who in the meantime had become a thorn in his 
side intellectually.866  
 Engels started by insisting that what passed for agnosticism was, in 
most cases, merely a ‘‘shamefaced’ materialism’, and he isolated three 
‘formal mental observations’ that ‘our agnostic’ makes before ‘he talks and 
acts as the rank materialist he at bottom is.’867 The first ‘formal mental 
observation’ that Engels identified was the refusal to rule out the possibility 
of ‘the existence of some Supreme Being beyond the known universe’; the 
second was the claim that sense perception was an unreliable guide to 
ascertaining the real character of the objects we perceive; and the third was 
the belief in Kant’s concept of the ‘thing-in-itself’, the existence, that is, of 
an unknowable, noumenal sphere wholly beyond the grasp of human 
sensation.868 Engels himself had little patience for these reservations. He 
viewed them as an elaborate time-wasting exercise. Thus, he wrapped up 
his brief rebuttal (-cum-elusion) of each with the following concluding 
remark: 
even if I was an agnostic, it is evident that I could not describe the 
conception of history sketched out in this little book as ‘historical 
agnosticism’. Religious people would laugh at me, agnostics would 
indignantly ask: Was I going to make fun of them?  And thus I hope 
even British respectability will not be overshocked if I use, in 
English as in so many other languages, the term ‘historical 
materialism’, to designate that view of the course of history which 
seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving power of all 
important historic events in the economic developments of society, 
in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the 
consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the 
struggle of those classes against one another.869 
 If Engels refused to accept the cogency of the three ‘formal mental 
observations’ that he set out, and poured scorn on the very notion of 
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accommodating any of those views to his theory, Bax was more indulgent. 
He subscribed to the first two reservations, had a complicated relationship 
to the third, and, as a consequence of the vantage-point he gained in 
striking those postures, rejected the theory of ‘historical materialism’ as it 
was presented by Engels. He was guilty, in short, of the nominally faux 
position-taking that Engels abhorred.  
For example, in the first instance, in his autobiography, Bax derided 
the ‘dogmatism’ of ‘the early and mid-Victorian man of education’ in 
matters of ‘the supernormal’; ‘however much we may regard the balance of 
probabilities as being against the affirmative side’, he wrote, peremptory 
pronouncements on either side of the question were ‘scientifically 
indefensible’.870 Secondly, in the suggestively titled essay, ‘The Practical 
Significance of Philosophy’, Bax warned against conflating ‘the “truth” of 
science’ with ‘Reality’.871 In opposition to Engels, he argued that, 
‘Philosophy shows the categories of science to be inadequate, as having the 
particularity of being or sense still cleaving to them.’872 And, finally, Bax 
conceded that to ‘treat the thing-in-itself as a thing existing and yet 
independent of all possible apprehension is… absurd.’873 However, unlike 
Engels’s facile dismissal of Kant, Bax handled the theory fairly, taking it, 
and Hegel’s relationship to it, as a starting-point for the discussion of his 
own metaphysic. To cap it all, as in ‘The Ideal of the Future’, Bax repudiated 
in ‘The Practical Significance of Philosophy’ the idealist-materialist 
dichotomy so insistently championed by Engels. Bax described it as a 
‘vulgar’ division.874 In the same essay, furthermore, he denounced Engels’s 
use of ‘the dialectical method without metaphysic’ as having ‘no basis and 
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therefore no justification as an instrument of research.’875 Hence, all things 
considered, it would be fair to say that he had, in short, earned a dressing-
down. Moreover, it was not just a question of intellectual pride. The 
practical bearing of the European Socialist movement was also at stake. 
 
Like Engels, Bax held that the dialectic was a ‘key’ with which to ‘unlock the 
innermost secret of every reality’ – not just ‘in anthropology’ and 
‘psychology’, as he had shown in the essays ‘Universal History’ and ‘The 
New Ethic’, but ‘in physics’ and ‘in biology’ too.876 On this, there was no 
dispute between them. For Bax, however, the dialectic could only be 
deduced by philosophy from ‘the primary synthesis of the consciousness’, 
or, in Kant’s words – which Bax used interchangeably with his own – from 
‘the unity of apperception’.877 The failure to acknowledge its source 
rendered ‘the dialectical method’ comparable, Bax wrote, to ‘a tree cut away 
from its roots’, namely barren and without a ‘locus standi’.878 Further, the 
‘difficulty of the ordinary man in getting rid of the absurd notion... that the 
“mind” merely apprehends a Reality subsisting in itself, independent, not 
only of his own mind but of Consciousness altogether’, also rested, he 
argued, upon the ‘inability to grasp the cardinal distinction’ between the “I” 
and its negation in ‘feeling’ in Kant’s theory.879 That is to say, the 
‘metaphysical problem’ was not of incidental significance. It was, rather, of 
considerable ‘practical importance’.880 For not only did it furnish the proper 
method by which reality could be known, it shed light, too, via further 
analysis of ‘the act of apprehension’, on the ultimate basis and telos of 
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human action, as well as the extent to which Law or Chance could be said to 
govern the course of human history.881 The practical ramifications of the 
first of these theoretical by-products – namely, the ontological upshot – 
enmeshed the ethical standpoint propounded by the Idealists. The 
consequences of the second, meanwhile, bore down, in the main, on the 
political strategy that Engels promoted, a strategy also endorsed by Second 
International Socialist leaders like Kautsky and Bebel.  
According to Bax, ‘Reality in its simplest and broadest expression’ 
implied ‘three elements’: 
(1) an “I” feeling, which constitutes the possibility of apprehending; 
(2) a “Feltness,” or the negation of this “I” as such, constituting the 
possibility of apprehendedness; and (3) the reciprocal 
determination or fixation of the “felt-ness” by that which feels and 
conversely. It is this third or formal element of reciprocal relation, 
which we term Thought, the category, the logical, and in it 
Consciousness is complete in its simplest aspect.882 
‘This primal synthesis’, he wrote, ‘alone constitutes reality.’883 To be sure, 
‘any man with any pretension to culture is a materialist’, Bax conceded – 
adding grist to the mill of Engels’s incredulous stance – but, he quickly 
added, that left ‘the metaphysical problem precisely where it was before, 
matter and motion themselves being simply general terms for sensation 
differentiated and synthesised by thought, and apprehended by the Ego.’884 
For Bax, the “I” of apperception could be legitimately ‘described as the 
Absolute’.885 Unlike ‘the other primary members of the synthesis’, it alone 
had ‘a noumenal value’.886 Neither matter nor mind, on this view, was 
‘ultimate’, ‘but alike’ owed ‘their reality to their apprehension or 
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apprehensibility, which, again,’ Bax wrote, ‘merely means that they are in 
the last sense the self-determinations or functions (objects) of an “I.”’887 
 Borrowing from the conceptual repertory established by Hartmann, 
Bax termed the second and third clauses in the act of apprehension – 
namely, the element of Feeling and the element of Thought – the alogical 
and the logical.888 The first was ‘through and through particular’, he 
explained, the other, owing to its mediatisation in language, ‘through and 
through universal.’889 It was precisely this second clause, Bax held – the 
alogical element – that Kant had expelled to the realm of the unknowable in 
the concept of the thing-in-itself. It was precisely that, too, that rendered 
Kant’s otherwise compelling theory of knowledge unsound. In opposition to 
Kant, Bax argued that, since ‘the word “Reality”... involves the notion of 
apprehensibility... a Reality that by its very nature, cannot become a content 
of Consciousness or be known, is a contradiction in terms.’890 Yet, if ‘the 
notion of the thing-in-itself, that is to say, a thing existing outside all 
possible consciousness,’ was ‘a manifest absurdity’, that did not mean that 
Hegel’s resolution of the problem was any more convincing; certainly, it 
was ‘scarcely more absurd than the reduction of reality to a mere logical 
process, a mere thinking and nothing more.’891 
 Taking up the ‘bold step’ taken in this regard by Hegel and his 
followers, Bax averred that, ‘though there may be no thing-in-itself, there is 
undoubtedly an in-itselfness in the thing, that is, in Reality.’892 ‘The clumsy 
objection of the man of “commonsense” and of the empirical psychologist, 
that out of Thought alone Thing can never be deduced, represents,’ he 
                                                          
887 Bax, ‘The Practical Significance of Philosophy’, pp. 188-189. 
888 Bax, The Problem of Reality, p. 22. 
889 Ibid.  
890 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
891 Ibid., p. 37. Bax, ‘The Practical Significance of Philosophy’, p. 182. 
892 Bax, The Problem of Reality, p. 37. 
226 
 
argued, ‘a hard fact against which pan-logism dashes itself in vain’.893 Bax 
advised against confounding ‘the great truth’ of transcendentalism – 
namely, the truth ‘that Consciousness... embraces the whole problem of 
existence, and that only by a confusion of thought do men suppose a 
problem outside of it’ – with ‘Hegel’s identification of the whole process 
with the Thought or concept-factor involved in it.’894 He continued: 
By what right do we dogmatically exclude the material elements in 
the synthesis... in favour of mere formal activity as Thought-
determination? Surely “common-sense” is vindicated when it 
protests against pan-logism, and avers that Relations without 
related elements – Relations “in vacuo” – are nonsense. To insist 
that the “I” as such, or in its self-negation as “Felt-ness,” is a mere 
determination of Thought, is an inversion of the conditions of the 
synthesis895  
As we have seen, ‘Thought’, according to Bax, was ‘the secondary or 
derivative principle in Reality’; it presupposed Feeling for its existence, 
without which there could be no ‘Particularity’, no ‘Contingency’, nor 
‘Impulse (Will)’.896 Simply stated, ‘Every real’, in Bax’s epistemology, 
contained ‘a non-rational as well as a rational element.’897 
 In his emphasis on the actuality of the non-rational, it is not difficult 
to see that Bax was influenced by Schopenhauer, and he declared his debt 
to the author of The World as Will and Representation accordingly several 
times over in the text.898 Far more important, however, than the means by 
which ‘the element of Reason’ had been ‘dethroned from the absolute 
position it was wont to occupy’ in the history of philosophy as Bax read it, 
and in his own reassessment of it in turn, was the ontological upshot of a 
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metaphysic that privileged Feeling instead.899 He formulated his position, 
in relation to Hegel, who wrought Reason-centric philosophy into ‘its most 
uncompromising and most developed shape’, as follows: ‘One might, pace 
Hegel, define the final term of the dialectical process as, not “Thought 
thinking itself,” but rather “Feeling feeling itself as determined by 
Thought.”’900 ‘On the theory of Panlogism,’ Bax wrote, ‘the highest form of 
the Individual Consciousness is Reason... But the fact remains, 
nevertheless, that the basis of Rationality in human action is always 
Feeling.’901  
Already, the implications should be clear enough for the ethical 
viewpoint propounded by Bax’s Idealist contemporaries, a viewpoint, that 
is, that put the principle of rationality on a pedestal. But Bax added a 
further blow to the theory in arguing that, ‘happiness, or pleasure’ was the 
‘end, the telos’ that Feeling sought.902 As before, he rejected the idea that 
‘the pursuit of pleasure is only an escape into the tyranny and monotony of 
passion and caprice’.903 Contrary to the arguments posited against 
Hedonism by Jones and other Idealists, Bax re-posited in The Problem of 
Reality the species of utilitarian ethics that he broached briefly in ‘The New 
Ethic’ and set out for the first time over ten years earlier in ‘The Ideal of the 
Future’. 
 In contrast to Jones’ position, the fact that Feeling ‘could not attain 
any fixity’ was of no concern to Bax.904 On the contrary, the pursuit of 
‘happiness or pleasure as abstract category’, Bax argued, could lead only to 
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‘ennui’.905 It was, rather, only as element of a constantly changing ‘concrete’ 
that happiness had any meaning.906 Like all other phenomena, it obeyed a 
dialectical logic. Certainly, Reason played its part in the process. But ‘The 
first term no less than the last is always Feeling. The difference between 
them is that, in the first case, the Feeling is indeterminate, in the last it is 
determinate.’907 It was precisely this, the mediating force of Reason, which 
enabled pleasure to ascend a scale of sophistication, to progressively 
exchange, in short, the lower for the higher. The ‘inevitable Dialectic of 
pleasure’ implied a ‘qualitative evolution’.908  
Granted, ‘the tendency’ hitherto ‘of social evolution’, Bax conceded, 
‘seems to be the tendency of misery to become less acute and more massive, 
less concentrated and more widely distributed.’909 That tendency did not, 
however, afford ‘any criterion’ as with regards to ‘future progress’.910 There 
was good reason to believe, rather, that the individual, previously the locus 
of all ethical theories, had run its course as a depository of pleasure and 
meaning. ‘In the pursuit of extra-personal ends’, Bax wrote, ‘there is an 
indication... that the Self-consciousness associated with an animal body is 
not the final form of Self-Consciousness.’911 Thus, he continued, taking up 
the line of speculative argument again that he advanced in 1881: 
May not the true significance of Ethics, of Duty, of the “Ought” of 
Conscience, the conviction that the telos of the individual lies 
outside of himself as such, consist in the fact that he is already 
tending towards absorption in a Consciousness which is his own 
indeed but yet not his own, that this limited Self-Consciousness of 
the animal body with the narrow range of its memory-synthesis is 
simply subservient and contributory to a completer, more 
determined Self-Consciousness of the Social Body as yet inchoate in 
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Time? If this be so, the craving of the mystic for union with the 
divine Consciousness in some transcendent sphere would be but the 
distorted expression of a truth perfectly consistent with the 
recognised lines of a scientific materialism.912 
 
At this point, two conclusions suggest themselves. Firstly, this conception of 
ethics, at once both teleological but not necessitarian, was incompatible 
with the morality of self-realisation. In formulating the idea of a constantly 
evolving dialectic of pleasure with the subordination or sacrifice of self to 
society as its end, Bax challenged the notion that Hedonism could ‘afford no 
universal law’, ‘no imperative’, and ‘no ideal’.913 Further, the relationship 
that Bax established between Feeling and Reason was also important for 
the role prescribed for the individual in the performance of moral action. In 
identifying ‘a Law-element and a Chance-element’ in every phenomenon, he 
downgraded it.914 ‘The moral “ought” only applies to the particular or a-
logical element in the action,’ Bax argued, ‘and it is the preponderance of 
this particular a-logical element over the necessitated and logical element in 
any personality that makes us respect a man as having “strength of will”’; 
for the rest, ‘character is the product of the circumstances of the individual 
and of those of his ancestors’, and ‘the individual may be said to be not 
“obnoxious” to praise or blame, since his action is determined.’915  
In this instance, Bax sought to stress the ‘Law-element’ over the 
‘Chance-element’ to counterbalance what he felt was the unrealistic 
compass ascribed to the agency of the individual by Idealists like Jones and 
Green. However, elsewhere in the book, Bax sought to do exactly the 
opposite, no less firmly stressing the ‘Chance-element’ at the expense of the 
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‘Law’. It takes no great effort of imagination to recognise that this put Bax 
on full collision course with Engels, who in Ludwig Feuerbach refused to 
acknowledge the role of chance in history.916  The second conclusion, 
moreover, trenches on similar ground. In Ludwig Feuerbach, Engels 
claimed that ‘happiness thrives for the most part on material means’.917 For 
Bax, however, as we have seen, it was realised in something akin to religious 
feeling. Furthermore, there was no contradiction, he insisted, between that 
impulse, distorted, for sure, at present, and a properly ‘scientific 
materialism’. That is to say, he made no effort to avert collision here with 
the patron of European Social Democracy, choosing instead a course of 
muted engagement.  
On the question of religion, Bax actually soft-pedalled in The 
Problem of Reality. It was an expedient move. For, in making it, Bax 
shielded himself from criticism at the point at which he was most 
vulnerable, the point, that is, where he could expect to elicit the least 
sympathy from his Social Democratic colleagues – most of whom were ill-
disposed to anything outside the range of straightforward empirical 
enquiry. He elected therefore, instead, to pursue Engels on other terrain 
staked out in Ludwig Feuerbach, taking up the question of determinism 
most overtly and consistently.  
Bax reacted, specifically, to Engels’s assertion that, ‘wherever 
accident superficially holds sway, it is always governed by inner laws and it 
is only a matter of discovering these laws.’918 He posited his response in two 
parts. Firstly, Bax dedicated an entire chapter to answering Engels’s claims 
about ‘inner general laws’, the notion of ‘accident’, ‘totality’, and other 
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phenomena as set out in the fourth section of Ludwig Feuerbach. Yet here, 
although Bax followed Engels closely, replying to his central argument 
point for point, he was still not completely candid about his real target of 
rebuke. He still used ‘Panlogism’ as cover. Bax’s concluding remarks, 
however, the second part of his response to Engels, were markedly less 
cautious. They were also more wide-ranging, or less strictly tailored to meet 
Engels’s claims as deposited in Ludwig Feuerbach directly. Although Bax 
continued to refer to Engels there along with his most subservient disciples 
euphemistically as ‘these worthy persons’, he drew out explicitly what he 
felt were the practical political consequences of adopting their determinist 
views.  
In the aforementioned chapter, Bax invoked at the outset the theory 
that ‘Chance’ was ‘only the name given to imperfect knowledge’.919 ‘I 
maintain,’ he wrote, ‘on the contrary, that no concrete event is reducible in 
its entirety to Law, but that on analysis it will invariably be found to contain 
an irresolvable Chance-element, which Thought in vain endeavours to force 
into the mould of the Category.’920 Chance and Law, on Bax’s view, 
corresponded to the second and third terms respectively of the primal 
synthesis of Reality, namely to the dynamic, alogical element of the 
synthesis and to its static, logical counterpart. On the one hand, ‘every event 
or fact’, Bax averred, ‘is conditioned in its actual happening by an infinitude 
of other events or facts, each of which is itself conditioned in the same way, 
and each of which might not have happened.’921 This was the Chance-
element, which took for its ‘hunting-grounds’ time and space.922 ‘Law’, on 
the other hand, ‘is valid,’ he insisted, ‘apart from all particulars of Time, 
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Space, and the sensible content of Time and Space.’923 ‘A true “Law”’, he 
went on, in conscious opposition to Engels, ‘defined’ something, it 
proclaimed ‘some event as impossible’; its mere probability did not make it 
a Law, only ‘an empirical generalisation’.924  
Having expelled accident and referred instead to ‘inner general laws’ 
that governed ‘the course of history’ – apparent already or merely awaiting 
‘discovery’ – Engels, Bax implied in his rejoinder-chapter, established, 
unknowingly, ‘an absolute prius in the order of time, a first event or 
complex of events uncaused or having the will of a Supreme Being for its 
cause, whence all subsequent events flow.’925 It was, ‘put plainly,’ he wrote, 
‘the notion of a machine being set going.’926 Bax poured scorn on the idea 
that ‘there is such a thing as the totality of events, and that every event as 
such is reducible to a final cause, a principle only hidden from us by our 
ignorance’; it ignored ‘the infinite vista of conditioning particulars’ that 
characterised the alogical side of Reality.927 To be sure, ‘the causal element, 
the Category, which proclaims that progress must necessarily be along 
certain lines and that the process itself cannot be determined by 
individuals,’ did obtain in history.928 Yet, it meant ‘merely that along such 
and such lines progress must move. Such and such, in general terms, must 
be the outcome of past and present conditions’.929 What it did not account 
for was ‘the when and where and the filling in of the picture’.930 ‘Historical 
progress’, Bax reiterated, could not be reduced simply to its logical side. It 
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was, rather, ‘like every other Reality... a synthesis of logical and a-logical, of 
universal and particular, of Law and Chance.’931 
In the concluding chapter of The Problem of Reality, Bax, at last, 
suggested openly that what had been said ‘as to the co-relativity of Chance 
and Law’ afforded ‘a key to the problem that puzzles so many worthy 
persons as to the compatibility of working for definite social or political 
ends with the belief that those ends are causally determined by economic 
and social conditions, independent of the action of any individual’.932 He 
had, he wrote, found the solution to the ‘dilemma upon the horns of which 
so many persons are impaled, and which leads them to think that if there be 
a law discernible in History, if human development follow a determinate 
course, irrespective of individuals, therefore we should hold our hands and 
repeat “kismet.”’933 Cleaving still to a Jacobin understanding of political 
transition, Bax was concerned, above all, to fell the authority of the theory 
of economic collapse promoted by Engels. Taking refuge once more in 
straw-men, he wrote: 
To our thinking, nothing can be more immoral, in the true sense of 
the word, as leading to apathy, indifference and imbecile 
contentment, than the doctrine of the “natural theologian,” who sees 
in the Time-process of the real world a puppet-show, determined by 
the precious divine wisdom of a deus ex maschina, and who thus 
leaves the actors therein without any raison d’être for action, other 
than that supplied by the dictates of pure self-interest. If “divine” 
wisdom were going to take the matter in hand at all, it could not 
surely require or expect the luckless individual to worry himself in 
clumsy endeavours to assist.934 
In contrast to Engels’s disregard for ‘the motives of particular individuals’, 
Bax insisted that the individual did, in reality, ‘very easily accelerate or 
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932 Ibid., pp. 157-158. 
933 Ibid., pp. 161-162. 
934 Ibid., p. 159. 
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retard indefinitely the course of progress... in spite of the fact that progress 
is in the last resort logically determined in its main outlines.’935  
Unlike Engels, Bax had no desire to dispel ‘great men’ from 
historical explanation.936 On the contrary, as we shall see in Chapter 11, Bax 
reserved a special place for ‘the convinced Socialist’ in the transition from 
class society to Socialism.937 At any rate, if any further evidence was needed 
to corroborate the analysis outlined above, Bax provided it in the account 
he gave of Engels’s theoretical accomplishments in his autobiography. ‘It is 
to the everlasting credit of Marx and Engels to have pointed out the 
importance of the material or economic basis of society in moulding and 
influencing that society’s life and destinies’, he wrote.938 
But what the Marxian school fails to recognize is that this one factor, 
important and even fundamental though it be, is not by itself 
necessarily the sole determining cause in social evolution. Moral, 
intellectual, and other non-material factors also play their part, and 
it may be quite as important a part, in determining the current of 
human affairs. In one age and under one set of circumstances, the 
economic factor may play the leading role; in another age and under 
another set of circumstances, a religious, moral, or political belief or 
conviction may occupy the leading place and economic conditions a 
comparatively secondary one. In one or two articles written quite at 
the end of his life and published after his death, Engels himself 
would seem to have to some extent recognized the inadequacy of 
what is regarded as the orthodox Marxist position. But Engels, as I 
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Liberalism Versus Socialism 
 
In 1886, the career and reputation of the advanced Radical politician, 
Charles Dilke, was shattered by his involvement in the notorious Crawford 
divorce case. In the fallout he was implicated as guilty of committing 
perjury. After several years spent fighting the charge, Dilke was cleared. He 
therefore attempted to resume his once promising political career again at 
the decade’s close. Thus, in the year 1890, the former Liberal cabinet 
minister, and potential successor to Gladstone as leader of the Liberal 
party, took up from more or less where he left off, issuing from July to 
November five articles in The New Review entitled, ‘A Radical 
Programme’.940  
The ‘Condition of the People’, Dilke wrote in the first instalment, ‘is 
the general description of the topics to which the electorate seem inclined to 
turn with some impatience.’941 In the same article, Dilke remarked upon the 
mutually-reinforcing intellectual and political shift which, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, had first been set on course during the 1870s and 1880s. Dilke 
argued that: 
There has been a great movement in these matters in our day. The 
opinions of advanced Radicals of twenty years ago in matters 
affecting property have, by the change of the times and the march of 
thought, come to be very much those now held by Lord Bramwell’s 
League for the Defence, as Lord Bramwell says, of Liberty and 
Property, and as others think, of Property alone.942  
                                                          
940 See Roy Jenkins, Sir Charles Dilke. A Victorian Tragedy (London, Collins, 
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941 Dilke, ‘A Radical Programme. Part I’, p. 2. 
942 Ibid., p. 13. 
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Gesturing openly at Bradlaugh, an opponent of State intervention, and the 
closest figure that Fawcett had to an heir, Dilke thus concluded: ‘Those who 
have stood still appear to have grown Conservative.’943 
Exaggeration apart, Dilke hit the nail on the head when he wrote in 
the second instalment that, ‘We can all remember the time in our youth 
when the doctrine of laissez faire seemed to comprise the whole of 
orthodox political economy; but now it reads like ancient history, and 
sounds as a dead doctrine in our ears.’944 Intellectually, that transformation 
could scarcely be better illustrated than by Alfred Marshall’s assumption of 
the chair of political economy at Cambridge left vacant following Fawcett’s 
death in 1884. Fortified by Mill’s late utterances, Marshall, unlike Fawcett, 
was receptive to Socialist ideas. He recorded his approval of Millian 
Socialism in his extraordinarily successful book, Principles of Economics, 
also published in 1890.945 At the same time, politically, however much 
Gladstone and other ‘old-time Liberals’ complained and sought to reverse 
the rising tide, if ‘the Liberal Party of 1880’ had not exactly ‘disappeared by 
1890’, it too had undergone serious reconstruction.946  
                                                          
943 Ibid. To be sure, Bradlaugh ‘repudiated the support of the LPDL’. But the 
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favourable to the workers than are the Liberals’, he wrote, ‘is the reverse of the 
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49, p. 459. 
944 Charles Dilke, ‘A Radical Programme. Part II’, The New Review, 3/15 (Aug. 
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Economics. A Review’, The New Review, 3/17 (1890), pp. 344-353. 
946 Lynd, England in the Eighteen Eighties, p. 226. See, for example, Edward Dicey, 
‘The Plea of a Malcontent Liberal’, The Fortnightly Review, 38/226 (Oct. 1885), pp. 
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Of course, as Fawcett foresaw, Dilke was partly responsible for that 
transformation. That much was also clear to Hyndman. Five years earlier, 
Hyndman had welcomed the ‘socialistic’ proposals embodied in The 
Radical Programme.947 By 1890, however, Dilke’s Radicalism was not just 
‘socialistic’. It was, rather, almost entirely of a piece with the Socialism of 
the Fabian Society.  
Following the events of ‘Bloody Sunday’, the demonstration against 
unemployment at home and coercion in Ireland that ended in violence in 
November 1887, the Fabian Society had successfully infiltrated the Liberal 
Party. It ‘permeated’ sections of it with its moderate, practical ideas.948 The 
consequence was not only the adoption of the Newcastle Programme at the 
annual conference of the National Liberal Federation in 1891. Radicals, like 
Dilke, also increasingly ceased to think of Radicalism and Socialism as 
antithetical.949 ‘It is possible to believe’, Dilke argued, echoing Webb’s 
contribution to Fabian Essays published the previous year, ‘that we are 
moving steadily towards a more socialistic state of society without on that 
account holding Socialist opinions.’950 Twelve years earlier this was a grave 
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prospect for his Radical colleague, Fawcett. For Dilke, however, the 
dawning era of ‘municipal Socialism’ that he anticipated in The New 
Review was by no means disagreeable. 
It goes without saying that, in this, Dilke was not unique. As Bax 
observed in an article published during the same month as Dilke’s series 
came to an end: ‘the general opinion seems to be that Liberalism, if its 
principles are thoroughly carried out, is not in any necessary conflict with 
Socialism.’951 By the late-1880s the New Liberalism – typically associated 
with L. T. Hobhouse and J. A. Hobson – had found its feet. Certainly, there 
was no shortage of pronouncements about the compatibility of Liberalism 
and Socialism from adherents of the former ideology.952 And the Fabian 
Society, with its innumerable Tracts and overt openness to ‘middle-class 
and professional men’, proved particularly attractive to Radicals like 
Hobhouse moving in an ever-more collectivist direction.953  
Before long, the question of Imperialism and the Fabian veneration 
of efficiency put an end to the honeymoon enjoyed by New Liberal and 
Fabian thinkers. But the Fabians had proven their mettle as practical social 
reformers through their involvement on the newly-established London 
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County Council, created in 1889.954 Thus, it was possible for Dilke to assert 
in 1890 that, 
The main difference between German and British Socialism is that, 
while German Socialism is professorial, or in other words a 
Socialism of theory British Socialism, so far as it has hitherto been at 
all successful in the mother country... is empirical, and deals, 
without any theory, with the facts of life as they present themselves. 
The English people know no rule but rule of thumb.955 
Needless to say, Bax had other, very different, ideas. This chapter deals with 
Bax’s relationship to these new phenomena: the New Liberalism and Fabian 
Socialism.  
 
Many of the Radicals who began to bridge the gap between Liberalism and 
Socialism in the 1880s were members of the National Liberal Club. 
Established with Gladstone’s assistance in 1882 to provide facilities for 
Liberals and Liberal sympathisers, Bax also joined the Club in 1889.956 In 
1887, the SL was captured by its anti-parliamentary, Anarchist-Communist 
faction. Bax therefore withdrew from the leading edge of the political fray. 
He chose to insert himself instead among the more comfortable and 
intellectually stimulating environs of 1 Whitehall Place and Middle 
Temple.957  
Among the academics, barristers, journalists, and politicians with 
whom Bax fraternized at the National Liberal Club, he renewed contact with 
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his Fabian counterparts and former co-participants in the Hampstead 
Historic Society, Sidney Webb and William Clarke.958 Bax spoke 
respectfully of Webb’s ‘superhuman industry…in public affairs’.959 But he 
was less impressed by Clarke, who later became a founding member of the 
Rainbow Circle.960 Unlike the so-called ‘Engels-Marx family grouping’, who 
formed the Bloomsbury Socialist Society in response to their loss of control 
in the League, Bax rejoined the SDF in 1888. However, he and Engels 
formed the same opinion of Fabian policy. Besides the unhappy conflation 
of form and content that he associated with Fabian Socialism, Bax argued 
that, to become the ‘last vertebra in the tail of the Liberal Party’, was no 
ambition at all.961  
Bax did not, in short, modify the revolutionary temper of his own 
brand of Socialism on account of his new surroundings. On the contrary, 
asked to deliver a lecture on the subject of Liberalism and Socialism at the 
National Liberal Club in 1890 he remained as uncompromising as ever in 
his political beliefs. In the published transcript of that lecture, suggestively 
entitled ‘Liberalism versus Socialism’, Bax therefore issued a rejoinder to 
the conclusions drawn by Webb ‘from the fact of the sporadic existence of 
public property in the present day as to the Socialistic tendencies of the 
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modern bourgeois world.’962 His real polemical sights, however, were set 
elsewhere.  
Instead of attempting to tap the Liberal tradition in an effort to pull 
its more susceptible advocates towards the Socialism of the SDF, Bax 
submitted to the audience a statement that amounted essentially to an 
ultimatum: 
The Liberal party has always claimed to be the party of progress, to 
be the exponent of the progressive lines of social and political 
development at a given epoch, and, as such, to be opposed to the 
party of reaction. This may be termed the negative side of Liberal 
theory, and so long as it maintains this attitude as the party in the 
vanguard of progress, it must necessarily become identical with 
Socialism – i.e., from the standpoint of Socialists. But here comes 
the crux. If Liberalism becomes identified with Socialism, it 
surrenders bodily all that has hitherto formed the positive side of its 
theory, and, indeed, what has hitherto given it the reason of its 
being.963 
Bax, in other words, invited the increasing number of New Liberals 
who had taken their cue from Green in pursuing the ‘same old cause of 
social good against class interests’ in alternative, seemingly conflictual 
ways, to become Socialists, rather than demand, more cannily, that the 
Liberals of the ‘Old’, static variety either alter their views to bring them into 
accordance with an altered environment or give up the title entirely.964 In 
presenting the relationship between Liberalism and Socialism in this way, 
as a zero-sum game, there was only a hair’s breadth between Bax’s analysis 
and Herbert Spencer’s, an equally uncompromising political actor, widely 
recognised by other contemporary Liberals as, likewise, unreasonably 
extreme.965 
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In 1884, Spencer published four articles in the February, April, May, June, 
and July editions of The Contemporary Review. They were collected and 
published together later that year as The Man versus the State. Soon after, 
Spencer’s text began its career as a manifesto for political individualists like 
those belonging to the LPDL, anxious to forestall any further advance of 
what Spencer termed there ‘The Coming Slavery’. Prompted by Percy 
Bunting, the editor of the Contemporary, to respond to Lord Salisbury’s 
intervention in the National Review on the question of workers’ housing, in 
those articles, Spencer resumed the onslaught against Liberal advocacy of 
State intervention begun by Fawcett in 1878.966  
Both Spencer and Bax treated Liberalism historically. Each assigned 
it a core value. In the absence of that core value it was no longer the same 
phenomenon, and should, therefore, be properly called by a more accurate 
name.  
For Spencer, ‘the liberty which a citizen’ enjoyed could be measured 
‘by the relative paucity of the restraints’ that ‘the governmental machinery 
he lives under... imposes on him’.967 In the past, ‘Liberalism habitually 
stood’, he explained, ‘for individual freedom versus State-coercion.’968 Yet, 
Liberals of the present, he argued, had ‘lost sight’ of that truth.969 Spencer 
thus concluded that, in consequence of the fact that a ‘popular good has 
come to be sought by Liberals, not as an end to be indirectly gained by 
relaxations of restraints, but as the end to be directly gained’, most of those 
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who now described themselves as Liberals were really no more than ‘Tories 
of a new type.’970  
 Give and take a, not unsubstantive, detail here and there, by 
substituting Socialism for Toryism, Bax was more or less of the same mind. 
Bax also believed that Liberalism ‘has up till now placed the freedom of the 
individual as the professed aim of all its measures’, and insofar as it ceased 
to continue to do so in the way that it had done historically – i.e. by 
negative means, as opposed to the positive action proposed by Green and 
others – it ceased, also, to be Liberal.971  
Crucially, Bax added, however, that what was actually ‘cared for was 
not so much the liberty of the individual as the liberty of private 
property.’972 Tracing a history of Liberalism ‘in a wider sense than that of 
mere current party politics’ not dissimilar from Spencer’s parallel effort, he 
gave his own genealogy of the phenomenon a twist derived from the work of 
Engels and Marx. Bax argued that ‘the Liberal party represented the 
struggle of the middle-classes with expiring feudalism and absolute 
monarchy.’973 Bax conceded that, ‘while Liberalism... was at first true to its 
principle... it was really fighting the battle of the individual.’974 Nonetheless, 
‘that security and freedom in the tenure of private property’ was ‘no longer 
synonymous with individual liberty, but often with its opposite’, was also 
obvious, he averred.975  
Bax argued that, 
Individual liberty now demands the curtailment and the eventual 
extinction of the liberty of private property, and that Liberalism, in 
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so far as it aims at maintaining the liberty of private property, is 
reactionary and false to the principle which it has always implicitly 
or explicitly maintained, of the right of each and every individual to 
full and free development.976 
Echoing the powerful humanist strain in the early Marx, ‘The individual 
now desired by the Socialist’, he concluded, ‘is the liberty of the individual 
as man, and no longer his liberty as mere property holder’.977 
 
Bax and Spencer agreed in their judgement of what Liberalism was. But Bax 
attacked Spencer for his defence of ‘the most flabby pretences of the 
Laissez-faire economy’ in the Handbook to the History of Philosophy.978 In 
contrast to his favourable estimation of Spencer’s other work, The 
Principles of Sociology already showed, Bax argued, a serious ‘falling off’.979 
It resulted ‘in an inadequacy of treatment verging at times on the 
puerile.’980 Thus, Spencer’s dogmatism in political economy, namely, his 
refusal to countenance any interference with freedom of contract, was only 
confirmed by his intervention in the Contemporary.  
In the second article Spencer singled out the DF as one of ‘the many 
concurrent causes which threaten continually to accelerate the 
transformation now going on.’981 Hyndman issued a reply to Spencer’s 
assault at the time.982 All the same, Bax laid down his own objections to 
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Spencer’s argument in the lecture he delivered in 1890.983 He objected, 
above all, to two points: to Spencer’s unflinching espousal, on the one hand, 
of negative liberty; and, on the other, to Spencer’s equation of all Socialism 
with slavery.984 
 Passing happily over both the ‘shady side’ of the Socialist ideal that 
Spencer illumined (as he had done before with Mill’s Chapters), and the 
moderate, or State-friendly, individualism championed by many 
mainstream Liberals, ‘The fact that individual liberty thus formulated [i.e. 
negatively] could be anything other than the only true individual liberty, 
never occurred’, Bax argued, ‘to the liberal individualist.’985 While the case 
for negative liberty held good, still ‘Up till the end of last century’, ‘the 
revolution in the production and distribution of wealth’ attendant upon the 
introduction of machinery had, he suggested, by the beginning of the 
nineteenth century ‘put an entirely new face on things.’986 Henceforth, 
liberty in its negative guise became ‘a purely abstract and formal’ kind of 
individualism.987 It ‘sacrificed the real freedom of the individual’ to a merely 
nominal species, a fact plainly recognised by ‘the Socialist, in 
contradistinction to the Liberal’.988  
Unlike Spencer, Bax did not believe in the necessity of ‘suffering’ 
and the permanence of the ostensible ‘misconduct’ from whence it 
flowed.989 As opposed to a vision of society that rewarded only ‘energetic’ 
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creatures, Bax, dwelling, in Spencer’s terms, on only the ‘promised 
pleasures’ and ‘thinking nothing of the accompanying pains’, looked 
forward, instead, to an era of ‘human individualism’ under Socialism, in 
contrast to the ‘class individualism’ of contemporary Liberalism, which 
encouraged the worst in human behaviour and kept the truly human, ‘social 
qualities’ in check.990 Disregarding Spencer’s warnings about ‘the tyranny of 
organisation’ and ‘the defects of existing human nature’, Bax concluded 
that, ‘liberty may be inseparable from property, but nowadays it is 
inseparable from the common holding of property by the community.’991 
 Moving on to Spencer’s second miscalculation, Bax flagged up ‘the 
nonsense talked about coercion under Socialism’.992 Bax asked, in rhetorical 
fashion, if anyone supposed for an instant that Socialism implied ‘any more 
coercion than what is absolutely necessitated by circumstances?’993 Bax 
distinguished between ‘the coercion of natural forces and of the economic 
conditions of a free competitive society’ on the one hand, ‘and that of 
Socialism’ on the other: ‘the one, he wrote, ‘is a blind, unregulated... 
capricious power left to assert itself to the full over the unlucky individual; 
while the other is a consciously exercised and regulated coercion whose aim 
is... to minimise the former to the utmost. The one means coercion 
untamed,’ he surmised, ‘the other coercion tamed.’994  
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Contrary to Spencer’s prognosis of a revival, ‘under a different form’, 
of ‘that regime of status’ which Liberalism had once helped society shed, 
Bax argued that, ‘The great thing that now oppresses men is, not the 
privilege of status, but the privilege of wealth.’995 And in opposition to 
Spencer’s claim that ‘All Socialism involves slavery’, Bax shot back that ‘the 
attainment of the maximum of formal liberty has produced a maximum of 
real slavery.’996 Not for Bax concerns that under collective ownership the 
‘individual would be a slave to the community as a whole’.997 It was ‘Free 
contract under a system of unrestricted individual property holding’ that 
had ‘strangled liberty.’998 However, Bax did not propose to leave to chance 
all provision against the potential tyranny of the majority. While no less 
dismissive of the reality of ‘political emancipation’ as the young Marx, Bax 
was far less ready to countenance disposing of the individual rights gained 
over centuries all at one go.  
 
Unlike the various ‘New’ Liberals, Spencer refused to believe in the viability 
of a mixed economy: it was a question of either/or, the phenomenon of 
‘political momentum’ permitting of no in-betweens.999 In accordance with 
the views of Bradlaugh and, slightly later, George, Spencer argued that the 
road to ‘a grinding tyranny like that of Ancient Peru’ was paved with the 
good intentions of those like Green, Toynbee and other current Liberal 
                                                          
995 Ibid., p. 86. 
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Cabinet Ministers who proposed the kind of apparently liberty-enhancing 
State interventionist policies that only, in fact, accelerated the advent of 
‘officialism’ and the downward spiral towards the condition of slavery he 
envisaged.1000 By contrast to Dilke, who echoed Hyndman in making the 
State and the people synonymous once all had the vote, to Spencer it 
mattered not one jot ‘the nature of the agency which interferes with 
them’.1001 The ‘real issue’ was ‘whether the lives of citizens’ were ‘more 
interfered with’ than they were before, a rule that held good for a despotic 
regime, where the degree of slavery might be heavy, as well as for ‘a 
popularly-chosen body’, where the degree of slavery might be light.1002  
Spencer, then, repudiated, in anticipation, almost all that Dilke said 
and stood for in 1890. But he and Dilke did, at least, share one conviction in 
common: the view, namely, that Liberals and Tories had begun to change 
places. In broaching that idea, Dilke did not intend to be taken literally. 
Spencer, on the other hand, did have a non-metaphorical meaning in mind 
when he raised the prospect of that eventuality.1003  
                                                          
1000 Will Socialism Benefit the English People? Verbatim Report of a Debate 
Between H. M. Hyndman and C. Bradlaugh (London, Freethought Publishing 
Company, 1884), p. 14. Henry George and H. M. Hyndman, The Single Tax Versus 
Social Democracy. Which Will Most Benefit the People? (London, Justice Printery, 
1889), p. 27. Spencer, The Man versus the State, p. 104. 
1001 ‘Formerly the State was looked upon by the masses of the people in the light of 
an aristocratic or of an autocratic abstraction,’ Dilke argued, ‘whereas now it daily 
comes to be more and more looked upon by the people as a synonym for 
themselves… The very phrase “paternal legislation” has become inapplicable to the 
State Socialism of Great Britain and her Colonies, for a democratic people now look 
upon the State not so much in the light of a father as in that of a servant of their 
will’. ‘A Radical Programme. Part II’, p. 159. Will socialism benefit the English 
people?, p. 16. Spencer, The Man versus the State, p. 76. 
1002 Ibid., p. 77. For Spencer it did not matter if the State was a popularly-chosen 
body, for ‘each member of the community as an individual would be a slave to the 
community as a whole.’ Ibid., p. 103. 
1003 ‘A new species of Tory may arise without disappearance of the original species’, 
Spencer explained. ‘Nevertheless,’ he continued, ‘ it is true that the laws made by 
Liberals are so greatly increasing the compulsions and restraints exercised over 
citizens, that among Conservatives who suffer from this aggressiveness there is 
growing up a tendency to resist it. Proof is furnished by the fact that the “Liberty 
and Property Defence League,” largely consisting of Conservatives has taken for its 
motto “Individualism versus Socialism.” So that if the present drift of things 
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Two years before the Liberal Unionist Party was formed in 
opposition to Gladstone in 1886, and George Goschen (whom Bax described 
as a mere ‘lump’ of ‘class-feeling’) accepted Lord Salisbury’s invitation to 
join his ministry as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Spencer called ‘the present 
drift of things’ on that front correctly.1004 The presence of the LPDL, with 
whom Spencer later collaborated, was only the thin end of the wedge: many 
of those who broke with Gladstone over the issue of Home Rule were no 
less concerned than Spencer about ‘the laws made by Liberals’, ‘so greatly 
increasing the compulsions and restraints exercised over citizens’.1005 
Perturbed, further, by another extension of the franchise in 1884, a large 
number of those who broke ranks with their former colleagues believed, like 
Webb, that Democracy and Socialism were natural bedfellows; to encourage 
the one, without installing beforehand the requisite ‘prophylactic’ devices, 
was to stimulate and promote the other.1006  
Bax, by contrast, was more sceptical. He believed, along with 
Hyndman, that, as things stood, the workers were ‘too ignorant, too 
apathetic, and too much split up among themselves’ to respond positively to 
                                                                                                                                                   
continues, it may by and by really happen that the Tories will be defenders of 
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‘the Cause of Socialism’.1007 The emergence of the New Unionism did 
nothing to alter his opinion on the matter, either. Bax was just as quietly 
contemptuous of trade unionism, both ‘old’ and ‘new’, as he was of the eight 
hour agitation, also supported by Dilke in his latest Radical programme. In 
a telling crossing of political paths, on his way back in to the SDF, Bax 
passed on the way out Burns, Champion, and Mann. All three held wholly 
positive views of both phenomena, as opposed to the ‘lofty detachment’ of 
the body to which they had until then belonged.1008  
Contrary to Engels’ belief that ‘the revival of the East End of 
London’ trumped in significance ‘the actual progress’ that Socialism had 
‘made in England generally’, Bax argued that successful revolutions were 
the work of energetic minorities. According to Bax, there was no reason to 
believe why Socialism would not be accomplished ‘in opposition to, or at 
least irrespective of, the inert mass constituting the numerical majority’ 
again.1009 ‘Mere class-instinct’ by itself could not, in any case, truly realise 
Socialism as Bax understood it.1010 Confounding Dilke’s dichotomy, Bax 
insisted on establishing a qualitative difference between  ‘Statification’ and 
Socialism of the right, ‘modern scientific’ kind, a difference borne precisely 
of theoretical speculation, rather than empirical observation or English 
‘rule of thumb’.1011 Unlike Engels, Bax did not detect lupine characteristics 
in the Socialism of the Fabian Society. But he did not hesitate either to 
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point out the serious shortcomings of the Fabian Socialists’ vision.1012 Thus, 
even if Liberals were prepared to drop the positive side of their theory, it 
would still not be enough, he argued in his National Liberal Club lecture, to 
















                                                          
1012 The ‘very people’, Engels argued, ‘who, from the ‘impartiality’ of their superior 
standpoint, preach to the workers a Socialism soaring high above their class 
interests and class struggles, and tending to reconcile in a higher humanity the 
interests of both the contending classes – these people are either neophytes, who 
have still to learn a great deal, or they are the worst enemies of the workers – 




The Morrow of the Revolution 
 
Fears about Democracy and Socialism did not abate in the wake of the 
failure of Mill’s prophesy made in the opening paragraphs of Chapters on 
Socialism to come to fruition in the immediate aftermath of issuing it in 
1869. The anxiety that the one, left unchecked, would ineluctably lead to the 
other intensified, rather, following the extension of the franchise again in 
1884. Despite the fact that the SDF had shown its true strength in its dismal 
electoral performance in the election of 1885, with Jack Williams and John 
Fielding picking up a mere 27 and 32 votes each, while John Burns scored 
only marginally better, taking only 5 percent of the votes in his Nottingham 
constituency, many commentators still anticipated the spread of Socialism 
as a direct consequence of ‘the electoral power’ now placed ‘within the reach 
of the working classes’.1013 Nor were these commentators all Individualists 
of the extreme variety, ready to find ‘the cloven foot of Socialism in every 
legislative restriction of individual liberty.’1014 On the contrary, while 
extreme Individualists were well-represented among the apprehensive, 
there were others, like George Brodrick, for example, not so much inclined 
to theatricality, who were also concerned about the ramifications of the 
extension of the voting system.  
 Posed explicitly in opposition to ‘the point of view adopted by’ the 
LPDL and ‘more or less sanctioned’ by Spencer, Brodrick argued in April 
1884 that, ‘however clear the germs of Socialism may be discerned in many 
                                                          
1013 Mill, Chapters, p. 223. For the SDF’s electoral performance see Crick, History 
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recent statutes passed under a democratic impulse, it would be difficult to 
specify one which is distinctively Socialistic’.1015 They ‘cannot properly be 
called Socialistic,’ he wrote, ‘inasmuch as they were not dictated by a desire 
to promote the Socialistic ideal of equality’.1016 Unlike Spencer and his 
epigones, Brodrick, in other words, did not dismiss as irrelevant the 
intentions embodied in the various measures passed in recent years. The 
bulk of Gladstone’s legislation had been occasioned, he held, ‘by a revulsion 
of the national conscience against the moral results of the laissez-faire 
system, left to operate uncontrolled’, and they need not necessarily assume 
a form ulterior to their strictly ameliorative design.1017 Nonetheless, it did 
not follow that, because most of ‘the Acts passed in recent years’ were free 
from the Socialism so often imputed to them, Democracy was ‘not 
Socialistic in its tendencies and aspirations’, all the same.1018 If Mill’s 
judgement had not yet worked itself out in practice, it remained, he 
affirmed, ‘a salutary warning’.1019 Brodrick reiterated that, ‘it would be very 
unsafe to imagine that working men, now admitted on equal terms into the 
governing class, and commanding a numerical majority of votes, will long 
abstain from using those votes for the purpose of furthering whatever 
objects they may have at heart.’1020 Something, therefore, would have to be 
done about the present contrast, nowhere ‘more appalling’, he claimed, 
‘between the lot of Dives and the lot of Lazarus’.1021  
 John Rae, whom Marx dismissed at the beginning of the 1880s as 
one of the ‘penmen of British philistinism’ and chief misinterpreters of his 
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work, was of a similar opinion.1022 In 1891, he argued that, ‘When supreme 
power is vested in a majority of the people, property cannot sit securely till 
it becomes so general a possession that a majority of the people has a stake 
in its defence.’1023 Like Brodrick, he, too, insisted on a more precise 
application of the word Socialism. It did not apply, he concurred, to ‘any 
fresh extension of the functions of the State’, but rather only to those with 
‘some false ideal of social or distributive justice’ as its conscious end.1024 
However, in contrast to Brodrick, Rae was also guarded about the notion 
that there was a ‘natural solidarity between democracy and socialism’.1025 In 
fact, the ‘natural tendency of democracy is not to socialism’, he claimed.1026 
Inserting a qualification, he distinguished between ‘two different forms of 
democracy’: ‘the American and the Continental’, and only the latter type 
had ‘a tendency only too natural towards’ the system that both he and 
Brodrick condemned.1027  
Taking a somewhat less reductionist stance than Brodrick, Rae 
isolated two factors that decided ‘the question whether political democracy 
must end in social’.1028 The first of these was ‘historical conditions’, the 
nature of ‘the national character’ that predisposed a people to behave a 
certain way.1029 The second, and ‘scarcely less important’, factor was 
‘whether the laws and economic situation of the country have conduced to a 
dispersion or to a concentration of property.’1030 Europe was vulnerable on 
both counts. Its stability, Rae therefore concluded, would ‘rest on the 
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number of its comfortable peasantry’.1031 The ‘dam of the Revolution’, he 
averred, would be ‘the small farm’, a fact ‘not less true of England’.1032 
 
That neither Bax nor Hyndman possessed a sophisticated understanding of 
the political mores of the groups in British society whom they hoped to lead 
is clearly evidenced by their consistent failure, with the exception of 
England for All, to properly account for the content of those traditions in 
their work of propaganda. That much is beyond dispute. But, at the same 
time, their combined appraisal of the danger posed to the status quo by the 
increasing electoral power invested in the workers was far more measured 
than that which Brodrick, Rae, and others advanced. For example, if 
Brodrick thought that Mill was right to forecast a delayed reaction, allowing 
time for ‘the new electors’ to learn first to ‘realise’, then ‘exercise their 
power’, Bax believed that ‘apathy’ would continue to provide the keynote 
for the majority in politics for at least the foreseeable future.1033 As opposed 
to nascent Socialist partisans, Bax saw only ‘human cabbage stalks’, lacking, 
for the most part, the will and sense of public duty demanded of change in a 
Socialist direction.1034 So ‘long as there is inequality of education’, he 
insisted, as well as other economic inequalities, ‘and the majority are at a 
disadvantage in respect of these things, they are necessarily incapable of 
weighing the issue before them.’1035 For Bax, then, Socialism posed at 
present no electoral risk because the majority, in the absence of sufficiently 
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tutored minds, were ‘at the mercy of every passing wind’ in terms of 
judgement formation.1036  
Bax set these views out in an essay entitled, ‘The Will of the 
Majority’. The main purpose of the essay was to argue that the will of the 
majority should on no account enjoy ‘an inviolable claim to respect’ as an 
axiom. That principle held true, not only for the present, but for a future 
‘society of equals’.1037 It was an essay self-consciously derivative of Mill’s 
writings, on both the question of liberty and on the forms of good 
government. In the first instance, much of what Bax wrote about will and 
education answered to Mill’s utterances on each of those subjects. However, 
he also endorsed Mill’s ‘one very simple principle’ concerning actions of a 
‘self-regarding’ kind as well as Mill’s recommendation that participation in 
public functions ‘should be as great as the general degree of improvement of 
the community will allow’.1038 
According to Bax, it was plain that, in consequence of the 
‘mechanical’ nature of electoral majorities, they could have ‘no claim on the 
recognition of the Socialist in the present day’.1039 Just as Mill refused to 
grant that ignorance should be ‘entitled to as much political power as 
knowledge’, Bax argued that the only will of the majority eligible for binding 
status on Socialists was ‘the will of the majority of the European Socialist 
party’.1040 Betraying none of Mill’s pronounced caution, however, Bax 
suggested that the ‘motto of the Socialist’ should simply ‘be the shortest way 
to the goal, be it through the votes of the majority or otherwise.’1041 Mill, to 
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1040 Mill, Representative Government, p. 336. Bax, ‘The Will of the Majority’, p. 
122. 
1041 Ibid., p. 128. 
257 
 
be sure, attributed importance to the weight of unusually wilful groups of 
individuals. ‘One person with a belief,’ he wrote, ‘is a social power equal to 
ninety-nine who have only interests.’1042 Yet he was also averse to anything 
as reckless as the proposition put forward by Bax that the end justified the 
means. Giving no thought to how the means might ‘modify, and thereby 
corrupt,’ the end in question, Bax offered the following thought-experiment 
as an example: 
supposing Social Democracy triumphant in Germany before other 
western countries were ripe for the change of their own initiative. It 
might then be a matter of life and death for Socialist Germany to 
forestall a military and economic isolation in the face of a 
reactionary European coalition by immediate action, especially 
against the stronghold of modern commercialism. Should such an 
invasion of the country take place, it would be the duty of every 
Socialist to do all in his power to assist the invaders to crush the will 
of the count-of-heads majority of the people of England, knowing 
that the real welfare of the latter lay therein, little as they might 
suspect it.1043 
 Although Mill would not on any measure countenance any such 
‘plunge’ into the unknown – indeed, actively opposing ‘those who would 
play’ such games on ‘the strength of their own private’ opinions – he would 
not have frowned so severely upon the ‘conditions’ that Bax established 
before a ‘verdict of the majority ought clearly to be binding on all’.1044 The 
prerequisites for this, according to Bax, were, firstly, ‘perfect economic and 
educational equality’, and, second, the maintenance of a ‘healthy interest in 
all questions affecting the commonwealth’.1045 Disregarding the adjective 
that Bax deployed in the first of those conditions, for Mill, too, the ‘first 
element of good government’ was ‘the virtue and intelligence of the human 
beings composing the community’.1046 Both he and Bax also recognised that 
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those qualities were not acquired easily. To some extent, at least, then, Bax, 
no less than Mill, was prepared to grapple with some of the more 
uncomfortable questions facing any future-system builder. His answers 
were not always ‘sharply authoritarian’ either.1047 Overlooked until now, 
side by side with Bax’s authoritarian proposals was a Liberal strain to which 
he was unequivocally indebted to Mill.  
 
In ‘The Will of the Majority’, Bax enunciated ‘one exception’ to majority 
verdicts arrived at even under circumstances ‘representing the highest 
practical reason of which human nature is capable up to date’:  ‘I refer’, he 
wrote, ‘to actions which Mill calls self-regarding, or those which in no way 
directly concern the society or corporate body.’1048 In ‘all really “self-
regarding actions,” that is, actions which directly affect the individual 
performing them alone,’ Bax wrote in article two years earlier, ‘complete 
freedom is of the very essence of Socialism.’1049  
That article was published in Justice in March 1891. By then, the SL 
had been absorbed by the Anarchists in the organisation. Branch by branch, 
it had continued the process of slow disintegration after Bax’s own breach 
with the group in 1888. Three years later, however, the Communist 
Anarchists, with whom Bax and the ‘Engels-Marx family grouping’ had 
initially quarrelled, had begun, in Thompson’s words, to be 
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‘outblustered’.1050 They were now the ‘moderates’ in an organisation 
increasingly ready to endorse acts of terror, or ‘propaganda of the deed’.1051 
Morris had thus been ejected from the editorship of the League newspaper 
Commonweal in May 1890, and six months later, he, too, finally vacated 
the League – not without taking with him, though, the 120-strong 
Hammersmith Branch, which soon after became the Hammersmith 
Socialist Society.1052  
Prior to the formation of the Independent Labour Party in 1893, the 
SDF was the only other Socialist organisation of size open to those now 
jumping ship, and Hyndman wrote to Morris accordingly, inviting him to 
contribute once more to Justice.1053 Bax’s article embodied a similar ploy. In 
recycling Mill’s injunction about the importance of ‘the play of individual 
initiative’, he was extending an olive branch to the ‘many good-hearted but 
weak-headed Socialists’ who had been ‘deceived’ by the ‘element of truth’ 
that Anarchism and Socialism shared in common, namely, that ‘the 
freedom of the individual, the non-coercion of the individual,’ was indeed 
‘an end to be striven for.’1054 
   Fully aware of, but impatient with, the differences dividing those 
who called themselves Anarchists, Bax resorted again to caricature, as he 
had done seven years before, by arguing that, as with the so-called 
Anarchist ‘view’ on violence, ‘the Anarchist’ travestied ‘the truth’ in 
individualism ‘by converting it into the holy dogma of the abstract freedom 
of the individual at all times and in all cases.’1055 Like the Liberal, in 
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1052 Ibid., pp. 559-579. 
1053 Hyndman, Record, p. 331. 
1054 Bax, ‘Individual Rights under Socialism’, p. 144. 
1055 Ibid., pp. 144, 145. On the question of violence, Bax asserted that, ‘The first 
element of truth in Anarchism is that force is as justifiable in the hands of 
260 
 
adopting that intransigent posture, ‘the aforesaid Anarchist’ championed 
only the ‘formal appearance of freedom’.1056 The Socialist, on the other 
hand, Bax contended, demanded ‘the greatest possible liberty (or license if 
you will) of the individual, limited only by the condition of its not infringing 
on the principle of equality of liberty.’1057 
 ‘We need scarcely say’, Bax reiterated, ‘that the notion that the 
maximum of Socialism corresponds to the minimum of individual liberty is 
as preposterous a travesty of any great principle as ever entered the 
perversest head of man.’1058 The ‘tendency of Socialism’ was, rather, he 
insisted, ‘toward the minimisation of coercion in every department, 
especially of direct coercion.’1059 Taking as an example the well-rehearsed 
concern ‘about the difficulty in a non-competitive society of dealing with the 
idle, dissolute &c.,’ the ‘problem correctly stated’, he averred, was ‘what not 
do with them. i.e. how best to cut them off pro hac vice from the advantages 
and even necessities of the social life against which they are sinning while 
leaving their formal freedom as individuals unimpaired.’1060 Those 
individuals would, in short, be allowed, Bax asserted, ‘to retain their 
individual autonomy’, however much society refused to cooperate with 
them in practical ways.1061  
Indeed, much of the illicit behaviour which was currently subject to 
the ‘positive coercion’ of the State would pass to the coercion of ‘public 
                                                                                                                                                   
revolution as of reaction, and that there is no inherent reason why it should not be 
successfully resorted to’; however, playing fast and loose with the subject of his 
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opinion’.1062 ‘Even though the private conduct of individuals might have an 
indirect bearing on the commonweal,’ Bax stated again, echoing Mill once 
more, ‘this would not justify direct interference’.1063 On the contrary, ‘any 
temporary inconvenience’, he wrote, ‘would be better than the infraction of 
the principle of the inviolability of the individual from coercive restraint 
within his own sphere.’1064 Curiously perhaps for someone so willing to act 
in the meantime in the nominal best interest of others, for Bax, this 
‘principle of limitation’ was sacrosanct.1065 It also gestured at a more 
realistic appraisal of the human capacity for conflict than his utterances on 
the notion of an unalienated, inherently ‘social’ man suggest. 
 
In replying to Hyndman’s letter, Morris declined the invitation to 
contribute again to Justice: ‘I want to pull myself together after what has 
been, to me at least, a defeat’, he wrote; ‘and I have got a lot of literary work 
on hand including two works more or less propagandist; to wit my News 
from Nowhere and the book that I have been working at with Bax which I 
am last going to tackle.’1066 The book that Morris mentioned was Socialism: 
Its Growth and Outcome. It was composed of articles that first appeared in 
Commonweal between 1886 and 1888, and published as a book in 1893.1067  
 Not surprisingly, given the libertarian bent in Morris, it too 
contained clear traces of Mill.1068 For example, Bax and Morris complied 
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there with the principle ‘to secure as much of the advantages of centralised 
power and intelligence, as can be had without turning into governmental 
channels too great a proportion of the general activity’ that Mill laid down 
in On Liberty, namely ‘the greatest dissemination of power consistent with 
efficiency; but the greatest possible centralisation of information, and 
diffusion of it from the centre.’1069 In a chapter entitled ‘Socialism 
Triumphant’, Bax and Morris envisaged a twofold basis by which ‘the 
administration of things’ would be accomplished ‘during the transitional 
period’.1070 Firstly, they conceived of ‘the township as the lowest unit’ of 
administration, while, industrially, the ‘trade or occupation’ would be 
organised, similarly, along ‘the lines of a craft-guild’.1071 ‘On the other hand’, 
they wrote,  
the highest unit would be the great council of the socialised world, 
and between these would be federations of localities arranged for 
convenience of administration. The great federal organising power, 
whatever form it took, would have the function of the 
administration of production in its higher sense. It would have to 
see to, for instance, the collection and distribution of all information 
as to the wants of populations and the possibilities of supplying 
them, leaving all details to the subordinate bodies, local and 
industrial.1072 
 Although Bax and Morris insisted that the work had been ‘in the 
true sense of the word a collaboration,’ at least one discrepancy between 
the book and Bax’s own independent writing is discernible.1073 Morris, 
unlike Bax, romanticised the so-called Teutonic village community. He 
regarded it as a model for Socialist administration.1074 But Bax was far more 
circumspect than his collaborator about the feasibility – or the desirability 
                                                                                                                                                   
‘William Morris and Anti-Parliamentarism’. And Fiona McCarthy’s observations 
are, likewise, typically sound in William Morris. A Life for Our Time (London, 
Faber and Faber, 1994). 
1069 Mill, On Liberty, p. 113. 
1070 Morris and Bax, Socialism, p. 290. 
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1072 Ibid. 
1073 Ibid., p. vi. 
1074 Morris outlines his vision in Chapters 11-14 of News from Nowhere. 
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even – of direct democracy. Whether or not Bax actually accepted the 
argument at the time, or simply sued for peace is another question, but he 
soon backtracked from the joint endorsement of direct democracy and the 
principle of delegation that they posited together in Socialism in 1893.1075  
Following Engels’s analysis, Bax accepted the notion that the State, 
as an organ of class rule, would eventually ‘wither away’.1076 In the absence 
of an exploited class to forcibly suppress, it would succumb in due course to 
the ‘administration of things’.1077 But in the meantime Bax gave 
considerable attention to the question of what kind of democracy was best 
suited to a transitional Socialist regime. The problem of ‘who’ ruled was 
obviously crucial. But the oft-neglected companion-problem ‘how’ it should 
be done was also important to Bax.1078 He did not think, assuredly, that the 
Paris Commune held the solution; a position on which Bax clearly differed 
again with Engels, who regarded the Commune as a template for the 
‘Dictatorship of the Proletariat’.1079 
 
In an essay entitled ‘The Morrow of the Revolution’ Bax wrote that, 
‘Socialists are often asked the question, what would you do if you found 
yourselves with power in your hands tomorrow?’1080 The question was ‘not 
an unreasonable one’, he continued, conceding, in so saying, the merit of 
                                                          
1075 Bax and Morris, Socialism, p. 292. The latter principle, it is worth pointing out 
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Bradlaugh’s incredulous question, ‘Dare you try to organise society without 
discussing details?’1081 According to Bax, it was a question ‘that Socialists 
should discuss before the day finds them unprepared.’1082 The obstetric 
metaphor could only take ‘scientific’ Socialists so far.  
Bax observed that in ‘Paris eighteen years ago the problem had to be 
faced in a practical manner’.1083 And while it was true that the leaders of 
Paris ‘performed the ordinary executive functions of an administration 
admirably’, confuting ‘those who affect to laugh at the notion of men 
unacquainted with official red-tape being put into responsible positions’, 
the experiment was not, overall, a success.1084 The problem of Socialist 
transition had not, in short, been resolved by this episode in history. 
Rather, ‘the leaders of Paris were in utter confusion as to its solution.’1085 In 
that essay, Bax confined his own proposals to two distinct spheres: to ‘the 
purely economic action’ of an organised Socialist administration on the one 
hand, and to its ‘legislative and juridical’ supplement on the other.1086 The 
question of democracy he tackled elsewhere.  
The ‘usual reply’, Bax opined, ‘to the question referred to in 
opening’, namely ‘that we intend to nationalise or communise the means of 
production and distribution’, was unduly evasive.1087 While ‘strictly and 
literally correct’, it performed very little, real expository work.1088 All well 
and good to explain further that ‘we mean to take over the big industries, 
railways, factories, banks... and to proceed by the erection of communal or 
municipal workshops and stores on a large scale to undermine by 
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competition the individualist-capitalist production and distribution’, but 
‘immediate steps of an ad interim character’ would also have to be 
taken.1089  
Descending scarcely to the level of detail expected by Bradlaugh, 
Bax proposed three courses of action: the implementation, firstly, of an 
eight-hour working-day or less; the enactment, secondly, of a law of a 
maximum and minimum; and the abrogation, thirdly, ‘of “civil” law, 
especially that largest department of it which is concerned with the 
enforcement of contract and the recovery of debt.’1090 For the rest, ‘until the 
economic change has worked itself out in ethical change,’ he added, ‘it is 
clear that a criminal law must exist.’1091 Bax, therefore, recommended the 
suspension of existing criminal law and its replacement with ‘the Code 
Napoleon’ in countries where it did not obtain. A ‘committee of urgency’ 
would also be appointed to bring it into accordance ‘with the new Socialist 
conceptions.’1092 
 
In 1976, Norberto Bobbio complained of how it had become ‘almost de 
rigueur for a Marxist concerned with political theory to hark back to the 
Commune and cite it as a source of inspiration and insight’. But when Bax 
offered his less than commendatory musings on the subject in 1889, that 
aspect of the nascent intellectual tradition had not yet been set.1093 Unlike 
most later thinkers associated with the same tradition, Bax did not believe 
that the relationship between democracy and Socialism was, so to speak, 
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automatic. Nor did he fetishize its direct variety. Rather, Bax recognised 
that, as Bobbio sparingly put it, ‘democracy is difficult’. 1094 
 To be sure, Bax embraced the notion that a time would come ‘when 
the social organism in all its parts’ would ‘work automatically’.1095 ‘But until 
that time does come,’ he confessed, ‘authority in direction will in many 
departments be necessary.’1096 First of all, Bax argued that ‘the initiative or 
referendum of a democracy cannot be taken on details of executive 
administration’.1097 In fact, that principle was no less true, he went on, of 
‘any matter requiring immediate decision, or on a question of tactics, or 
(with good results) on questions involving special knowledge, in short, on 
anything other than general issues.’1098 True democracy, he argued, ‘while it 
means all for the people, does not mean the impossible absurdity that 
everything should be directly regulated by the people, i.e., by a direct 
popular vote.’1099 
 Bax restated the notion that ‘the will of the majority in itself is by no 
means absolutely so worthy of all acceptance as some assume.’1100 In a 
genuinely ‘free society of equals’, he wrote, ‘the will of the majority must be 
the ultimate court of appeal, not because it is an ideally perfect one, but 
because’ simply it is ‘the best available’.1101 Showing no sign of devaluing the 
role of intellectual elites, Bax found it hard to conceive of a time when 
opinion would ever attain a state of real equality, one opinion counting for 
as much as another. It must, at any rate, be admitted, he insisted, that ‘in 
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affairs of management, of tactics, of administration, or in decisions 
requiring special knowledge, authority’ would be necessary for some time 
before the order of routine eventually prevailed.1102  For example, ‘In the 
case of a revolutionary army, military or political, on board ship, or in the 
factory, the workshop, etc., there must be a controlling, an authoritative 
voice in direction’.1103 That much, at least, was clear ‘to all practical or 
reasonable persons’.1104 ‘The real point to determine’, then, according to 
Bax, was only ‘the nature and limits of that amount of dictatorial power’.1105 
 Bax described ‘a Scylla and Charybdis to be avoided’.1106 ‘The first’, 
he explained, ‘is the idolisation of the mere control of numbers – the 
tendency to regard the mere forms of democracy as of equal or even greater 
importance than the democratic end in view’.1107 While the second, 
meanwhile, lay ‘in allowing dictatorial powers, without appeal, to be in the 
hands of any one man’.1108 An ‘unqualified and unconditional repudiation’ 
of the latter by no means had to involve ‘throwing oneself into the arms’ of 
the former, he counselled.1109 Rather, a third possibility of steering a course 
between them was also obviously available. A ‘Socialist society in its earliest 
stages’ shared the organisational needs of a political party.1110 What was 
wanted in leadership for the latter was ‘the direction of a small scale 
committee of, say, three competent and trusted delegates, to render an 
account of their stewardship, and be re-elected (or rejected) after serving 
for a term’.1111 Notwithstanding the actual details, which he withheld, the 
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same held true in ‘all matters of administration, direction, and 
organisation, political, social, industrial,’ Bax asserted, for ‘the Social-
Democratic society of the future’ in its infancy.1112 
 Bax did not disavow, then, representative democracy as a form of 
good government. However much of a sham its extant application appeared 
to him, it was both preferable to, and more practical than, the principle of 
‘the count-of-heads majority of a popular assembly or unwieldy 
committee.’1113 The ‘right of recall at any time’ that Engels set so much store 
by in his introduction to The Civil War in France was put to one side in 
favour of the above-mentioned small elected committees, free to serve for a 
term unhindered before being re-elected or rejected once that term had 
elapsed.1114 As shown by his faith in the European Socialist party to wield 
responsibly the maxim ‘the end justifies the means’, the potential for power 
to corrupt did not weigh heavily on Bax’s mind when enunciating his 
stripped down notion of representation, however vague his attempt was to 
execute that task. Bax’s advocacy of the ‘harm principle’ was, perhaps, 
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In his autobiography, Havelock Ellis described Bax as ‘a daring adventurer 
in theoretical fields’.1115 Of that there can surely be little dispute. No more 
controversial, one might assume, was the claim of Bernstein that Bax was 
‘one of those English intellectuals who, early in the eighties, first restored to 
Socialism… its civil rights in the world of letters’.1116 In the light of the 
foregoing pages, both remarks seem beyond doubt. Yet, as has been shown 
in this thesis, Bax has rarely been granted the attention that that 
contribution to the history of British Socialism plainly merits. Still now, 
Morris is judged ‘the only theorist of originality and stature whose work has 
significant affinities with Marx’.1117 Concomitantly, Bax is dismissed, fifty 
years on from the work of the Marxist historians broached at the outset, for 
his ‘overly academic manner and often idiosyncratic views’.1118 
 Not surprisingly, Hyndman‘s standing has not much improved in 
the meantime, either. In his account of Marx’s relationship to British 
Socialism in the nineteenth century, David Leopold made similarly short 
shrift of him too. There, many of the old stock-misconceptions – 
Hyndman’s ‘conservatism’, ‘enthusiasm for empire’ etc – are uncritically 
recycled once more.1119 Certainly, Bax’s opinion that in ‘Hyndman we have 
one of the most remarkable figures of the twentieth century’ has not yet 
been echoed in the historical profession.1120 Nor, however, has Bax’s more 
                                                          
1115 Havelock Ellis, My Life (London and Toronto, William Heinemann Ltd, 1939), 
p. 156. 
1116 Bernstein, My Life in Exile, p. 200. 
1117 David Leopold, ‘Karl Marx and British Socialism’, in W. J. Mandler (ed.), The 
Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2014), p. 416. 
1118 Ibid., p. 415. 
1119 Ibid., pp. 415-416. 
1120 Ernest Belfort Bax, ‘The Evolution of Revolution’, Justice (3 Feb. 1921), p. 3. 
270 
 
convincing utterance: that he found ‘it difficult to envisage the… Socialist 
movement’ without him.1121 But, as we have seen, Hyndman was a pivotal 
figure, both far more complex intellectually than historians have given him 
credit for and a crucial force in getting the Socialist movement off the 
ground in Britain during the 1880s. 
 In short, if ever a new referent were needed for Thompson’s phrase, 
‘the enormous condescension of posterity’, together, Hyndman and Bax 
provide it.1122 To upend that phrase and turn it against its author is of 
course something of a paradox. But the historical assumptions of 
Thompson and his peers have engendered the need for a rescue mission 
comparable to that which Thompson sought to accomplish for ‘the poor 
stockinger’, ‘the Luddite cropper’ and so forth1123. As was shown in the 
introduction, the fact that most of the pioneering studies trenching on the 
ground compassed in this thesis emanated from historians who also 
inhabited the intellectual tradition that Bax and Hyndman cleaved to has 
meant, in practice, that properly dispassionate appraisals of their 
interaction with Marx’s work and their respective contributions to the 
remaking of British Socialism have been few and far between.  
 
It is certainly true to say that Bevir has done something to counteract that 
historiographical defect. His portrait of Bax is, on the whole, a step forward. 
But Bevir advances as history what is in fact, properly speaking, a series of 
rationally reconstructed intellectual profiles. And as we have also seen in 
the introduction, his use of aggregate concepts has often done far more to 
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shroud and confuse our understanding of the past than to elucidate it – his 
use of the term ‘Marxist’ providing a case in point. What is more, Bevir’s 
reconstruction of Hyndman’s ideas strikes a singularly discordant note with 
the analysis presented here, serving to buttress, rather than challenge, the 
politically-charged assessments inherited from Thompson and others. 
Thus, if Bevir moved the historiography forward with Bax, with Hyndman 
he set it into reverse. 
 However, what Bevir missed, above all, in The Making of British 
Socialism was the centrality of Mill to the story he was attempting to tell. In 
the section entitled ‘The Marxists’ Mill is not mentioned once. Yet, as we 
have seen in Chapters 2, 3, and 11, the influence that Mill exercised on the 
two figures most responsible for propagating a species of Marx’s ideas was 
far-reaching. Whether that was Mill’s Chapters on Socialism that loomed so 
large in Hyndman’s imagination in 1881, his Representative Government 
that gave substance to Hyndman’s view of the British empire and of 
political reform, or the use that Bax made in turn of the same text and On 
Liberty, Bevir’s omission is a glaring error. Moreover, other errors abound 
in Bevir’s text.  
For example, the imprecision of the claim that ‘British socialism 
emerged largely in response to… the collapse of classical economics and the 
crisis of faith’ is also a serious flaw.1124 It elides, firstly, all that is specific 
about the process of Socialism’s remaking – in particular, the formative 
discussion of the topic which took place in the periodical press between 
1878 and 1880, discussed in Chapter 2. While, secondly, it does little justice 
to the more general reasons as to why Socialism emerged when it did – the 
conduciveness of the ‘culture of altruism’ that intellectuals like Bax 
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inhabited, the unravelling of co-operation as a viable going concern, 
experiments in municipalisation and other recent instances of State 
intervention, the onset of democracy, and the emergence of monopolies and 
global economic competition. 
 The failure, meanwhile, to acknowledge Mill and the debate in the 
periodical press, combined with Bevir’s general inattention to detail, has 
meant that other crucial sources of influence have likewise gone 
undetected. In Hyndman’s case, Mazzini, Fawcett, Morley, and Toynbee all 
go unobserved. For Bax, Spencer is the most significant figure that Bevir 
failed to notice. This thesis, by contrast, has sought to shed as much light as 
possible on those sometimes less than obvious connections. It has also 
sought to restore the numerous dialogues in which the writings of Bax and 
Hyndman were enmeshed. That has meant going far beyond their 
interaction with the work of Marx and Engels. But here, too, as we have 
seen, their texts – most obviously, those of Bax and Engels – were also in 
conversation.   
 
What has emerged from the research set out in this thesis is that, put in the 
simplest of terms, Hyndman, firstly, was not the Tory Radical of historical 
repute, and Bax, secondly, was one of the most serious internal critics of 
‘Marxism’ of his generation, who did battle with Engels in print. Both 
findings will be news to other historians. But it is only in the light of them 
that the dispositions for which Hyndman has been routinely condemned 
become explicable: Hyndman’s gradualism, the top-down nature of his 
Socialism, and his mistrust of Trade Unions, for example; all were vestiges 
of the waning influence of Mill, Morley, and Fawcett, Liberals to a piece. At 
the same time, once it is recognised just how prominently Bax appeared in 
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Engels’s political imagination it becomes much harder to continue to turn a 
deaf ear to his ‘idiosyncratic views’.  
 In many respects, in his criticism of Marx and Engels, Bax was in 
fact well ahead of the curve. The same, indeed, could even be said of 
Hyndman until roughly 1882.1125 Moreover, the distinctiveness of their 
respective convictions owed a disproportionate debt to native sources, 
above all, to Mill, the Idealists, and the indigenous Comtists. With the 
exception of the Idealists, it was these sources, similarly, which initially set 
Socialism going. By the middle of the 1880s the Comtists may have been a 
spent force. But in the preceding decade their stance on the Paris Commune 
and their rejection of Malthus and political economy made the Positivist 
body an obvious conduit for Bax.1126 The role of Mill’s Chapters, on the 
other hand, needs no further comment.  
 Without doubt, the encounters with German sources of those 
intellectuals involved in the remaking of Socialism who had spent time in 
Germany were also important. The leading Kathedersozialisten were not 
only familiar to Pearson. More significantly, they were familiar to 
Cunningham too. Bax, likewise, showed no inhibition in 1879 in invoking 
Dühring and Lange. For the latter, at least, Marx, properly speaking, came 
later, and later still, came Engels’s interpretation of Marx. The same 
ordering holds true of Hyndman’s relationship to Marx’s work. The two 
main subjects of this thesis may have taken different exits at the fork in the 
road after Marx’s death, with Hyndman following Engels in notably 
uncomplicated fashion. But prior to 1883 they both saw Marx, first and 
foremost, as a political economist. 
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 Only later, as we have seen, did Engels succeed in imposing his 
interpretation of Marx on the protagonists of ‘scientific Socialism’ in 
Britain. That very term, along with the twin-concepts ‘historical 
materialism’ and the ‘materialist dialectic’, not to mention the Marx-Darwin 
analogy and the mythic joint-identity, were accretions. They first made an 
appearance in Hyndman’s book, The Historical Basis. Thereafter, it was the 
‘second fiddle’, and no longer the first, that counted. Thus, out went appeals 
to justice and reform of the representative state and in came ethical 
relativism and ‘the administration of things’. Bax, of course, had never 
made recourse to an abstract notion of justice. Nor had he seriously 
envisaged anything other than a revolutionary overturn of the bourgeois 
State. He did, however, issue a critique of ‘Marxism’, which continued to 
resound across the twentieth century. 
 
As we have seen in Chapters 4, 10, and 11, when it came to his appreciation 
of power Bax did not show himself in the best light. He failed to attend to 
the warnings that a ruling class could also exist under Socialism.1127 He was 
not on particularly firm ground either in his analysis of competition. In 
contrast to Engels, Bax showed no inclination to credit the price mechanism 
as an efficacious instrument of economic co-ordination.1128 Planning, 
rather, was simply presumed unproblematic. On these matters, Mill was 
unquestionably the most perspicacious advocate of Socialism during the 
period of its remaking. But, on other questions, Bax was less short-sighted. 
He was canny enough, for example, to isolate some of the most obvious 
shortcomings of ‘Marxism’ that other critics internal to that tradition 
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returned to repeatedly down to the point of its disintegration as a serious 
intellectual force in the 1980s.1129 
  Spurred on by the upturn of interest in Kant during the early 1880s, 
Bax, first of all, poured scorn on the idealist-materialist dichotomy. For 
him, as was demonstrated in Chapter 9, it was a false and dangerous 
division that effectively sanctioned passivity. To circumvent the ‘crude and 
dogmatic materialism’ of Marx and Engels, Bax constructed the theory of 
contingency also laid out in Chapter 9.1130 Starting from the philosophical 
premise that Reality comprised a synthesis of Feeling and Thought, he 
emphasised the role of the individual and human activity in history. Finally, 
Bax rejected Engels’s ‘unanimist depiction of democracy’ too.1131 To endorse 
the kind of direct democracy enacted during the Commune was, he held, a 
mistake. At a time when few other Socialists gave it a second thought, Bax 
also insisted on the retention of individual rights under Socialism. 
There is no shortage of thinkers with whom Bax could be paired on 
these issues. But what is undoubtedly most interesting here is the extent to 
which his New Left detractors also adopted these views. First of all, 
Thompson famously argued that the individual is ‘partly an agent in 
history’; ‘men’, he wrote, ‘do not only “reflect” experience passively; they 
also think about that experience; and their thinking affects the way they 
act.’1132 Thompson also endorsed the rule of law as ‘an unqualified human 
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good’.1133 Other members of the New Left, meanwhile, subjected the concept 
of ‘historical materialism’ to even closer scrutiny. Stedman Jones, for 
instance, explored the poverty of the philosophical materialism promoted 
by Engels via the work of Georg Lukács; and Anderson, likewise, drew 
extensively on the same Western Marxist tradition.1134 However, none of 
these authors upgraded Bax in their estimation as a result. Morris, rather, 
continued to elicit the sympathy of the New Left, in both its First and 
Second incarnations. 
But for the pronounced political bias of the Communist Party 
Historians Group and its First New Left progeny in the 1950s, and the 
decidedly abstract, universalist frame of the generation of conceptually 
ambitious historians who inherited the New Left mantle in the 1960s, Bax 
and Hyndman would no doubt have had a much fairer showing in the 
historiography of British Socialism. In the event, omission in the first case 
and parody in the second reigned. The parallels that existed between them 
have been documented here because they belong essentially to the same 
continuous history. Respectively, they mark the beginning and the end of 
the intellectual tradition invented by Engels during the 1880s. In the same 
degree as it is no longer possible to take the existence of ‘Marxism’ for 
granted at the outset of the 1880s, it is no longer desirable to continue to 
take cues from historians also in the Marxist tradition. This thesis has 
sought to storm the last bastions of Engelsian prejudice.  
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